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Editors’ Introduction

It is with great pleasure that I write my very ﬁrst Editor’s Introduction.
Before I share some initial impressions about the journal more generally, and then
reﬂect on this edition speciﬁcally, I wish to pay my respects to the former Editor-inChief, Christian Gudehus, who, for eight years, guided the journal to where it is
today. Christian’s decisions across those many years have meant that the journal’s
reputation remains as one of the foremost scholarly publications on genocide and
its prevention. Under his guidance the journal opened itself to other forms of voice
and today includes not only traditional scholarship but submissions such as
dossiers, interviews, essays, roundtables and, more recently, the Arts and
Literature section, all of which I believe provides the journal, and our community,
eclecticism of insight and opinion.
Alongside this evolution, and with the help of the journal’s cohort of editors,
Christian implemented several pragmatic initiatives that sit behind the scenes and
are crucial to the running of the journal. These range from reﬁning templates and
the compilation of a reviewer’s list (as examples), to using software that helps the
board in its communication. I add this praise as I am not sure how I might have
coped as a newcomer to the journal had these incentives not been in place. I am
very grateful to all on the board who helped in the adoption of these ideas, and to
Christian for realizing the need to constantly develop and reﬁne their
implementation.
In sum, Christian leaves an indelible and signiﬁcant legacy, and the journal has
beneﬁted much from his guidance.
And here I am, six months into the role and I have already learned much. For one,
and as mentioned a short while back in an IAGS newsletter, I am surprised by the
breadth and width of scholarship the journal receives, and the eclectic types of
voice from those who ﬁnd the topic of genocide and its prevention a scholarly
interest. I am also pleased to realize that the journal receives a wide array of
scholarship and over the past six months I’ve read articles whose topics stretch the
globe, and in equal balance from both the established and the newcomer. I believe
this speaks well of the future of our community and, so too, the journal and the
reach of its appeal as a repository of ideas on a difﬁcult topic.
In this very ﬁrst edition that I have been privileged to learn from, guest edited by
our colleagues Emily Sample and Henry Theriault, we come to a difﬁcult and
pressing issue. Under their guidance, this edition offers an array of submissions on
the subject of environmental degradation and genocide, a topical and worrying
concern that is also being addressed in an upcoming edition of Holocaust Studies
and was the subject of a special edition of the Journal of Genocide Research in 2021. I
think this alignment speaks to our fears as a group of people who, all too well,
understand the risks associated with climate change and environmental damage.
As Martin Crook and Damien Short pointedly highlight in their introduction to
their 2021 edition, “[t]he preponderance of evidence demonstrates emphatically
that unless the global community and political and diplomatic elites involved in
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climate governance, change course dramatically and wean us off fossil fuels,
ecological catastrophe awaits us.”1
Having read the articles submitted under Emily’s and Henry’s guidance, I have
been left thinking about the dire situation we ﬁnd ourselves in, and not just from
an ecological point of view, but existentially. Working in this ﬁeld as we do, as
scholars (from many backgrounds) that ponder the human condition in relation to
the worst forms of criminality we can inﬂict on ourselves, I suppose none of what
is being reported in these articles should come as a shock. Reading each of the
submissions on their own merit reveals some aspects of the troubles we ﬁnd
ourselves in. As a collective, however, the ideas and discussions act as a warning,
highlighting our inadequacies as a species. Either we cannot comprehend the
impending doom, or we do understand yet have an inbuilt societal stasis that, for
whatever reason, leaves us very (very) gradually making changes that might help
us avoid a calamitous outcome. It is indeed worrying. And yes, ecological
catastrophe seems to await.
A core argument that these discussions highlight, as noted in Nancy Rosoff’s
exegesis of Brooklyn Museum’s display titled “Climate in Crisis: Environmental
Change in the Indigenous Americas,” is that for far too long (and I write this as an
Australian who recognizes my own nation’s many failures in this regard), we have
ﬂagrantly and arrogantly ignored Indigenous ways of caring for the world,
privileging a Western-centered lifestyle that emphasizes ownership, exploitation,
privatization, and so the list goes on. One message I took from reading this
collection is a need for an orientation away from Western “values,” to an alignment
with Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies. We need, at the very least, to be
aware of those populations, and their ways of living, who have been warning the
world for generations about the harm being inﬂicted, and who have been
purposefully ignored.
A few years ago, I was teaching a course on Australian literature and the book-ofthe-week was by Kim Scott, a Noongar man from Western Australia. Called That
Deadman Dance (2010),2 the book, in part, describes the spiritual relationship the
Noongar people have with nature. The book resonated and I subsequently went in
search of other authors to better understand this relationship. I found a poignant
and important description from an American-born ethnographer called Deborah
Bird Rose, who came to Australia to study indigenous relations to ecology. This is
the description:
Country in Aboriginal English is not only a
common noun but also a proper noun. People talk
about country in the same way that they would
talk about a person: they speak to country, sing to
country, visit country, worry about country, feel
sorry for country, and long for country. People say
that country knows, hears, smells, takes notice,
takes care, is sorry or happy. Country is not a
generalised or undifferentiated type of place, such
as one might indicate with terms like ‘spending a
day in the country’ or ‘going up the country.’

1

Martin Crook and Damien Short, “Introduction,” Journal of Genocide Research 23, no. 2 (2021), 155.

2

Kim Scott, That Deadman Dance (Sydney: Picador, 2013).
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Rather, country is a living entity with a yesterday,
today and tomorrow, with a consciousness, and a
will toward life. Because of this richness, country
is home, and peace; nourishment for body, mind,
and spirit; heart’s ease.3
As I reﬂect on the articles submitted as part of this edition, I cannot help pondering
this idea of Country versus country, and how so much of what might befall us due
to climate change and the degradation of the environment might (possibly) have
been avoided (or be avoided) had we a better understanding of this relationship.
Or had we been open to other ways of thinking and being that are different to
those that have been imbibed socially and culturally within many of us for far too
long. Even in this age of “green technology,” as Regina Paulose shows us, we still
seem to ignore these crucial voices. Let us hope that editions such as the one
compiled here show us, as a community and a population more generally, that we
are slowly working towards realization and a hopeful recovery, keeping in the
forefront of our social conscience the importance of the adoption of something akin
to Country.
With that, I leave you to read and reﬂect.
Kirril Shields
Editor-in-Chief, GSP

The editorial team of GSP welcomes this special edition that has been guest edited
by Emily Sample and Henry Theriault. As outlined in their editorial, the
conversations at the core of these papers represent a growing corpus of work that
speaks to the risks, including genocide, associated with humanitarian crises caused
by climate change and the environment's demise. We hope readers take as much
from these diverse voices as did our editorial board, and we hope the collection
acts as a springboard to much needed discussion and deliberation, and action, that
aims to minimise the risks of genocide and human rights violations that may come
from climate change.
Jeff Bachman
Daniel Bultmann
Sabah Carrim
Laura C. Collins
JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz
Shannon Fyfe
Douglas Irving-Erickson
Salpi Kevorkian
Roland Moerland
Kirril Shields
Fiza Lee Winter
The Editorial Board, GSP

3

Deborah Bird Rose, Nourishing Terrains: Australian Aboriginal Views of Landscape and Wilderness (Sydney:
Australian Heritage Commission, 1996), 7.
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Introduction
In January 2021, IAGS and GSP hosted three panels on Environmental Degradation, Climate
Change, and Mass Violence.1 Each one showcased a specific intersection within this nexus:
Indigenous issues, gender, and ecocide. This special issue emerges from this series of panels
as a means for many of those speakers to explore their cases and arguments in greater depth,
and for a broader audience. The focus of these panels was to not only highlight the emerging
research on these pressing issues, but gauge interest for this particular nexus.
These panels each drew dozens of participants from across the world, signaling to us
that we had tapped a vein of unexplored interest. Indeed, for as many scholars and
practitioners identify as part of the genocide studies field, and for as well established as the
field of environmental studies is, there are surprisingly few who have so far integrated the
two. While this is changing, as evidenced by this special issue, it is still safe to say that this is
still an emerging topic. As the effects of anthropogenic climate change become more accepted,
evident, and widespread, many fields of conflict research and practice, including our own,
must shift to include this new reality.
This special issue offers an opportunity to invite additional scholars into the
discussion which began through the three panels, and to disseminate research or a yet wider
set of issues. The diversity of topics and approaches in the following pages, as well as the
insightfulness and relevance of each article, provide a broad foundation and set of models for
subsequent scholarship in this overarching area. The pressing need for sustained focus and
discourse on the challenge of climate change for human rights and peace make the ideas and
cases presented here of immediate concern to all scholars of genocide and, indeed, all human
beings.
The Conflict-Climate Nexus
The study of environmental conflict emerged as the Cold War came to a close as the next big
security issue. Environmental conflict studies have spawned three decades of continuously
branching studies. Thomas Homer-Dixon helped introduce and institutionalize the narrative
of the environment as a security threat, arguing that degradation and resulting scarcity of
resources would lead to a two-fold response: elites hoarding resources and mass migration
from ecologically depleted zones, and that the resulting pressures would culminate in
“simple-scarcity conflicts,” “group-identity conflicts,” or “insurgency against the state.” His
arguments have been chiefly received as neo-Malthusian, where overpopulation is the main
cause of environmental degradation. As such, he has garnered major criticism about over
universalization of his theory, as well as his narrow focus on countries with high birthrates.
The climate change securitization field emerged from these studies and, for a variety
of reasons, remains the dominant narrative on climate change and conflict. Military and
defense institutions were some of the first to raise the alarm on the effects of what was then
called global warming, albeit in classified documents. The anticipated effects of climate
change, they realized, had implications for hundreds of seaside and island military bases,
global distribution of troops, and the future of strategic aid. Following this line of analysis,
many scholars (often funded by military institutions) focused on the national security aspects
of climate change and conflict, with a specific focus on migration and border security. This
research advocates for mitigating climate change and preventing conflict to ensure people
can stay in their current homes and communities, though not necessarily for humanitarian

1

Panels are accessible online at https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLyIgA4_0g_IJd2aYmxvBLdWxQ63MqwrO2.

Emily Sample and Henry Theriault. “Guest Editorial: Environmental Degradation and Genocide.” Genocide Studies and
Prevention 16, no. 1, 4–10. https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.16.1.1911.
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purposes. Many argue that this narrative frames climate change mitigation as valuable only
inasmuch as it protects the interests of the so-called Global North.
The majority of climate change-conﬂict research has continued in this trajectory by
studying resource scarcity as a driver of conﬂict. The role of climate change is now being
investigated in both past and current conﬂict case studies across the globe. Environmental
security research spans from the traditional research on agricultural and subsistence societies to
climate change’s role in myriad intersecting issues, including migration, water security, and
land distribution.
Due to the long-term nature of climate change, most studies focus on patterns of one or
more of the climate change indicators, like rainfall, temperature, or agricultural yield, while
others focus on the effects of natural disasters, or “climate shocks.” Despite numerous
quantitative studies, analysis has not consistently shown a direct correlation between these
indicators and conﬂict. Joshua Busby asserted that “variability…rather than scarcity per se, was
more likely to be damaging to citizens because it would upend planning and agriculture,
making it harder for people to sustain livelihoods in the event of unexpected negative
surprises.”2 As such, studies have sought to home in on the environment as a “threat
multiplier” by exploring environmental conﬂict within the context of state infrastructure, social
inequality, poverty, food insecurity, or a history of environmental conﬂict.
It is valuable to note that the majority of studies on climate change and conﬂict focus on
countries and regions in Africa, followed by Asia, despite the majority of climate changeinducing gasses and pollution coming from the United States, Europe, and, more recently, India
and China. This is due in part to the “streetlight effect,”3 and has signiﬁcant ethical implications
for how conﬂict analysts should understand the wealth of studies devoted to speciﬁc countries
and regions. Cullen Hendrix4 and Courtland Adams et al.5 argued that former British colonies,
speciﬁcally in Africa, are currently over-represented in the climate change-conﬂict nexus
research due to more open policies towards foreign researchers, broader English-language
ﬂuency, and availability of large-N conﬂict data.
There is a growing movement for scholarship that does not examine climate change and
conﬂict as a security threat to Western countries. This branch of the ﬁeld dovetails with the
climate justice ﬁeld, which highlights the need for Indigenous leadership, equal participation of
women, and, most importantly, for the perpetrators of climate violence to be brought to
international and domestic justice. In this vein, Jürgen Zimmerer called for “sustainable
prevention as the route to changing the fundamental conditions under which violence blossoms
and to lasting effect.”6
As evidenced by the key presentations of the panel on “Environmental Degradation,
Climate Change, and Genocide: Intersections with Indigenous Issues,” within many of the
states that are major contributors to global climate change, governmental polices at the
national, regional, and local levels, as well as corporate and majority group nongovernmental activities still allowed or sanctioned by governmental authorities, often result
in significant impacts of environmental degradation on Indigenous communities and
territories, and represent intentional or negligent continuations of the genocidal destruction
against these Indigenous groups perpetrated in earlier periods through other means,
2

Joshua Busby, “The Field of Climate and Security: A Scan of the Literature,” Social Science Research Council, April 2019,
6.

3

The streetlight effect is the tendency for researchers to focus on particular questions, cases, and variables for reasons of
convenience or data availability rather than broader relevance, policy import, or construct validity. See Cullen S.
Hendrix, “The Streetlight Effect in Climate Change Research on Africa,” Global Environmental Change 43 (March
2017), 137, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.01.009.

4

Ibid.

5

Courtland Adams et al., “Sampling Bias in Climate–Conﬂict Research,” Nature Climate Change 8, no. 3 (March 2018),
200–203, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0068-2.

6

Jürgen Zimmerer, “Beyond Gaddaﬁ: Sustainable Prevention in the Face of Environmental Injustice,” Journal of Genocide
Research 13, no. 1–2 (June 2011), vii, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2011.580556.
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including direct murder, forced starvation, exterminatory deportation, cultural suppression
and destruction, and societal and familial fragmentation. Attention to the genocidal role of
environmental degradation in past exo-colonialism and settler colonialism, and present
oppression of and violence against Indigenous peoples across the world, must be central to
the burgeoning study of environmental degradation and genocide.
The Relationship between Climate Change and Genocide
In many ways, the identity-based conﬂict lens on environmental conﬂict is a logical extension of
the ﬁeld. Despite this, between the three major journals in Genocide Studies, there are
surprisingly few articles published on this topic. Jürgen Zimmerer edited a special issue of the
International Journal of Human Rights on climate change, environmental violence, and genocide
in 2014 and, more recently in 2021, the Journal of Genocide Research published a special issue as
well, highlighting the Genocide-Ecocide Nexus.
One of the reasons for this dearth of research is due in part to the inherent complexity
and politicking of climate change. In order to acknowledge the need to prevent climate
change-induced conflict, one must (1) acknowledge that climate change is happening, (2)
recognize the full seriousness of the fact that it will get worse, and (3) go beyond performative
reiterations that something can be done about it. Assuming this, there are different ways
through which to understand the relationship between the effects of climate change and
genocide.
The ﬁrst intersection is as a casual factor. After a climate shock, such as a ﬂood, drought,
ﬁre, or other major weather event, there may be competition or hoarding of limited key
resources, such as food, water, or energy. In this circumstance, one group may commit genocide
against another to reduce resource needs by “weeding out” the targeted population. Argued in
depth by Alex Alvarez, climate change “will certainly create conditions and mind-sets
conducive to the development of intergroup hostility, tension, and violent conﬂict.”7 As people
are placed in settings of insecurity and unpredictable access to the food, water, and energy
resources necessary for their lives and the lives of their families, they may be more susceptible
or open to a “ﬁrst strike” action out of weaponized fear of their own starvation.
The second intersection between climate change and genocide is as method of
commission of genocide. Historical examples of the use of environmental degradation
abound, including the destruction of food and water sources. Whereas, in the past, a typical
technique was to force targeted populations into harsh environments such as deserts as
means of causing their deaths, in today’s world environments ill-suited for human existence
are spreading to areas that previously comfortably supported human life. Governmental
policies and corporate practices have a significant and often determining role in (1) whether
such environmental degradation will occur at all and (2) where it will occur. As has been clear
over the past quarter century, these environmental impacts are intentionally focused on areas
of Indigenous and other racially, ethnically, etc., vulnerable groups, and have thus become
means of their destruction. Whether grand “development” projects by their own governments
and the effects of widespread environmental exploitation and harm practiced deliberately by
transnational corporations, or more localized, the differential impact on vulnerable
populations is central to how environmental destruction, including climate change is
practiced today.
The third intersection reverses this relationship, recognizing the harm and change
caused to the environment and climate due to genocidal actions. In addition to the localized
harm mass, untreated human remains can cause damage to an area’s agricultural and water
sanitation, there can be massive increases in greenhouse gas emissions due to bombings and
resulting fires, as well as the intentional destruction of energy supply lines during a genocidal
attack.

7

Alex Alvarez, Unstable Ground: Climate Change, Conﬂict, and Genocide (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishers, 2017).
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Overview of the Edition
Mark Levene is one of the ﬁrst scholars to place anthropogenic climate change within the
context of genocide prevention. Over a decade later, his article continues this conversation
through an analysis of Holocaust narratives and iconography in the messaging to prevent
climate change. Climate activists have used the Holocaust, and the emotional response its
mention elicits, to spur public action on environmental issues. At the convergence of “never
again” and “before it’s too late,” Levene posits that invoking the world’s empathetic response
(or lack thereof) to the Holocaust does not best serve the needs of those desperately trying to get
the attention of the leadership of the Global North. Instead, there are other key aspects of
Holocaust history and process that could be used as a guide and warning for the inevitable rise
in environmental migrants and refugees. Digging below the surface of the obvious parallels,
Levene argues that the value of utilizing the Holocaust in environmental rhetoric is in
demanding responsibility from those in power to act instead of react: “speaking through the
people, and for the people, demands ‘never again’ will we allow ourselves to be bystanders as
the hubris of the economically and politically powerful take us hurtling towards planetary
nemesis.”8 Levene’s thought-provoking exposition critiques the public understanding of the
Holocaust paradigm and how it should—or should not—be used in grassroots environmental
organizing.
Emily Sample argues a similar tack with her analysis of resource scarcity within the
genocide continuum. Her article builds the case that the Holocaust, from Hitler’s obsession with
Lebensraum to mass killings on the Eastern front, is intimately intertwined with the fear of and
protection against food insecurity, and that policy and military decisions were made with this in
mind. Acknowledging the Holocaust case as the archetype against which genocide early
warning and prevention policy is crafted, this article adds food, water, and energy resource
scarcity—or the credible threat thereof—to the list of mass atrocity early warning signs. As such,
Sample argues for the inclusion of the effects of climate change in future genocide prevention
policy and analysis, due to the myriad of ways in which climate change can create, multiply,
and intensify both resource scarcity and resource insecurity.
Marisa Ensor applies a “gendered lens” to the environmental aspects of mass violence
in South Sudan. While the gendered nature of mass violence in Sudan has been well-discussed,
as sexualized violence against women and girls especially has been an area of great attention in
considerations of this case, the gendered nature of the impacts of environmental dimensions has
not. It is this gap Ensor strives to ﬁll.
Ensor calls attention to the “gender-differentiated” impact of various mechanisms of
mass violence. For example, displacements from areas of environmental degradation increase
the vulnerability of women and girls to sexualized violence, while food shortages
disproportionately affect this population.
Ensor calls for support to victims to follow gender demographics in order to provide a
counterbalance to the differential targeting of women and girls. A key element of Ensor’s work
is focused on the agency of South Sudanese women, who have persisted in making their voices
heard in discussions of how to address mass violence in South Sudan.
Rachel Killean and Lauren Dempster respond to a notable lack of attention in the ﬁeld
of transitional justice to environmental concerns, speciﬁcally the use of environmental
destruction in perpetration of mass violence and environmental degradation as a product of
mass violence, as well as the desirability of “green” reparative schemes. Were they only to
expand the notion “transitional justice” to recognize as essential to it the environmental
dimension of mass violence, the article would represent a major step forward for the ﬁeld. But
the authors intentionally invert the typical framework, as they highlight the ways in which a
truly inclusive understanding of “the environment” and its relationship to mass destruction of

8

Mark Levene, “The Holocaust Paradigm as Paradoxical Imperative in the Century of Anthropogenic Omnicide,”
Genocide Studies and Prevention 16, no. 1, 94, https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.16.1.1886.
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human beings and other elements of the world require rethinking some of the fundamental
assumptions of transitional justice itself as a liberal, anthropocentric concept.
Along with this productive theoretical disruption, the authors offer a comprehensive
overview of speciﬁc manifestations of the full set of environmental dimensions of mass violence
and its aftermath, from the role of resource competition and exploitation in fomenting conﬂict,
and the use of environmental destruction as a tool of genocide, to the devastating
environmental effects of mass violence (itself ranging from the destruction of animal and
vegetable life, to extensive land mining) and the ways it can hinder post-conﬂict recovery. The
novelty of the authors’ attention to the direct and indirect devastating effects of mass violence
that correspond to core concerns of the environmental movement, such as biodiversity and
poaching, reveal just how neglected these aspects of environmental harm are in discussions of
mass violence.
Killean and Dempster locate a central challenge to mainstream Northern/Western
transitional justice and legal frameworks more generally in the denial of status to non-human
entities in various Indigenous traditions that take a more holistic view of the human position in
the world and recognize non-human biological and non-biological components of the world as
being vulnerable to harm and having a status akin to human beings. While this viewpoint has
been present in ethical discourse for decades, the foundations of European-based legal theory
exclude such a possibility. As the authors point out, in the latter framework, harm to “the
environment” is generally considered of concern only insofar as damaging it harms human
beings.
Killean and Dempster offer a compact yet far-reaching and highly insightful rehearsal
of various “limitations and blind spots” of transitional justice theory and practice that alone
offers much to any reader interested in this area of study and activity. They explain the
implications of these gaps for the environmental aspects of mass violence. Given the embedded
liberal, capitalist, and North/West-centric views characteristic of transitional justice models and
practices, the authors call for a move to “transformative justice,” by which socio-economic,
legal, and political structures are transformed toward less oppressive, liberatory forms driven
by Indigenous concepts appropriate to a given case and context. It is through this centering of
Indigenous thought and values, and decentering of the liberal state, that alternative approaches
to the environment emerge. As the authors point out, a transitional process that reinforces
liberal capitalism leaves intact powerful mechanisms of environmental degradation. When the
non-human environment is accorded ethical status, indeed, transformative processes can go
beyond shifting from one set of human beings controlling areas of the world to another, to
become reparative processes for the non-human natural world itself.
Regina Paulose’s contribution to the special issue is a major intervention in genocide
studies, Indigenous studies, and environmental studies. The view that environmentalist
agendas and practices are favorable to and even consistent with Indigenous environment
stewardship and values is uncritically accepted pervasively in environmentalist circles. Paulose
shows that, on the contrary, much of “green technology,” which attempts to generate “clean”
energy, that is, energy that produces zero carbon emissions (through, for example, hydropower,
wind power, and solar power) not only violates but eliminates Traditional Ecological
Knowledge of Indigenous and ethnic minority peoples around the world and thereby functions
genocidally against these groups. Paulose uses the case of the Sami People, Indigenous nomads
in Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia, as an illustration of the genocidal impact of “green
technology,” while also raising awareness of an Indigenous group that is not well-represented
in the genocide and human rights studies literatures.
An important point made in the paper is that, while the environmental degradation
caused by “green technology” projects, including making large amounts of their traditional
territories uninhabitable for the Sami and unﬁt for the reindeer herding that is not simply their
main means of subsistence but a foundational element of their cultural and social existence, has
a genocidal impact, the pressures and policies adopted to gain control of land and coerce Sami
acquiescence to projects are themselves extensions of genocidal campaigns of forced
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assimilation. Far from being a rehearsal of the passive victimization of the Sami, Paulose cites a
key alternative presented by the Sami themselves based on their Traditional Ecological
Knowledge, calling for an alternative to “green energy” in the form of creation of “zero carbon
societies in harmony with nature,”9 not established through the destruction of key components
of the natural world and the human societies that have existed symbiotically with them for
centuries and millennia.
The discussion of the exterminatory impact of mineral extraction in Northern Russia
(which is resulting in among other things extremely poor health conditions, including a death
rate for Sami in this region 2.4 times higher than for non-Sami people in the region) for
production of electronic cars has important resonances with similar processes elsewhere in the
world that are driving mass violence and destruction, most notably the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Reﬂecting a common function of colonialism, here is a case in which the environmental
beneﬁt of non-Indigenous peoples comes through the direct environmental harm and
destruction of an Indigenous people.
The article makes a ﬁnal key intervention in genocide studies. Instead of taking
Northern/Western understandings of genocide as the foundation of analysis of the impact of
“green technologies” on Indigenous peoples, the authors call for a rethinking of the legal
concept of genocide in order to better accommodate the kind of destruction discussed in the
article. This sets an important agenda for the United Nations and world community as a whole
if the rhetorical concern expressed for protection of Indigenous and other minority populations
is not to be exposed as empty.
The focus on Indigenous understandings of climate change is echoed in Rosoff’s
important contribution on the Climate in Crisis: Environmental Change in the Indigenous Americas
exhibit at the Brooklyn Museum. This exhibit places today’s changing climate into the longer
timeline of environmental violence and colonialism in the Americas. The objects displayed in
this exhibit form a narrative not only of the deep bond between humans and nature, but seek to
illustrate how violence against the plants, animals, and ecosystems necessary to sustain human
life, is violence against the people themselves. Art has the ability to approach these hard,
political questions with broad audiences. By blending this conversation into modern art
spheres, we are reminded that Indigenous peoples and ways of knowing are not to be discussed
only in the past tense. This curated exhibit stands in conversation with the arguments laid out
by Killean and Dempster, both explaining in their own ways the complex relationship between
humans, culture, nature, and violence.
Intersecting Denials as the Next Focal Issue
Genocide denial has long been recognized as a persistent problem. Well-known cases include
Turkey’s denial of the Armenian Genocide, Japan’s denial of the Nanjing Massacre and other
Paciﬁc War atrocities, omissive and refutational denial of and genocide of Indigenous peoples in
Australia and the Americas, and the Holocaust by various groups and governments, but it is not
overstretching to say that every case of past and present genocide is subject to signiﬁcant denial
by perpetrators and/or other parties. For instance, at every stage of the Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur,
and the Rohingya cases, denial has been rampant.
Denial is famously misrepresented as being the “ﬁnal stage of genocide,” but in fact
denial typically occurs throughout the genocidal process, after it, and, indeed, as Fatma Müge
Göçek has argued, before a genocide, during the steps that lead to it.10 It is precisely denial
during and before genocide that parallel typical denial of environmental degradation and
climate change. While, in legal, political, and public spaces, individual perpetrators of
environmental damage often deny the occurrence of the acts that resulted in the damage, deny

9

Regina Menachery Paulose, “Death by a Thousand Cuts? Green Tech, Traditional Knowledge, and Genocide,” Genocide
Studies and Prevention 16, no. 1, 50, https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.16.1.1886.
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Fatma Müge Göçek, Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–
2009 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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responsibility for those acts, and/or deny the link between the acts and the damage, even more
devastating is the denial of the fact of environmental degradation and climate change itself.
Deniers attack evidence that climate change is occurring at all, that it is human caused, that it
already is having and will have devastating effects, and more. Deniers also reject claims that
this or that proposed activity—fracking, building a dam, reducing pollution regulation
thresholds, etc.—will result in environmental harm.
For less than a decade, genocide scholars and others been publicly discussing the
parallels between denial of environmental harm and climate change and of genocide. What is
becoming more and more clear is not simply that the same argument tactics and forms are used
to deny genocide and climate change, that often the same public relations ﬁrms and other
players are active in both types of denial, and other parallels, but that, as environmental
destruction and genocide become intertwined, their denials become merged in an overarching
denial process. Study of the concrete and theoretical intertwining of different genocide and
climate change denial campaigns, and the attacks on critical thinking and the scientiﬁc method
that underlie them, have become crucial if this new Environmental-Genocidal Denial Complex
is to be challenged successfully. The editors hope the current volume will provide an important
step in this engagement.
Emily Sample
Henry C. Theriault
Guest Editors, GSP Special Issue 16.1
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Introduction
The relationship between environmental degradation and periods of mass violence is complex
and multi-faceted. Environmental degradation can destabilize societies and cause conflict;
attacks on the environment can be a means of harming targeted groups; and both mass
violence and subsequent transitions can leave damaging environmental legacies.1 The
connections between environmental degradation and mass violence have received increased
recognition in international law and policy. This has been exemplified by the work of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)2 and the International Law Commission on
protecting the environment during conflict,3 and the growth of environmental peacebuilding.4
Despite this growing recognition, the environment-conflict nexus has often been underexplored and under-theorized within transitional justice.5 In this article, we interrogate this
inattention and explore the limitations and possibilities of transitional justice responses to the
environmental harms associated with mass violence.
By transitional justice, we mean both “that set of practices, mechanisms and concerns
that arise during a period of conflict, civil strife or repression,”6 and the distinctive field of
academic knowledge7 that seeks to provide “legal, political, philosophical or moral concepts
that back the practice of transitional justice.”8 Since emerging in response to the downfall of

1

Explored below.

2

International Committee of the Red Cross, Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the
Environment in Times of Armed Conﬂict, endorsed by UN GA Res. 49/50 (Geneva: ICRC, 1994, updated 2021).

3

Michael Bothe, “The ILC’s Special Rapporteur’s Preliminary Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation
to Armed Conﬂict: An Important Step in the Right Direction,” in International Law and the Protection of Humanity.
Essays in Honor of Flavia Latanzi, ed. Pia Acconci et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

4

See, for example, Carl Bruch et al., Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conﬂict Peacebuilding (London: Earthscan,
2016); Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad, High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conﬂict Peacebuilding (London:
Earthscan, 2011); Ashok Swain and Joakim Öjendal, Routledge Handbook of Environmental Conﬂict and Peacebuilding
(London: Routledge, 2020); Helen Young and Lisa Goldman, Livelihoods, Natural Resources, and Post-Conﬂict
Peacebuilding (London: Routledge, 2015).

5

See, for example, Janine Natalya Clark, “Are there ‘Greener’ Ways of Doing Transitional Justice? Some Reﬂections on
Srebenica, Nature and Memorialisation,” International Journal of Human Rights 20, no. 8 (2016); Lieselotte Viaene et
al., “Call for Papers for 2023 Special Issue, Transitional Justice and Nature: A Curious Silence,” International Journal
of Transitional Justice, accessed September 21, 2021, https://academic.oup.com/ijtj/pages/call_for_papers.

6

Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The New Landscape of Transitional Justice,” in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century:
Beyond Truth versus Justice, ed. Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariecurrena (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 2.

7

Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’” International Journal
of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009).

8

Hannah Franzki and Maria Carolina Olarte, “Understanding the Political Economy of Transitional Justice: A Critical
Theory Perspective,” in Transitional Justice Theories, ed. Susanne Buckley-Zistel et al. (London: Routledge, 2013),
203.

Rachel Killean and Lauren Dempster. “Mass Violence, Environmental Harm, and the Limits of Transitional Justice.”
Genocide Studies and Prevention 16, no. 1, 11–39. https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.16.1.1840.
© 2022 Genocide Studies and Prevention.

12

Killean and Dempster

communist regimes in the 1980s,9 transitional justice has shown itself to be a ﬁeld capable of
signiﬁcant change and expansion.10 A multi-disciplinary body of scholarship now plays a
crucial role in envisioning a “broader and more holistic project.”11 While the ﬁeld is increasingly
diverse and contested, transitional justice remains centered around two assumptions: that
transitions to liberal democracy are a good thing, and that mechanisms such as truth
commissions, trials, institutional reforms, and reparations can contribute to democratic rule of
law and societal reconciliation in the aftermath of violence.12
Although environmental concerns have yet to enter the mainstream of transitional
justice discourse, emergent literature indicates an increased willingness to engage with
environmental harm. This has been evident in scholarship exploring, for example, the
connections between natural resources and conﬂicts,13 the relationships between victims and
their environments,14 and the harmful impacts of colonialism, land expropriation, and largescale environmental degradation.15 Others have explored the expansion of the situations to
which transitional justice applies to include natural disasters16 and climate change.17 Arguments
that international criminal law should do more to prosecute environmental harm have gathered
momentum,18 while others have considered whether there are “greener” ways to implement
reparative mechanisms.19 It has even been argued that centering environmental justice in
9
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10

Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003).
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“Trying Just Enough or Promising Too Much? The Problem-Capacity-Nexus in Tunisia’s Transitional Justice
Process,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 16, no. 1 (2021), accessed February 26, 2021. https://doi.org/
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transitional justice could reduce the risk of ethnic tensions continuing after violence has
ceased.20
This nascent literature can be situated against a broader critical scholarship that seeks to
interrogate transitional justice’s limitations and blind spots.21 In this article, we bring this
scholarship into conversation with bodies of literature long preoccupied with environmental
harm, including green criminology and victimology, environmental justice scholarship,
sociology, and Indigenous studies. By doing so, we aim to explore the limitations and
underlying assumptions that impede transitional justice’s ability to respond to environmental
harm. Drawing from this multi-disciplinary literature, we make four key arguments. First, we
argue that the dominance of anthropocentric legal frameworks has often resulted in the
exclusion of environmental harm and victimhood from transitional justice’s remit. Second, we
contend that transitional justice’s neo-colonial tendency has excluded worldviews that might
offer greater consideration of environmental harm. Third, we explore how a lack of redress for
structural inequalities can leave pre-existing environmental injustices intact following the
cessation of mass violence. And fourth, we propose that transitional justice’s “liberal imprints”22
and associated sympathy for capitalism make it complicit in laying the groundwork for future
environmental degradation. While this article is exploratory in nature, we also begin to map
possibilities for a greener approach to transitional justice.23 Before turning to the ﬁrst of our
arguments, we provide some context by outlining in greater detail the connections between
mass violence and environmental degradation.
Mass Violence and Environmental Degradation
Environmental harm can be a cause, a method, and a result of mass violence, as well as a barrier
to sustainable peace. In this section we explore each of these in turn. While often interacting
with other social, economic, and political dynamics,24 competition over natural resources can be
a signiﬁcant motivator of mass atrocity.25 For instance, “critical food-people-land imbalances”26
and “intense inter-communal competition for land”27 have been linked to genocidal violence in
Rwanda, Armenia, and Eastern Anatolia.28 Environmental degradation and misuse can decrease
communities’ welfare, exerting pressure on societies, entrenching societal divisions, and
increasing the potential for violence.29 The rise of neoliberal ideologies, and the related
unsustainable pursuit of economic growth, facilitates over-exploitation of land, water, and

20
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wildlife, with violent implications for both the ecosystems and the human communities that
rely upon them.30 For example, environmental degradation, unsustainable natural resource
exploitation, and associated human rights violations are thought to have contributed to mass
violence in the Solomon Islands31 and Liberia.32 Indeed, while the United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP) has estimated that the exploitation of the natural world has
contributed to at least forty percent of internal conﬂicts in the last sixty years,33 others have
suggested that most conﬂicts are rooted in resource competition and/or resource scarcity.34
Environmental destruction can also be a deliberate method of mass violence. There is a
growing scholarship which explores acts of environmental destruction as a tactic of genocide.35
For example, the Guatemalan Army’s scorched-earth policy involved burning corn ﬁelds
deemed sacred by the Maya, destroying a food source and committing a cultural violation.36 As
Lauren J. Eichler argues, the particular webs of relationships that can exist between Indigenous
communities and the natural world can render environmental destruction a genocidal act that
“literally eliminates, disﬁgures, and maims” other-than-human members of Indigenous
communities.37 Outside this context, environmental destruction can be a method of depriving
targeted populations of resources and shelter, as exempliﬁed by the US’ use of Agent Orange in
Northern Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.38 Even when not a deliberate strategy, mass violence
can cause environmental degradation. For example, in Rwanda, displacement camps and
resettlement areas have impacted negatively on biodiversity due to the inhabitants’ reliance on
(and competition for) natural resources.39 Elsewhere, landmines in both the Balkans and
Cambodia40 have impacted upon soil, plant, and animal life, threatening biodiversity.41 More
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broadly, mass violence can lead to “armed and lawless societies,” facilitating unsustainable
hunting practices,42 poaching,43 and other incidences of harmful natural resource exploitation.44
Environmental degradation can hinder post-conﬂict recovery, removing potential
platforms for cooperation and depleting the resources available for social reconstruction.45 A
failure to address underlying environmental injustices can also make a return to violence more
likely. Examples include Darfur, where long-term peace is considered unlikely unless
“underlying and closely linked environmental and livelihood issues” are addressed.46 Indeed,
in Guatemala, ongoing cycles of violence have been linked to the failure of transitional justice
interventions to address the historic environmental causes of the conﬂict.47
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that these connections are exacerbated
by the climate crisis.48 Climate change can cause environmental degradation that may ignite
violence, while the carbon releases associated with armed conﬂict in turn contribute to climate
change, making future conﬂicts increasingly likely.49 In the longer term, mass violence can also
deplete the resources communities need to withstand the effects of climate change, increasing
vulnerabilities and risks of harm.50
Having highlighted some of the ways in which environmental harm and mass violence
can be related, we now turn to our analysis of the limitations of transitional justice as a means of
addressing this relationship. In the following section, we unpack the ﬁrst of our arguments: that
the dominance of anthropocentric legal frameworks has precluded adequate consideration of
environmental harm within transitional justice.
Legalism, Anthropocentrism, and Invisible Harms
Legalism can be understood as “the morality of rule following”51 and in the context of
transitional justice, is demonstrated by a focus on law as the means to solve social conﬂict.52
While Wendy Lambourne has argued that transitional justice also encompasses psychosocial,
socioeconomic, and political aspects of justice,53 the focus on law as the “means to achieve
justice has remained central.”54 This “dominance of legalism”55 is often discussed in the context
of legalistic responses to harm. However, legalism has a broader role to play in shaping how the
harms caused by mass violence are understood, creating “subjects and truths which are blind to
42
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certain forms of injustice and harm.”56 As will be examined in this section, this has implications
for the ability of transitional justice to recognize environmental harm and victimhood.
Characterized by a conﬂation of human rights law, criminal law, and international
humanitarian law,57 transitional justice tends to prioritize “gross violations of civil and political
rights (arbitrary or indeﬁnite detention, severe assault, ill-treatment, etc.)” or “criminal acts
(property destruction, abuse of children, etc).”58 This often leads to the exclusion of socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental rights.59 The development of international criminal law
as a means of addressing mass violence has further contributed to a tendency to view events
through a “crime-driven lens.”60 As noted by Arbour, the inﬂuence of criminal law on
transitional justice has led to “eminently predictable” exclusions of other harms and
discriminatory practices.61 Critical scholarship has sought to challenge transitional justice’s
dominant frameworks for “the lives they ignore, the injustices they fail to see and the
patriarchal and racialized power structures that remain intact and unexamined,”62 yet rarely has
this encompassed environmental harm.
We argue that this exclusion can be linked to the anthropocentricity of dominant legal
frameworks. Mainstream legal thought emphasizes “man” as the “central personage of both
traditional philosophy and traditional law.”63 As a result, law often struggles to include
environmental harms, instead focusing on actions “which cause harm to the health or business
of humans from a very anthropocentric and economic perspective.”64 Indeed, as Michael J.
Lynch et al. argue, “there is no such thing as an ecological right that is not, in the ﬁrst instance,
deﬁned by some assumed association between humans and nature in which humans are the
point of reference.”65 This is most pronounced in the context of the rights, “particularly property
rights—that the criminal law recognizes and protects.”66
This anthropocentrism is evident in transitional justice,67 which is often limited by the
assumption that “all forms of justice have something to do with the derivation and application
of some theory or perspective on justice for humans and humans alone.”68 International
criminal law in particular has been critiqued for its failure to prosecute crimes against the
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environment in their own right,69 as illustrated by continued calls for a crime of ecocide.70 In the
absence of such a crime, the environmental harms acknowledged in international criminal
practice have been framed as harms against people or property.71 Such framings have also
emerged outside courtroom settings. For instance, the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation
Commission has been critiqued for acknowledging the physical violence that resulted from
resource extraction but overlooking related environmental harms,72 while the Liberian Truth
and Reconciliation Commission framed the environmental degradation caused by
unsustainable diamond mining as a predominantly economic harm.73
Green victimological literature indicates that victims of environmental harms are highly
diverse, encompassing both human and non-human animals.74 However, “environmental
victimization [does] not sit well with traditional models of criminal justice and, therefore,
traditional modules of victimology.”75 Transitional justice’s grounding in these same models76
has in turn shaped understandings of victimhood,77 with laws designed to address legacies of
mass violence often speciﬁcally deﬁning who can be categorized as a victim.78 As a result,
formulations of victimhood in transitional justice often reﬂect White’s observation that “human
victims of environmental harm are themselves not widely recognized as victims of ‘crime’”
while “the non-human entity is seldom considered worthy of attention.”79 This is not always the
case. For instance, Colombia’s Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz has recognized the territories of the
Awá, Sia, and Nasa Indigenous peoples and the Black communities of Tumaco as victims of the
conﬂict.80 In Peru, the centerpiece of the memorial El Ojo Que Lloro, is a sculpture of the
ancestral goddess Pachamama, to acknowledge the pain inﬂicted on Mother Earth by the
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conﬂict.81 However, these types of approaches remain relatively exceptional and we argue that
transitional justice remains premised on harms against people and property.
The general exclusion of non-human victims is reﬂective of Carsten Stahn’s observation
that overly narrow conceptions of legal personality can render identities “invisible.”82 More
expansive conceptualizations of legal personality might help bring environmental harm to the
fore in efforts to address legacies of mass violence. It is notable that the exclusion of non-human
victims is reﬂective of particular understandings of agency; for some Indigenous peoples, the
“non-human” (for example, land, animals, plants) also has agency.83 Relatedly, green
criminologists and victimologists have worked to direct our gaze to the rights of nature, as well
as the rights of future generations and Indigenous peoples.84
We would argue that engaging with more diverse perspectives on what constitutes
harm, who constitutes a victim, and which entities can have legal personality, might constitute a
crucial ﬁrst step in greening transitional justice. In transitional justice processes, acquiring
victim status has practical, social, and symbolic implications. The incorporation of victims’
rights into transitional justice practice means that victims have become progressively
recognized as protagonists capable of shaping the harms that are recognized and the forms that
transitional justice takes.85 Against this backdrop, who or what is recognized as a victim matters.
The importance of acknowledging the validity of diverse voices and perspectives is explored
further in the following section, which turns to transitional justice’s neo-colonial tendency and
its implications for who has the opportunity to shape the ﬁeld.
Neo-colonial Tendencies and Re-imagining Justice
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im and others have noted a neo-colonial tendency in transitional
justice, where “preference is given to a standard of justice that is mandated by the international
community over Indigenous or ‘traditional’ practices that are unacceptable because they are
inconsistent with ‘universal’ human rights norms, as proclaimed by the international
community.”86 As a result of this neo-colonial tendency, the transitional justice programs
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implemented in the Global South are often conceived in the Global North.87 This often leads to
the prioritization of legal forms of individual accountability and retribution, reﬂecting norms
characteristic of the Global North.88 These “‘one-size-ﬁts-all’, technocratic and decontextualised
solutions”89 are subsequently imposed on diverse transitional sites. This speaks to a “broader
trend of conceptualizing the West as the locus and agent of justice and human rights that needs
to respond to the conﬂict and abuses occurring in non-Western states.”90 Similarly, transitional
justice research exists “within a system of power,”91 and as Padraig McAuliffe highlights, there
is a “notable lack of researchers from the Global South in overall theorization of the ﬁeld.”92 Or,
as put by Keiran McEvoy, “transitional justice remains quite white.”93 This dominance of
Western intellectual and legal traditions effectively silences other, equally valid, “ways of
knowing” and creates a ﬁeld that appears “unable or unwilling to envisage ways of knowing
that surpass our own imagination.”94
One effect of this tendency is that “even the possibility of an Indigenous alternative
conception of justice is not taken seriously at a theoretical or empirical level.”95 Yet, excluding
Indigenous perspectives can silence worldviews that conceptualize and understand
environmental harm in more nuanced and sophisticated ways. For many Indigenous peoples,
the relationship between humans and nature is interdependent (rather than one of human
dominance); territories can speak, express feelings, suffer harm and feel pain, and harms against
the environment are violations requiring redress.96 However, the “harmonization with these
spiritual forces…does not exist within the human rights and transitional justice ﬁelds.”97 This
absence has been evident in, for example, the report of the Guatemalan Truth Commission,
which described the effects of the government’s “scorched earth policy,” as harm caused to
persons and property.98 Yet, as the “wider natural environment” is part of the “Mayan
cosmovision,”99 one might have expected the Commission to fully engage with the cultural
signiﬁcance of this harm.
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There are notable examples of approaches that engage with contextual particularities
and “Indigenous knowledge” (for example, the practices of Girinka and Gacaca in Rwanda).100
However, dominant transitional justice approaches can often be “alien to most Indigenous
worldviews,” which may be grounded in the centrality of community, the multi-generational
duration of harms, and the tendency for knowledge to be shared orally rather than via written
record.101 Similarly, while the need to “localize” transitional justice has been emphasized in
scholarship for some years,102 in practice it often fails to “fully consider local meanings of
justice.”103 As a result, some have been skeptical of transitional justice’s ability to adapt to
diverse worldviews.104 While cognizant of this critique, we next make some modest suggestions
as to how transitional justice might incorporate such perspectives in order to better respond to
environmental harms.
There is an emerging realization within transitional justice scholarship of the need to
acknowledge “discounted and disregarded voices,”105 and for transitional justice efforts to be
“informed by Indigenous worldviews.”106 There is also a relatively well-established literature
on the beneﬁts of transitional justice “from below,”107 which requires—to draw on Edward Said
—that those impacted by harm are given “permission…to narrate” their experience.108 Taking
this as our departure point, we argue that incorporating greater environmental awareness
necessitates, at a minimum, recognizing as valid local understandings of, and relationships
with, the natural world. Such engagement would go beyond incorporating alternative views
into transitional justice’s dominant frameworks, requiring the “hard work” of building and
maintaining connections and alliances between practitioners, victims, Indigenous communities,
and other lesser-heard groups.109
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In addition to foregrounding “from below” approaches, we argue that a more
fundamental shift is required in how we conceptualize and practice transitional justice. There is
now an expanding body of scholarship examining the need to “decolonize” transitional
justice,110 and a call to direct attention “towards Indigenous visions, aspirations and aims.”111
Noting the connections between Indigenous rights and environmental rights, Jennifer
Matsunaga calls for transitional justice scholars to divert their “energies towards developing
justice alternatives.”112 Engagement with Indigenous “conceptions of the environment” and
“understandings of harm and healing”113 might encourage a “reimagining of human
relationships to place.”114 We would submit that this might contribute to the design of
environmentally-inclusive forms of transitional justice more broadly. As argued by Arturo
Escobar, what is needed is “a decolonization of the legal and social knowledge that informs the
ﬁeld of transitional justice, but, above all, the will to promote deep discussions about ‘the pluriverse of worlds’ with an open mind and a receptive heart.”115 Such discussions might encourage
a fundamental shift away from a “belief in abstract universals,”116 and a questioning of the
dominance of Global North perspectives.117 They might also prompt greater engagement with
long-standing environmental injustices and structural inequalities that have historically been
overlooked in transitional justice. These inequalities, and the environmental implications of
their exclusion from transitional justice’s view, are examined in the next section.
Structural Inequality, Environmental Injustice, and the Limits of Transition
As discussed above, unequal access to and distribution of natural resources are often root
causes of mass violence.118 In the aftermath of mass violence, a failure to address these
underlying environmental inequalities may leave a range of harms unaddressed, reducing the
chances for a sustainable peace and planting seeds for future violence.119 However, we argue
that there are three key interconnected parameters which limit transitional justice’s ability to
address structural inequalities. First, the above-mentioned exclusion of economic, social, and
cultural rights can decontextualize atrocity, overlooking the systemic factors that often form the
backdrop to periods of mass violence.120 Second, the “implied temporal parameters…embedded
in the words ‘transitional justice’”121 can position certain harms outside the remit of transitional
justice mechanisms.122 Third, the focus on perpetrators of speciﬁc criminal acts precludes
consideration of the beneﬁciaries of a systematically unfair system in which a more distributive
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form of justice might be more appropriate.123 We contend that these boundaries can limit the
ability of transitional justice to respond to environmental harms, particularly in contexts where
“violence and injustice have been experienced over generations to whole communities.”124 They
can also obscure the reality that for many victims, the cessation of mass violence may be
followed by the continuation of or return to positions of subjugation,125 which shape their
ability to access, use, care for, and protect natural resources.126 As a result, responses to mass
violence can be seen as insufﬁcient without the simultaneous addressing of underlying systems
of land dispossession, discrimination, and oppression.127
Recognition of transitional justice’s limitations as a means of addressing structural
inequalities has led to the emergence of “transformative justice” theories.128 Transformative
approaches seek to foreground the broader socio-economic, political, and ecological contexts of
mass violence,129 and propose a shift away from the “short-term nature of dominant transitional
justice practice” to more long-term processes of change.130 Outside the context of mass violence,
similar arguments can be found within the environmental justice literature, which has worked
to expose the disproportionate impacts of environmental degradation and the unequal
distribution of natural resources in a wide range of contexts.131 In response to these injustices,
David Pellow and others have advocated for “transformative (rather than primarily reformist)
approaches to realize environmental justice.”132 From this perspective, environmental justice
requires the interrogation and confrontation of the structural contexts in which environmental
harm occurs,133 and measures that pursue fundamental social change.134
Both transformative and environmental justice advocates have argued for Nancy
Fraser’s trivalent framework of redistributive justice (to promote equal access to resources),
procedural or representative justice (to increase marginalized voices in positions of power), and
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recognition (through the designation of social and cultural standing or status).135 As Fraser notes,
these responses to injustice may be resolved through afﬁrmative remedies which reduce
inequalities without challenging underlying social relations, or through transformative
remedies that correct “inequitable outcomes by restructuring the underlying generative
framework.”136 We have found that this framework, and the work of environmental activists in
pursuing transformation, offers an insight into what environmentally transformative justice
might necessitate in the aftermath of mass violence. For example, redistributive justice may
require systemic changes to the management of energy production and natural resources,137
such as the re-establishing of Indigenous or community land practices and custodianship.138
Representative justice would call for engagement with the role of identity and status in shaping
access to and control over natural resources.139 Sensitivity to inequalities would be required to
ensure that discriminatory practices of exclusion are not reproduced within transitional
mechanisms,140 and that the voice and agency of those facing environmental injustices is
recognized. Recognition would in turn require acknowledgement of the full range of
environmental harms experienced. Going further, it might extend to recognition of cultural
connections and claims to environments, the historic territorial sovereignty of targeted groups,
or indeed, the rights and standing of nature itself.141
It might be that the pursuit of environmentally transformative justice could facilitate a
shift beyond the maintenance of unequal and harmful “human social and economic
organization”142 towards more egalitarian principles.143 Yet, cautionary voices have called for
modesty when exploring the transformative potential of transitions from mass violence, noting
that “no process or set of transitional justice processes can by itself fundamentally transform a
community.”144 Certainly, there are limits to what transitional justice mechanisms can achieve
without buy-in from those already in positions of power.145 Nor can it be assumed that elites
who beneﬁtted from systems of inequality would willingly sacriﬁce those beneﬁts following the
cessation of violence.146 As McAuliffe warns, a range of entrenched domestic social, economic,
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and political factors form the parameters in which change is possible.147 Transitional justice’s
tendency to “strengthen, rather than challenge” the state148 and to reinforce “existing relations
of power” arguably further limits the possibilities for such transformation.149
Drawing from critical environmental justice scholarship and “from below” perspectives
as explored above, we might therefore consider the value of an approach that decenters the
state’s role in greening transitional justice. This approach “deprives the state of the power to
deﬁne the issues and their solutions,” and instead encourages communities to name the issues
they face and develop appropriate responses.150 A bottom-up approach which encourages
communities to think and act “beyond the state,”151 and invokes methods and principles of
“mutual engagement and shared learning,” might be particularly “consonant with green
ideals.”152 Such a decentering is all the more relevant to environmental justice, given the state’s
frequent positioning as one of the key actors pushing extractive projects.153 Yet, we acknowledge
that the transformative potential of community-driven measures is restricted not only by the
continued dominance of elites, but the broader “asymmetrical global order” in which
transitional justice operates.154 The place of transitional justice within this order, and its
unwillingness to challenge some of its underlying assumptions, form the focus of our ﬁnal
section.
“Liberal Imprints,” Naturalizing Capitalism, and the Risks of Future Harm
In this ﬁnal section, we move beyond a critique of transitional justice’s failure to meaningfully
respond to atrocity-related environmental harm, to argue that traditional approaches to
transitional justice practice can in fact facilitate further environmental harms. To do so, we
critique what Marcus Zunino has termed transitional justice’s “liberal imprint,”155 and its
resulting sympathy for capitalism.156
Transitional justice has been shaped by the historical context in which it emerged,
namely the post-Cold War rise of liberal democracy, the associated decline of left-wing political
movements,157 and the emergence of neoliberal economic theories.158 Grounded in postauthoritarian transitions to liberal market democracies, transitional justice continues to be
shaped by contemporary liberal democratic theory.159 This has been evidenced in the ﬁeld’s
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endorsement of liberal peacebuilding,160 political and economic liberalization,161 the
prioritization of civil and political rights, and the individualization of victimhood.162
Praised by some for its contributions to democracy and rule of law, liberalism has often
been framed as something inherently pacifying, universalizable, and “good.”163 Yet, this
attachment to liberalism can also be critiqued for its relationship to free-market capitalist
ideology and the associated privatization and deregulation,164 both of which can cause
signiﬁcant environmental harm.165 These risks of environmental harm have only grown as
neoliberalism has come to dominate social, political, and economic life.166 Centered around
individualism and the pursuit of wealth and private property, neoliberalism relegates the nonhuman world to the status of a resource for exploitation,167 laying the groundwork for extractive
and environmentally harmful practices.168
The failure of dominant political and economic systems to recognize or further
economic, social, and ecological interdependence has long been critiqued by critical
environmental political theorists.169 Political ecologists, ecosocialists, and green criminologists
have emphasized capitalism’s reliance on the exploitation of nature, arguing that environmental
degradation is embedded into the global political economy.170 Indeed, as observed by David
Whyte, it is no longer controversial “to assert that the economic growth paradigm is impossible
to decouple from environmental destruction.”171 Environmental justice scholars have further
argued that any discussion of environmental harm and injustice must be situated within the
global regimes of power that relegate “particular geopolitical places, geographies, and peoples
to the bottom of our global hierarchy.”172 This has been reﬂected in the emergence of what has
been termed “the resource curse”173—a phenomenon whereby capitalist exploitation of the
Global South generates unequal access to natural resources, corruption in environmental
governance, polluted environments for marginalized groups, and as a result, conﬂict.174
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As Miller notes, “in the vast majority of cases, transition occurs in conjunction with a
project of economic and/or political liberalization.”175 The assumption that such liberalization
offers the best method for restructuring societies176 means that transitions from mass violence
can be as damaging to the environment as the period of violence itself, if not more so.177 Natural
resource extraction, deforestation, and land use conﬂicts can intensify during transitional
periods,178 while the cessation of violence can herald the emergence of new unsustainable
extraction methods, environmentally harmful practices, and/or erosions of environmental
protections. This is in part the result of fragile communities’ efforts to recover from the impacts
of violence,179 but can also be linked to the interventions of international institutions seeking to
promote a “liberal peace” grounded in market economies.180 While economic development has
been associated with longer lasting peace,181 reliance on macroeconomic growth can facilitate
further victimization, social injustices, and “polarization, which looms like social and economic
dynamite.”182 The particular characteristics of neoliberal policies (such as a minimized state, the
marketization of natural resources, the reliance on markets for core needs, and the framing of
individuals as primarily economic beings) fail to repair root causes of violence and facilitate the
future over-exploitation of land, water, and wildlife.183 Such actions have their own violent
implications, both for communities with material and spiritual connections to land,184 and
ultimately, entire populations.185
As capitalism’s links to environmental destruction have become increasingly
undeniable,186 some have argued that responses to environmental harm must be anticapitalist.187 This presents a challenge to transitional justice as a means of redressing
environmental harm, given its traditional failure to challenge assumptions about the
inevitability of markets.188 We, of course, acknowledge the distinctions between transitional
justice mechanisms and the more long-term interventions and processes used to further a
175
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“globally expansive liberal order.”189 Nevertheless, the ﬁeld has been critiqued for overlooking
the role international market forces play in causing conﬂict,190 for continuing to support
“reforms to foster a growing capitalist economy,” and for producing scholarship that naturalizes
capitalism.191 Indeed, as Bowsher argues, one might go further and argue that transitional
justice “preﬁgures and supports processes of neoliberalization during transition.”192 Reﬂecting
our arguments above, he notes that transitional justice’s focus on individual rights violations,
and exclusion of structural violence, supplants and precludes calls for redistributive justice,
which by its nature is incompatible with the neoliberal project.193
For Augustine S. J. Park, transitional justice’s allegiance to liberalism serves as a way of
foreclosing and tacitly delegitimizing other futures.194 Echoing his calls for a suspension of
transitional justice’s “taken-for-granted assumptions,”195 we suggest that proponents of a
green transition might advocate for the integration of economic models and reforms that place
stronger and speciﬁc emphasis on democratic control of the economy and environmental
protection.196 Such approaches might engage with, and incorporate, diverse models that present
a challenge to dominant capitalist approaches.197 These include the indigenous notion of Buen
Vivir (good living), which prioritizes the interconnections between humans, non-humans, and
the natural world,198 the solidarity economy project that “envisions and enacts economies based
on cooperation, sharing, and on living with enough rather than on competition, exploitation,
and wealth accumulation,”199 or Just Transition strategies, which focus on the shift “from an
extractive economy to a regenerative economy.”200 As we explored above, the ability of
transitional justice alone to transform societies is limited. Nevertheless, we argue that by
drawing on these and other alternative economic models, the practice of transitional justice
could begin to adapt in ways that do not inevitably “naturalize capitalism,”201 and thus the
commodiﬁcation and destruction of the natural world.
Conclusion
In this article we have made four key arguments about the limits of transitional justice as a
response to environmental harm in the context of mass violence. First, we argued that
environmental harm and victimhood is often overlooked in transitional justice, due to the
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dominance of anthropocentric legal frameworks. Second, we examined the impact of
transitional justice’s neo-colonial tendency, and how this has resulted in the exclusion of
worldviews that consider human-environment relationships in fundamentally different ways.
Third, we considered the implications of transitional justice’s failure to address structural
inequalities—as a result of which pre-existing environmental injustices often return or continue.
Fourth, we contended that the relationship between transitional justice and capitalism render it
complicit in laying the groundwork for future environmental harms. Throughout, we have
argued that the grounding of transitional justice in a narrow range of perspectives has blinkered
the ﬁeld to the environmental causes, methods, and effects of mass violence. Yet, like Hannah
Franzki and Maria Carolina Olarte, “we hold the speciﬁc signiﬁcance of transitional justice
scholarship to lie in its efforts to provide legal, political, philosophical or moral concepts that
back the practice of transitional justice.”202 In that spirit, we have proffered some tentative
suggestions as to how we might begin to counter the effects of these limitations in the context of
atrocity-related environmental harm.
One central thread through our argument has been the value of transitional justice
“from below.”203 This approach holds the potential to expand our understandings of harm,
victimization, and the particularities of the contexts in which mass violence occurs. As Kieran
McEvoy and Lorna McGregor encourage, justice “from below” involves engagement with “the
agentic practice and potential” of those often overlooked by formal transitional justice
institutions.204 In order for such an approach to effectively capture the nature and scale of
environmental harm, we suggest that providing a platform for lesser heard voices is unlikely to
be sufﬁcient. As Rosemary Nagy observes, “transitional justice is a discourse and practice
imbued with power” to determine “who is accountable for what and when.”205 Noting Park’s call
to “radicalize” transitional justice,206 the transitional justice “from below” that we envision is
not (to draw on Said’s words) a “giving of permission,”207 but a fundamental shift in the balance
of that power.
We propose embracing a “from below” approach that is not merely tokenistic, but is
built on a genuine commitment to open up the practice of transitional justice.208 In centering the
voices of those on the ground in sites of mass violence and making space for diverse
knowledges and understandings of the natural world, responses to mass violence might be built
on notions of “human, ecological and species rights and broad egalitarian principles.”209 While
we are arguing for this approach in all incidences of mass violence, we note that such a shift is
particularly important in the context of harms perpetrated against Indigenous peoples.
Although often targets of mass violence (including attacks against their territories), Indigenous
peoples’ experiences and views are often overlooked in a transitional justice shaped by neocolonialism. Any genuine effort at decolonizing transitional justice “demands an Indigenous
starting point.”210
As we hope is clear, we are not advocating for an abandonment of transitional justice as
a framework for responding to mass violence. Rather we argue that what is required is a
fundamental shift in how we think about and do transitional justice. One of the key rationales
for our continued support for the ﬁeld (despite its limitations) is the power that it has to effect
positive normative change. Transitions often accompany moments of rupture, creating space for
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rethinking previously entrenched societal structures.211 While acknowledging the limits of
transitional justice as a means of transforming society, it is worth considering whether these
moments of rupture may present a nexus of opportunity for “progressive change” with regards
to the governance of, and relationship with, the natural world.212 Indeed, transitional justice has
shown itself capable of effecting profound and rapid shifts in international norms. As a result, it
may be an effective vehicle for spreading environmentally conscious norms.213
The arguments made throughout this article must be placed in the context of the
growing international awareness that “humanity is waging war on nature.”214 Much of the
harm perpetrated against the environment is carried out legally or with impunity; this reality
requires more holistic responses than transitional justice alone can supply. Yet, as observed by
UN Secretary General António Guterres, in such a moment in time, “it is crucial that we make
peace with nature…it must be the top, top priority for everyone, everywhere.”215 Transitional
justice has already seen an “evolution of what justice might entail” as we recognize “that
practices we see as ‘normal’ may in fact be deeply problematic and in need of repair.”216 With
climate change and mass extinction exacerbating the harms caused by the exploitation of
natural resources and increasing the risks of future mass violence, the need to consider the
possibilities of a green transitional justice has never been greater.
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Introduction1
The current international focus on the environment, climate change, and our oceans has
ushered in an urgency in thinking about “green tech,” which is technology that can respond
to environmental threats (such as carbon emissions) and generate “clean” energy.
Hydropower, solar power, and wind power are different kinds of green tech that has found a
new fan base given the current push to offset emissions. These particular technologies are
mature compared to newer technologies such as wave power.2
This article explores the destruction that has been left in the wake of green tech
initiatives particularly on the lives of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter referred to as Peoples).
Can green tech be considered a benign solution to environmental problems considering what
its implementation requires and the horrific impact it has on Peoples? To answer this question
the author will focus on the destruction taking place in the Sápmi or Sámi eanan, the traditional
homeland of the Sámi Peoples. In addition to the persecution the Sámi have and continue to
face over several decades, the author will focus on green tech and how it destroys knowledge
systems like Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK), often considered a subset of Traditional
Knowledge. TEK is passed down through generations and is a deep-rooted knowledge
system often specific to Indigenous and Ethnic Minority Peoples and the continuation of their
societies. The author concludes that the destruction of traditional homelands, such as the
Sámpi along with the elimination of TEK, should be appropriately considered among the acts
which constitute genocide. Green tech, cloaked as a sustainable solution to protect the
environment, is actually another manner and method in which to destroy Peoples. Therefore,
the elimination of Traditional Knowledge and its subsets must be considered when
considering the actus reus of the crime of genocide. The author concludes that in order to
prevent the further annihilation of Peoples, a specialized “Warning Signs” framework for
genocide should be considered.
TEK: Defined and Practiced
The Contours of TEK
Traditional Knowledge has been deﬁned by the international community as “the knowledge,
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities around the world.”3 A subset of
Traditional Knowledge is TEK, which is “the knowledge base acquired by indigenous and local

1

The author would like to note that she is not part of, nor does she work for the Sámi Peoples. Since the Sámi were not
consulted regarding the writing of this article and its conclusions, it is entirely probable that the Sámi and other
Indigenous Peoples mentioned here would not reach the same conclusions. All resources used to write this article
are open source. Further, the author has made a concerted effort to use as primary sources direct from the
communities impacted and Indigenous scholars as they are the knowledge holders. The author thanks and honors
the leaders and academics who are from the Sámi communities, and academics from different Indigenous
communities who are cited within this article. The author encourages anyone who wants to learn more about these
issues to contact the communities in question.
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peoples over many hundreds of years through direct contact with the environment.”4 Chief
Robert Wavey of the Fox Lake Cree Nation states, “traditional ecological knowledge is based on
mutual well-being and sharing.”5 TEK is a culmination of holistic teachings and practices over
thousands of years that is passed on through generations. Therefore, any attempt to simplify
TEK or Traditional Knowledge systems is misguided as it is “evolving and living knowledge.”6
TEK emphasizes a way of life.7
Historically, as colonialism spread, genocidal policies were employed against Peoples,
in turn destroying Traditional Knowledge8 and its subsets. Leanne Simpson of the Anishinaabeg
Nation succinctly notes, “the forces of cultural genocide, colonization, and colonial policy
perpetuated over the last several centuries by successive occupying settler governments is
responsible for the current state of Indigenous Knowledge…”9 Those who wished for the
erasure of Indigenous Peoples beneﬁted from attacking Traditional Knowledge as it became “a
mechanism to annihilate Indigenous nations and assimilate Indigenous Peoples.”10 A recent
example is worth noting here. For the last few years, large numbers of wildﬁres have burned in
California in the US.11 When the European settlers arrived in North America, ﬁres were seen as
a “destructive force” to humans, whereas Tribal culture viewed ﬁres and controlled burnings as
a technology that could provide beneﬁts. TEK was suppressed in favor of the European
viewpoint.12 “The main impediment to scientiﬁc acceptance of the wide impact of aboriginal
burning arises from a lack of understanding of the cultural context in which it took place.”13
It is also important to remember that “the transmission of traditional knowledge among
generations is a complex and fundamental process embedded within the deep socio-cultural
structure.”14 The passing of Traditional Knowledge and its subsets from one generation is
critical as it is the “foundation of [I]ndigenous [P]eoples’ identities, cultural heritage,

4

James Bourque et al., “Preface,” in Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Concepts and Cases, ed. Julian T. Inglis (Ottawa:
International Development Research Centre, 1993), vi; see also Kyle Powys Whyte, “On The Role of Traditional
Ecological Knowledge as a Collaborative Concept: A Philosophical Study,” Ecological Processes 2 (2013), https://
doi.org/10.1186/2192-1709-2-7.

5

Robert Wavey, “International Workshop on Indigenous Knowledge and Community-Based Resource Management:
Keynote Address,” in Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Concepts and Cases, ed. Julian T. Inglis, (Ottawa: International
Development Research Centre, 1993), 16.

6

Elina Helander-Renvall and Inkeri Markkula, “On Transfer of Sámi Traditional Knowledge: Scientiﬁcation,
Traditionalization, Secrecy, and Equality,” in Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Heritage, ed. Alexandra Xanthaki et al.,
104–129 (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2017). https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004342194_006.

7

For an excellent and brief discussion on Holistic Indigenous Cultures, see Duane Champagne, “Understanding
Holistic Indigenous Cultures,” Indian Country Today, September 13, 2018, accessed June 4, 2022, https://
indiancountrytoday.com/archive/understanding-holistic-indigenous-cultures; see also Rudolph Rÿser,
“Indigenous Peoples and Traditional Knowledge,” Berkshire Encyclopedia of Sustainability 5/10, Ecosystem
Management and Sustainability (2011).
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Leanne Simpson, “Stories, Dreams, and Ceremonies: Anishinaabe Ways of Learning,” Tribal College Journal of American
Indian Higher Education 11, no. 4 (May 15, 2000), accessed June 4, 2022, https://tribalcollegejournal.org/storiesdreams-ceremonies-anishinaabe-ways-learning/.
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Leanne R. Simpson, “Anticolonial Strategies for the Recovery and Maintenance of Indigenous Knowledge,” American
Indian Quarterly 28, no. 3/4 (2004), 375, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4138923.
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accessed June 4, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jun/21/big-sur-wildﬁre-willow-ﬁre; see
also Fulvio Mazzocchi, “Western Science and Traditional Knowledge: Despite Their Variations, Different Forms of
Knowledge Can Learn From Each Other,” EMBO Reports 7, no. 5 (2006), 463–466, https://doi.org/10.1038/
sj.embor.7400693.
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civilizations, livelihoods and coping strategies over several centuries. Its promotion, protection,
and preservation are fundamental for the sustainability of the livelihoods of [I]ndigenous
[P]eoples, their resilience to human-made and natural disasters and the development of their
communities.”15
Traditional Knowledge Recognized, and Protected
The international community, whether it be through regional summits or the United Nations,
have memorialized and emphasized the importance of Traditional Knowledge. There are three
Declarations and Agreements authored by Peoples which emphasize the connectivity between
Traditional Knowledge and Peoples way of life. In 2009, the Anchorage Declaration called upon
states to abandon green tech and to instead focus on empowering Indigenous communities.16 In
2010, the Cochabamba Peoples Agreement17 recognized the rights of nature and called upon
responses to climate change to further incorporate in a “balanced and integral manner,
measures regarding capacity building, production and consumption patterns, and other
essential factors such as the acknowledging of the Rights of Mother Earth to establish harmony
with nature.”18 In 2018, the Managua Declaration emphasized similar principles and denounced
“false solutions” such as geoengineering.19
States around the world have also given a nod to Traditional Knowledge in
international instruments. For instance, and, although not explicitly, the importance of TEK
makes an appearance in Recommendation 5 adopted by the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Assembly in 1975. The recommendation, among other points,
calls for:
1. That governments maintain and encourage traditional
methods of living and customs which enable communities,
both rural and urban, to live in harmony with their
environment;
2. That educational systems be oriented to emphasize
environmental and ecological principles and conservation
objectives derived from local cultures and traditions, and
that these principles and objectives be given wide publicity;
[and]
6. That existing natural values be respected and integrated in
the early planning stage of every urban or industrial
development scheme, this requiring that ecological
principles be taken as the basis for all planning.20

15

See interview with Chandra Roy-Henriksen, Chief of the Secretariat of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues. “Traditional Knowledge—An Answer to the Most Pressing Global Problems?,” United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) News, April 22, 2019, accessed June 4, 2022, https://www.un.org/development/
desa/en/news/social/permanent-forum-on-indigenous-issues-2019.html.

16

Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change, “The Anchorage Declaration,” April 24, 2009, accessed June
4, 2022, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/ngo/168.pdf.
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World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, “Peoples Agreement,” (blog), April 22,
2010, accessed June 4, 2022, https://pwccc.wordpress.com/support/.
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“Managua Declaration: From the Meeting of the Broadened International Collective on Environmental and Climate
Justice,” La Via Campesina, August 27, 2018, accessed June 4, 2022, https://viacampesina.org/en/managuadeclaration-the-meeting-of-the-broadened-international-collective-on-environmental-and-climate-justice/.
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International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), “Recommendation 5, Protection of Traditional Ways of Life,”
12th IUCN General Assembly Meeting, Kinshasha, 1975, accessed June 4, 2022, https://portals.iucn.org/library/
sites/library/ﬁles/resrecﬁles/GA_12_RES_005_Protection_of_Traditional_Ways_of_Li.pdf.
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Eventually TEK made an entrance into the international lexicon in the 1980s and was
further incorporated into international instruments beginning with the 1989 International
Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, also known as C169.21
Subsequently, TEK was highlighted in the 1992 Rio Declaration as Principle 22. In sum,
Principle 22 states that Indigenous People have a “vital role in environmental management and
development because of their knowledge and traditional practices.”22 The broader category of
Traditional Knowledge made its way into the 1992 Convention of Biological Diversity. The
Working Groups of the Convention sought to incorporate Traditional Knowledge through
implementation of Article 8(j) and Article 15.23 The parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity speciﬁcally emphasized the importance of Traditional Knowledge as it is “considered
a ‘cross-cutting’ issue that affects many aspects of biological diversity...”24 Finally, the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) emphasizes that Indigenous
Peoples have the “right to maintain, control, protect, and develop... Traditional Knowledge.”25
The incorporation of these knowledge systems into international instruments should
not be interpreted to mean that this Knowledge is vigilantly protected by the international
community. At best, the incorporation of Traditional Knowledge and TEK in some of these
instruments highlights the awareness that State governments have regarding Traditional
Knowledge systems. It also shows that Traditional Knowledge and its subsets appear to be
reduced to and perceived as “tools” that can be used to favorably resolve environmental
challenges, as opposed to a genuine understanding the complexity of these systems and how it
is integrated into a Peoples’ way of life.
The author now turns her attention to the Sámi who suffer as a result of green tech
projects which destroy the Sápmi. As this next section will highlight, “…the destruction of the
environment is a colonial manifestation and a direct attack on Indigenous Knowledge and
Indigenous nationhood.”26 Following the discussion about the destruction of the Sámpi and
TEK, the author will examine how these actions constitutes genocide, and moreover, how the
protection of TEK and traditional homelands could prevent genocide from taking place.
Exploring TEK and the Traditional Homeland
The Sámi are an ancient people whose original homeland is the Sápmi which spreads across the
states of Russia, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. For the Sámi, inherited knowledge, or árbediehtu
is the collective wisdom and skills of the Sámi people used to enhance their livelihood for
centuries. It has been “passed down from generation to generation both orally and through
work and practical experience. Through this continuity, the concept of árbediehtu ties the past,
present and future together.”27 Their knowledge of the region, which they have been an integral
part of for so long and has formed their “systems of traditional knowledge,” have been under
attack for a century.28

21

International Labour Organization (ILO), Convention 169–Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989.
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United Nations General Assembly, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Aug 12, 1992 (UN Doc. A/CONF/
151/26 (Vol 1)), Principle 22.

23

Convention on Biological Diversity, Traditional Knowledge.

24

Ibid; see also Claudia Card, “Genocide and Social Death,” in “Feminist Philosophy and the Problem of Evil,” ed.
Robin May Schott, special issue, Hypatia 18, no. 1 (Winter 2003), 63–79, accessed June 23, 2022, https://
www.jstor.org/stable/3811037.
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United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 31; see also Erik Gómez-Baggethun et al.,
“Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Global Environmental Change: Research Findings and Policy
Implications,” Ecology and Society 18, no. 4 (December 2013), accessed June 4, 2022, http://www.jstor.org/stable/
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Development in Sompio, Finland (s.l.: Snowchange Cooperative, 2010).
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It is clear from Sámi history there has been a consistent struggle for protection of the
Sápmi and their traditions, particularly reindeer herding and husbandry.29 Due to the
geographical spread of the Sápmi, the Sámi People face constant pressures. Historically, “the
land of the [Sámi] is and has been of central importance to the colonizers, both strategically and
politically, on account of its geographical situation, its natural resources, and its ice-free
harbors.”30 In the last few decades new pressures revolve around different green tech projects.31
Reindeer play a critical role in Sámi culture and life.32 Reindeer are considered part of
the “cosmology” of the Sámi.33 Reindeer herding provides economic security and is an integral
part of promoting the Sámi way of life. One Sámi reindeer herder noted that reindeer have been
“key to helping the Sámi people survive Scandinavian and Russian governments’ forcedassimilation policies.”34 The reindeer have been instrumental to maintaining and bringing back
the Sámi language and culture.35 Besides the sustenance that reindeer provide to the people,
other parts of the reindeer are used to create products that express cultural traditions.36 One
example is duodji which is a traditional Sámi craft that uses reindeer “bones, sinews, skin, and
fur.”37
The Sámi have faced different forms of persecution for being a nomadic people. They
were often charged fees to use lands that were once theirs and have been victims of hate crimes
as “farmers sometimes started forest ﬁres to burn away the reindeer pasture around swamps
where they gathered winter feed for their cattle.”38 Prior to 1751, the reindeer herders used
siidas, groups which had an area of land where reindeer could roam in their designated patch.
“This system of managing reindeer and grazing provisions has worked well for centuries with
the Sámi treating Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia as one landmass.” But as the borders
closed, the “reindeer and herders were moved from border regions, preventing reindeer from
following their traditional migrations and halting trade and exchange that had sustained
herders and settled populations for centuries.”39
Herding is regulated through the laws of each national government, thus creating
restrictions on how Sámi reindeer herders operate.40 The reindeer “must have as much

29

Sámi Parliament and Sweden Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Affairs, The Sámi—An Indigenous People in
Sweden, trans. Robert Crofts (Västerås: Edita Västra Aros, 2005), 12, accessed June 23, 2022, http://elibrary.lt/
resursai/Uzsienio%20leidiniai/Countries/Sweden/Agricult/2005/ma2005_03.pdf.

30

Harald Gaski, “The Sami People: The ‘White Indians’ of Scandinavia,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 17,
no. 1 (January 1993), 115–128, accessed June 4, 2022, https://doi.org/10.17953/aicr.17.1.6427j6g14h536v13.

31

Henry Minde, “Sami Land Rights in Norway: A Test Case for Indigenous Peoples,” International Journal on Minority
and Group Rights 8, no. 2/3 (2001), 107–125. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24675167.

32
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Parliament and Sweden Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Affairs, The Sámi, 20–21. Citation ﬁrst
appeared in note 28.
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Project and the Norwegian Parliament” (Copenhagen: IWGIA, June 1982), 24, accessed June 4, 2022, https://
www.iwgia.org/images/publications/0102_45_Dam_a_river.pdf.
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undisturbed grazing as possible in summer to be able to grow and put on fat to survive the long
winter.”41 Further, “access to good winter grazing is essential to keep the reindeer alive, but
summer grazing is key for enlarging a herd.”42 Therefore, open space and terrain are critical
elements in helping reindeer to ﬂourish, but the status quo shows an alarming trend in the
opposite direction.
Of course, it would be remiss of the author not to point out that climate change is
negatively impacting reindeer populations and the Sápmi. “Even a change of a few degrees, like
the current average rise of about 2.3 degrees Celsius across the Arctic since the 1970s, can
greatly impact reindeer feeding patterns—and, with those, the Sámi’s economy.”43 In recent
years, climate change has forced herders to buy feed instead of allowing for grazing to occur.44
Sámi elders have reported that they cannot trust “traditional weather reading skills” anymore
due to the effects of climate change.45
The Sámi have faced many challenges in the Sápmi as a result of green tech, which
has included but has not been limited to hydropower dams, wind farms, and solar
geoengineering. All of these situations repeatedly show the destruction of the Sápmi and the
dismissal of árbediehtu in favor of technologies that will render the Sámi way of life obsolete.46
Green Energy Projects in the Sámpi
Hydropower: Alta Dam (Norway)
Hydropower is one of the most controversial green technologies that is built to generate clean
energy but has deleterious impacts on Peoples.47 The Alta Dam controversy is perhaps one of
the stark examples where green tech has disrupted and contributed to the eradication of the
Sámi way of life. As one scholar noted, “[t]he project was, in many ways, an extension of
Norwegian modernist and development ideologies that had long deﬁned hydropower projects
both in Norway and abroad, as well as relegating Saami populations to politically marginal
status.”48 In 1970, Norway proposed a hydroelectric dam to be built on the Alta River, which
runs through the reindeer herding grounds of the Sámi, and would submerge Masi, a Sámi
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village which was recognized as a “cultural heritage area.”49 Several protests followed the
decision by Norway to construct the proposed dam. In 1974, the Parliament undertook an
investigation into the proposed dam. The investigation was considered improper because it did
not adequately assess the impact the dam would have on reindeer pastoralism.50 In 1980, the
government formed the Sámi Human Rights Commission to attempt to broker peace on the
issues.51 That same year, the Court of Appeals in Norway issued a decision supporting the
construction of the dam; despite having acknowledged the impact the dam would have on Sámi
livelihood, the Court ultimately appeared to dismiss the objections raised.52 More protests
continued off and on until 1982 when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Norway and allowed
construction of the Alta Dam to continue.53
Often overlooked when evaluating dam construction and the accompanying reservoirs
is the amount of homeland that is taken from Peoples. “Land grabbing can occur both in
physical removal, in changing cultural norms of land management, and in claiming rights to
attributes like mineral, eminent domain, or even carbon rights.”54 The construction of the Alta
Dam and the elimination of grazing territory, or “land grabbing,” undermined the traditional
ownership of the land. Some reindeer herders reported that they felt pressured to support the
Alta project in order to prevent “endangering” the interests of other reindeer herders.55 All of
this, as with projects that had taken place in other parts of the Sápmi, had detrimental
consequences for the reindeer. By the 1980s, this damage to the Sápmi was labeled
“insurmountable.”56 As of 2006, “the damage to reindeer, salmon and farming, and changes in
local climate have occurred in accordance with ecological predictions made in the early
1980s.”57 It must be emphasized that “major ecological disturbances such as hydroelectric
development…have profound cultural impacts by obliterating reference points and actual
resources.”58
The Alta Dam situation also highlights the dismissal of árbediehtu, as “scientiﬁc research
was used selectively to support such goals but without ignoring the important contributions of
local knowledge and scientists who opposed the project.”59 Further, “the Norwegian
government of the 1970s and 1980s did not consider local knowledge to be useful in its
determinations of political goals.”60 The Alta Dam should have served as a cautionary tale of
“how exclusionary practices may only be taken so far. The perceived need to present policies as
if they were justiﬁed by science, when in actuality the scientiﬁc knowledge was constrained and
incomplete, created tension in the system.”61
The Hydropower Projects of Finland and Sweden
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Finland and Sweden have also pursued ambitious hydropower plans. In Finland, the Lokka and
Portitpahta reservoirs—the largest in Europe—on the Kemijoki River destroyed the southern
part of the Sápmi.62 The construction of these reservoirs “resulted in system shifts in the whole
ecological complex of the region.”63 Reports indicate that the construction included “immense
damages to the Sámi and their way of life. Reservoirs came on top of a highway, clear-cut
forests and herbicides such as the “Agent Orange” which had been employed in the Vietnam
War.”64 Further, “the whole Indigenous governance structure of reindeer herding,
tokkakuntapaimennus, was destroyed with the reservoirs.”65 The construction of the dam and its
reservoirs in the area did not take into account the perspectives of the local communities, and
further “local people had no other possibilities to inﬂuence the process than through the sales of
land or the juridical process.”66 According to oral histories from Sámi in the area, forced
assimilation practices already in practice were “sped up” as a result of the arrival of the
reservoirs. “With the arrival of the reservoir the social networks that had been acting as cultural
buffers and survival mechanisms until the late 1960s were torn apart.”67
When studying the reservoirs in Finland, Markku Laukkanen noted, “economical forces
penetrate to areas where traditional livelihoods based on nature’s resources have great
signiﬁcance for the local population; it has become the basis of life, a necessity. This creates a
conﬂict.”68 Therefore, it is inevitable as resource scarcity increases in different areas and
humanity continues to face climate change that these conﬂicts will increase.
Sweden’s hydroelectric thirst also caused damage to reindeer husbandry, land use, and
culture.69 Ola Utsi, a reindeer herder and handicrafts teacher in Sirges sameby (Sámi village in
Sweden) summarized the impact of the Swedish projects:
They say that waterpower is environmentally friendly energy,
but I say that stands for those who don’t live here. For those of
us that live next to a big reservoir it isn’t environmentally
friendly. It is inﬂicting damage. My way of living is damaged.
My environment is damaged. My source of livelihood is
damaged. You have to take another perspective. You cannot say
that waterpower is green energy. It is a lie. It is green for some,
but not for me. This point is easily forgotten.70
In 2009, Girjas, a Sámi village, ﬁled suit against the Swedish government in state court
for sole administrative rights for use over their land. The case eventually made it to the Högsta
domstolen (Supreme Court) who decided in 2020 that “the village has the sole right to administer
hunting and ﬁshing rights based on ‘prescription from time.’”71 The Högsta domstolen decision
was a signiﬁcant decision in favor of the Sámi, but how it will impact the reinforcement of land
grabs for hydropower projects in Sweden remains to be seen.
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Wind Power: Death in the Air
In an effort to promote sustainable solutions to climate change, the government of Norway
decided to build wind farms to generate clean energy, allowing Norway to cut its CO2
emissions. Norway has been awarding licenses to companies who are building wind farms in
areas that are “vital” for reindeer pastoralists which include “migration routes and crucial
pastures.”72 In addition, the wind power farms will “disrupt key hunting and ﬁshing areas” for
the Sámi.73
In 2004, a report by the Norwegian Reindeer Husbandry Association stated that “wind
power in areas with reindeer pastures were minimal,” and the report sought ways in which
land use for both wind power and reindeer husbandry could “coexist.”74 Unfortunately, in an
updated report issued in 2020, the Association concluded that “wind power interventions in
reindeer grazing land mean that reindeer herders no longer can continue like they have done
for generations.”75 The report supports this ﬁnding with studies that were completed a few
years earlier and updated in 2020. Speciﬁcally, the report noted, “all the districts then still have
problems due to wind power development and several have lost large grazing and operating
areas. None of the districts say that the reindeer have been accustomed to the wind turbines.”76
The reindeer must keep moving to ﬁnd food but stay away from where they would normally
graze because of the noise of the wind turbines.77
In Sweden, “large wind power plants are regarded as environmentally hazardous
activities” and most applications are rejected because of reindeer husbandry.78 Currently,
Sweden has developed wind power on a larger scale than Norway. The Sámi in this area have
stated the result of the wind farms “is much worse than they thought in advance.”79
It appears that others in the region have an issue with the resources being utilized for
wind power farms. In fact, an unlikely alliance between oil and gas supporters and
environmentalists has been created to oppose wind farms.80 One could surmise that Norway
learned some lessons from the 1970-1980 debacle of the Alta Dam, as there have also been
reports that due to local opposition and varying interests, such as reindeer herding, that the
wind power projects will be “limited” and “moderate” but will “not end.”81
It is clear that wind power has created another means to destroy the Sápmi. Wind
power “is in a league of its own in this matter, executing pressure for a pace and scale of
development by wind power companies and authorities that is without comparison
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historically.”82 Perhaps there is hope on the horizon for the Sámi. In October 2021, the Supreme
Court of Norway ruled that the construction of wind turbines in the Fosen district was illegal
and the wind farm licenses were invalid. The Court stated, “there was no question of a collision
between environmental considerations and the reindeer owners’ right to cultural practice.”83
In these situations, involving wind farms, “there are many who have both practical
experience and theoretical knowledge about reindeer husbandry, but they are not desired by the
developers for reindeer husbandry impact assessments. Developers want people without
special reindeer husbandry knowledge, with an apparent professional authority that can be
used to provide conclusions that can justify intervention.”84 Perhaps working with the Sámi and
utilizing árbediehtu in these situations would have provided for holistic response.
Solar Geoengineering (Sweden)
In 2010, the Swedish Commission on Climate and Vulnerability, predicted “a risk of conﬂict
regarding land use between reindeer herding infrastructure, mining, wind power, space
operations, and military exercises.”85 Despite this statement, Sweden continued to build wind
farms in the Sápmi and in the last three years began to explore the idea of another planet
cooling scheme intended to decrease the earth’s rapid warming.86 Up until 2018, “solar
geoengineering” was only done through computer models. Harvard University’s Project,
Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment (SCoPEx) intends on launching the project in
the skies and in different phases.87 SCoPEx intends to spray particles into the air, which in turn
cool the earth by reﬂecting sunlight back into space.88 What kinds of material would be needed
to make the spray particles effective is still being debated and determined.
Between 2018 and 2021, Swedish Space Corporation and Harvard joined together and
determined that the ﬁrst test ﬂight would take place in Kiruna, Sweden.89 The SCoPEx test ﬂight
was not intended to spray any particles according to researchers.90 Regardless, the Sámi
objected and petitioned to stop the experiment stating that it “entails risks of catastrophic
consequences” and constitutes a “real moral hazard.”91 The Sámi’s position makes sense given
the circumstances already unfolding in Kiruna and throughout their history; Kiruna is home to
controversial iron ore mines that have grown wider and closer to the city center of Kiruna every
year. The plan by the Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara AB is to move the entire city.92 Moreover, the
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town sits in the Sápmi and mining has frequently disrupted the reindeer herding. The mines
have caused earthquakes93 and contribute to Sweden’s greenhouse gas emissions.94 The Sámi
have made it clear that these projects are not the solution to the problems posed by climate
change and suggest to, “transform to zero carbon societies in harmony with nature.”95 Although
the tests will not take place in Sweden at this time, SCoPEx is looking for a new area in the
coming year.96
In 2021, the Sámi were also able to successfully defend themselves against the Arctic
Ocean Rail. The project was intended to pass through Finland into Norway and thus through
Sápmi.97 Had the Council continued to pursue the project, it would have decimated reindeer
herds.98
Mineral Extraction for Green Cars (Russia)
The northern part of Russia is rich in minerals, resources, and a diversity of Indigenous
cultures; yet Russia only recognizes a small number of the Indigenous Minority Peoples in the
country.99 Russia abstained from adopting the UNDRIP in 2007.100 Recently, Russia started a
registry in order to track the identity of the Indigenous Peoples in the northern part of Russia,
but it appears to have run into some challenges.101
It is reported that the smallest population of Sámi live in North Russia.102 The Sámi in
Russia face similar challenges to their counterparts in Sweden, Finland, and Norway in terms of
the persecution of their people, language, and culture. A signiﬁcant distinction between the
populations is that there is no separate Sámi Parliament in Russia.103 The Sámi in Russia mainly
reside in the Murmansk, which is also referred to as the Kola Peninsula. The Sámi in North
Russia face an “existential threat” due to climate change as their livelihoods are “intrinsically
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wedded” to the climate.104 Among the visible impacts are “thinning reindeer herds, ﬁsh stocks,
drying lakes, and forest ﬁres.”105 The Sámi are not guaranteed traditional hunting rights.106
Further complicating problems for the Sámi and other Indigenous Peoples in the region is the
Russian government’s interest to expand its presence in the region in order to exploit its
resources and minerals. The registry, mentioned above, appears to have been created to aid this
effort.107
Palladium, a precious metal that is used in electric cars, is mainly produced in Russia,
South Africa, and Canada.108 The largest area of palladium production in Russia is located in the
Arctic area, both in Taymur Peninsula and Kola Peninsula. The largest producer is NorNickel or
Norilsk Nickel, which was started in the 1930s, and is a privately owned company.109 NorNickel
has had the worst environmental track record in North Russia. NorNickel’s products have
raised ecological concerns for years because of the large amount of sulfur dioxide (1,953,000
tons in 2019) emitted.110 Murmansk gained a reputation for acid rain as a result of NorNickel’s
output.111 In 2020, a power plant of a subsidiary company of Norilsk Nickel, began leaking oil. It
was reported that at least 21,000 tons of oil had contaminated the Ambarnaya river and
surrounding area.112 The contamination eventually reached the Arctic Ocean through Lake
Pyasino and linked rivers,113 and Russia began investigating the plant for criminal negligence.114
Four years prior, in 2016, an accident caused by heavy rains led to the ﬁltration dam of its plant
to turn the Daldykan river, red.115 The “mega polluter” has such an impact on Indigenous ways
of life that the communities have collectively called upon US carmaker Tesla not to purchase
mineral resources from the company for its electric cars.116 Sámi activists have stated that the
pollution has “poisoned” the Sámi soul because the nature is poisoned.117
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These particular corporate-made environmental hazards, alongside climate change,
exacerbate poor health conditions of Indigenous People in the area.118 The Sámi have a 2.4 times
higher death rate among other people in Murmansk.119 Norwegian scientists have claimed that
the closure of a local NorNickel plant has already brought great improvement to pollution
indicators.120 However, the damage to the Sámi people, their ability to graze on the tundra with
reindeer, and, ﬁsh appear past the point of no return.
Traditional Homelands, Traditional Knowledge, and Genocide
Genocide and the Traditional Knowledge Factor
One must consider the intentional act of destroying traditional homelands belonging to Peoples
and the destruction of intricately woven Knowledge systems belonging to these groups as the
commission of genocide. For Peoples, “these relationships are encoded in the structure of
Indigenous languages and in Indigenous political and spiritual systems.”121 Separating and
minimizing acts of “environmental destruction” and the eradication of Traditional Knowledge
may lend itself to assisting the perpetrator achieve the desired result of destroying a group in
whole or in part. Further, legal experts in the genocide ﬁeld should carefully consider why there
is a reaction to always separate acts related to the environment from Peoples. For example, the
destruction of the Sápmi in the contexts highlighted above should not be considered as
anything but genocide considering the connection and importance the Sámi have to the
Sápmi.122
As the late Judge Antonio Cassese, a leading jurist in international criminal law,
sensibly pointed out, the Genocide Convention was based on compromise and since then,
“international law has undergone signiﬁcant transformation…Furthermore, it is even more
difﬁcult to understand why genocide can be carried out only through one of the enumerated
acts, since there may be other acts that can be resorted to with a view to destroying one of the
protected groups.”123 Cassese articulated that the “rigidity” around genocide was being
“softened” by the international court system.124
Raphael Lemkin, in his incomplete work, History of Genocide, references cases
throughout three different historical time periods where he examines the genocidaire and the
victim group utilizing the Genocide Convention.125 One such case was the genocide of the
Herero Peoples. The Herero were pastoralists who resided on their ancestral territory. They
were dependent on large herds of cattle, both as a source of sustenance and the cattle were
believed to belong to the ancestors of the Herero People and thus were considered sacred.126 The
Herero were forced to give up their lands to the German settlers, despite treaties that recognized
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“strict equality of the two races.”127 Lemkin utilized observations from those who lived in the
area at the time. One particular writer stated that the Herero were “reduced to a state of
slavery…they do not allow the Herero to own cattle or land except under conditions which
make it next to impossible.”128
Although Lemkin does not examine Traditional Knowledge systems in this writing,
Lemkin’s attention to the Herero matter emphasizes a point he makes earlier in his volume:
“surgical operations on cultures and deliberate assignation of civilizations, which are genocide,
have caused such drastic changes that they can be noticed and scientiﬁc accounts of their
occurrences can be made.”129 Today, the Herero still face the impacts of genocide. Their land has
not been returned to them and the younger generations travel to obtain work. It is reported that
Herero Elders are being asked to preserve their Traditional Knowledge in electronic tablets so
that the next generation can learn the Herero way of life.130
The impact of genocide is far reaching. The destruction of the Sápmi and árbediehtu are
actions that cannot be reversed once they are lost and should be examined as genocide. Using
Lemkin’s words, the “surgical operation” destroying the Sápmi and árbediehtu would be the
equivalent to removing a brain from a human and expecting it to function the way it would if it
still had one.
Preventing Genocide: Towards Specialized Warning Signs?
It would be fruitful to consider that while the international community races to reach “carbon
zero,” the situations involving the Sápmi and TEK no longer serve as a cautionary tale. There
are many Peoples around the world who are suffering and will continue to suffer the same
consequences as the Sámi because governments and corporations can use different means and
methods to carry out unﬁnished business of persecution. Further, it is likely time to consider
that Peoples need updated mechanisms which can assist in the prevention of genocide.
One starting point is re-assessing whether or not the United Nations Framework of
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes (Framework) adequately reﬂects various forms of technology, as
discussed in this article, green tech. It is not an overreach to suggest that the United Nations
Atrocity Framework should consider—at a minimum—hydropower dams, given the World
Commission on Dams report released in 2000. Moreover, the Framework should be updated to
include the environment.131 The United Nations should also consider whether or not the
Framework currently operates in a fashion that would protect Peoples, given the considerations
outlined in UNDRIP which the member states must pay heed to.
Another place that deserves some more attention are the warning signs of genocide. Dr.
Gregory Stanton has indicated that there are 10 stages of genocide which are “predictable” and
therefore, adequate prevention measures can stop genocide.132 The 10 warning stages are
classiﬁcation, symbolization, discrimination, dehumanization, organization, polarization,
preparation, persecution, extermination, and denial. While these 10 stages appear
comprehensive, it is necessary to reconsider them in the context of Peoples, Traditional
Knowledge, and Traditional Homelands. As we have seen with the Sámi, they have been
through various stages of genocide up until present day.
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None of the prevention systems are working to stop the destruction of the Sámpi. No
matter how nuanced the genocide label may be (calling it cultural genocide, ecocide, etc.), all of
this must be considered in order to stop the repeated cycles of destruction Peoples like the Sámi
face.
Conclusion
Traditional Knowledge carries signiﬁcant importance to Peoples and this particular knowledge
system is intimately tied with their Traditional Homelands. As the author has illustrated in this
brief article, the Sámi in the Sápmi have a deep-rooted connection to their Homeland and utilize
Traditional Knowledge. The Sámi, like all of us in the world, are also facing the pressures of
climate change and, in addition, the pressures from governments and corporations, who are
annihilating the Sápmi.
This article focuses on why the actus reus of genocide should be expanded and stay
ﬂexible to the needs of Peoples around the world. As the author has highlighted in this article,
the acts that constitute genocide should be expanded to include destruction of Traditional
Homelands and Traditional Knowledge and its subsets such as TEK because of its central
importance to Peoples. States have an option to always extend across the aisle to work with
Peoples to ﬁnd common ground and holistic solutions instead of treating such systems of
Knowledge hostile to their interests. Recent announcements by the United States government
indicating that it will elevate Indigenous Traditional Ecological Knowledge into US policy, and
the recent announcement of Truth Commissions in Finland and Sweden regarding the Sámi, are
appropriate steps in this direction.
In today’s ever evolving world, with the advent of newer technologies and rapidly
unfolding situations, the crime of genocide must be ready to bend from a narrow view and not
be limited in its application.
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Introduction
Local conditions in South Sudan during the 10-plus years that have elapsed since its
independence on July 9, 2011, have led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians,
including a high proportion of women and children, and the displacement of millions more.
Large-scale, systematic violence intensified after a new conflict erupted in December 2013.
Violent conflict and an array of rapid and slow onset climate disasters have coalesced to
create widespread catastrophic circumstances. While political violence has declined after the
so-called Revitalized Peace Agreement (A-RCSS; Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of
the Conflict in South Sudan) was signed in 2018, communal violence has not abated.1
Additionally, environmental challenges including both droughts and severe flooding
as well as locust swarms have resulted in widespread crop and property damage in the
affected regions. Famine was declared in 2017,2 with current conditions being classified as
widespread acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition.3 As of November 2021, over 800,000
people were reported as affected by flooding in areas along the Nile and Lol rivers, and in
Sudd marshlands since May 2022. Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile States are the worst affected.
Across vast stretches of these regions, thousands of people are crammed onto patches of high
ground bound by stacks of sandbags, as floodwaters have risen to the brink of the sandbag
walls for the third consecutive year.4 An additional 2.3 million South Sudanese remain
refugees hosted in neighboring countries.5
Women and girls have often borne the brunt of the multiple shocks and stresses
pummeling the world’s newest country. From the onset of the conflict, government and
opposition forces committed grave acts of sexual violence, targeting victims based on their
gender, ethnic, and perceived political identities. Thousands of women and girls, but also
civilian men, boys, and children, have been subjected to brutal forms of sexual violence,
including rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, sexual mutilation and torture, and sexual
humiliation. 6 Levels of sexual violence, high even during inter-war periods, skyrocketed as
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the conﬂict spread into previously peaceful areas of the country.7 Once civil war fueled by
ethnic divisions engulfed the country in 2013, violence against women and girls grew even
more pronounced. From 2013 until the end of 2018, soldiers on both sides of the conﬂict used
sexual violence and torture, especially on women and girls, as part of their military strategies.
Furthermore, a complete breakdown of the rule of law permitted armed men to operate with
impunity throughout the conﬂict.
Although most political violence abated when the most recent peace agreement was
signed in September 2018, conﬂict-related sexual violence (CRSV) has persisted. Violence
toward civilians remains pervasive, including targeted attacks, gender-based violence,
kidnappings, and murders. Additionally, water-borne diseases, malaria, malnutrition, and
diarrhea are widespread in the regions affected by ﬂooding and are affecting primarily women
and children.8 Many men have left to search for work and have not returned, leaving mothers to
fend for themselves and their often-numerous children. Burning and pillaging of homes and
livestock is still rampant. Fueled by hunger and desperation, assaults on aid convoys and the
looting of supplies have become increasingly common, making it both difﬁcult and dangerous
for humanitarian efforts to reach in-need families with the support they require to survive.
The intersection of these multiple crises has displaced nearly 4 million South Sudanese,
about half of whom have ﬂed to neighboring countries, mainly Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and
Uganda, resulting in Africa’s largest refugee crisis since the Rwandan genocide in 1994.
Repeated displacement has been common as people have sought to cope with highly volatile
conditions by moving to different places both within and across national borders. Those who
have been forced to ﬂee their homes have lost loved ones and their homes, their land, and their
livelihoods. Widespread displacement exacerbates other risks to the safety of women and girls,
including intimate partner violence and underage pregnancy.
Despite these seemingly insurmountable challenges, South Sudanese women have
made signiﬁcant strides in their push for inclusion in national peace processes. Even when
displaced and, in some cases, especially when in displacement contexts, women are becoming
increasingly politically organized. This is particularly the case at the community or grass-roots
level. Women’s voices are, however, not always heard in high-level discussions, underscoring
the need for more inclusive, multi-track peacebuilding efforts.
Informed by a feminist political ecological framework, and based on research
conducted in South Sudan and in refugee camps in Uganda, this article presents some of the
ﬁndings of a larger longitudinal study of the gender-environment-security nexus in South
Sudan and neighboring countries. The information for the section of the project discussed here
was collected through a combination of desk research and multi-sited ethnographic ﬁeldwork
undertaken in the fall of 2018 and spring/summer of 2019. Part of this work was facilitated by
the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). This ongoing study is currently being conducted
remotely by colleagues from Assistance Mission for Africa (AMA), a Juba-based humanitarian
and development organization in whose board of directors I have served since 2018. Field datagathering methods include focus-group discussions and key informant interviews conducted
with women and girls in both countries. Participatory resource mapping, risk calendars, and
gender and conﬂict analysis tools were also implemented with study participants.
Following this introductory section, I outline the context of mass violence and
environmental fragility and displacement in this beleaguered African country, with a focus on
gender-differentiated impacts. I then turn my attention to the massive displacement affecting a
large proportion of the population. The local responses to these compounded crises, and the
7
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gender-speciﬁc challenges and opportunities facing women and girls in their efforts to
overcome a legacy of violence, environmental crises and displacement are discussed next. I
conclude my analysis by re-emphasizing the signiﬁcance of adopting a gender-sensitive
approach to humanitarian programing in mass violence, climate disasters, forced displacement,
and other complex emergency situations.
The Context of Mass Violence and Environmental Fragility
The links between gender, mass violence, climate change, and human mobility are complex,
often interrelated and mutually constitutive. Rather than constituting a direct causal factor of
the identity-based violence that has characterized the various phases of conﬂict in South Sudan,
climate change has been found to act as a threat multiplier that leads to displacement and
exacerbates the risk of conﬂict. In some cases, displacement is the intervening factor between
adverse environmental conditions and mass violence while, in other cases, displacement is itself
the consequence of climate-induced conﬂict. Women and girls face greater burdens from the
impacts of climate change, environmental shocks and stresses, food insecurity and
displacement, given the subordinated position they occupy in South Sudanese society. The
opportunities to engage in peacebuilding, natural resource governance, and human rights
activism available to them—and the ones they are creating for themselves—are also genderdifferentiated.
Overview of the Conﬂict
The area now recognized as South Sudan has a long history of mass violence and displacement,
having experienced waves of armed conﬂict since the 1950s. The war ended in 2005 following
lengthy political negotiations. A referendum on independence was held from January 9–15,
2011, resulting in the Republic of South Sudan becoming an independent nation on July 9, 2011.
The ofﬁcial ceaseﬁre and subsequent independence facilitated the return of large numbers of
refugees. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that 2.5 million South
Sudanese had returned by 2012.9
High hopes for the young nation were dashed two years later, when South Sudan again
plunged into violent conﬂict. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the ruling
party, imploded in a power struggle between President Salva Kiir, a member of the Dinka ethnic
group, and his former Vice President, Riek Machar, a Nuer. The majority Dinka and the
minority Nuer are the two largest groups in South Sudan and have a history of bloody feuding.
As the national army was divided along Dinka-Nuer ethnic lines, soldiers from each faction
turned against each other in Juba, the nation’s capital. The ﬁghting between those loyal to Kiir
(SPLM-in-government, or SPLM-IG) and Machar’s supporters (SPLM-in-opposition, or SPLMIO) soon spread across the country giving way to a deadly pattern of revenge and counterrevenge attacks. Government forces targeted civilians in areas of high Nuer concentration,
claiming that their aim was to push back against rebel ﬁghters. The failure of several initial
attempts to secure an effective peace agreement among the various parties within the
government resulted in renewed ﬁghting in mid-July 2016. The intensiﬁcation of violence
hampered aid delivery to vulnerable populations across the country.10 Restrictions imposed by
the Government of South Sudan on the UN Mission in the country (known as UNMISS)
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continued to tighten. Inter-communal conﬂicts also intensiﬁed,11 often centering on competition
over land for pasture, cattle raiding, and the abduction of women or children.12
Multiple peace deals and ceaseﬁres were almost immediately violated until a new
“revitalized” peace agreement, known as A-RCSS, was reached in 2018. The cessation of
hostilities has largely held, with partial but noteworthy progress being made in some areas.
Peace, nevertheless, remains tenuous—an unsurprising outcome given how pervasive political
instability and armed struggles have been in South Sudan for most of its almost nine years of
independence. The latest war (2013–2018) resulted in an estimated 382,900 casualties13 and
forced nearly 4.5 million to ﬂee their homes.14 The human and environmental costs of the
conﬂict have been staggering, differentially and disproportionately impacting women and girls.
Violence against Women and Girls
When civil war engulfed the country again in 2013, egregious human rights violations,
including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), were perpetrated with near complete
impunity.15 The already high levels of sexual violence skyrocketed as the conﬂict spread into
previously peaceful areas of the country after the signing of the August 2015 peace agreement.
This was particularly prevalent in the period following the clashes that re-erupted in the capital
city, Juba, in July 2016. Armed men afﬁliated with various military groups routinely attacked
women and girls at gunpoint; those on their way to fetch water and fuelwood, heading to food
distribution sites and, ironically, forcibly displaced women and girls ﬂeeing violence and
environmental disasters in their home villages, have been the most likely targets.16 Whether
conﬂict-related or committed in times of peace, SGBV is a pervasive crime in most cultural
traditions in South Sudan given their pronounced male-centric standpoint.17
In Unity State, which experienced some of the most intensive violence throughout the
conﬂict, government troops committed gruesome acts of gang rape, abducting women, and
keeping them as sex slaves. Between May and December 2015, one of the heaviest periods of
ﬁghting in the area, humanitarian organizations estimated that 1,200 civilians were killed, 1,430
raped, and 1,630 abducted in locations such as Leer, Koch, and Mayendit.18
A 2022 report issued by the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan found that
“these attacks are not random opportunistic incidents but usually involve armed soldiers
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actively hunting down women and girls.”19 Rape carried out during attacks on villages are
systematic and widespread. Although most political violence abated after the signing of the RARCSS, SGBV has persisted and, in some cases, violence against women and girls has
increased. Violent crimes against women and girls during times of conﬂict take place in a
context of pronounced patriarchy and gender inequality. As in other spheres of social life,
gender inequalities result in girls’ far lower access to educational opportunities. Factors
including child marriage and the dearth of prenatal and postnatal healthcare services result in
girls having a much greater probability of dying during pregnancy or childbirth (one in nine)
than of completing primary school (one in one hundred).20
A complete breakdown of the rule of law has permitted armed men to operate with
impunity before, throughout, and after the ofﬁcial end of the conﬂict. The situation is
compounded by the National Police Service’s limited capacity, and their tendency to refer cases
to customary courts. Customary courts are primarily responsible for the administration of
justice throughout the country, and application of customary law remains the primary
mechanism. Many of these customary and local institutions, including traditional courts are,
however, largely ill-equipped to adjudicate cases of violence against women and girls that has
been made more prevalent by conﬂict and the associated breakdown of traditional community
and family structures. Furthermore, customary traditions are often in conﬂict both with
international human rights principles, and with the rights of women and children established
by the Interim Constitution of South Sudan.21
Environmental Insecurity
Anthropogenic climate change exacerbates and compounds this already complex picture. A
changing climate will alter the frequency, intensity, duration, timing, and location of slow- and
sudden-onset of climate-related hazards. According to the Climate Change Vulnerability Index,
South Sudan is among the ﬁve most vulnerable countries in the world, with temperatures
increasing 2.5 times faster than the global average.22 Environmental conditions are becoming
increasingly arid, with intensiﬁed and prolonged periods of drought punctuated by erratic and
brief, but torrential rains. These conditions promote both violence and displacement.
Although there is a wide range of seasonal and yearly variation, overall rainfall has
decreased by 10 to 20 percent, and temperatures have increased by more than
1ºC since the middle of the 1970s.23 At the same time, the frequency of extreme weather events
such as droughts and ﬂoods has increased signiﬁcantly, with more than 55 percent of the South
Sudanese population being directly affected.24 Inadequate rainfall in 2018 exacerbated the
effects of the conﬂict and slashed crop production, with only 52 percent of the national cereal
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needs being met by recent harvests.25 More than half of the families who could harvest only
collected enough food to cover their needs for one to four months, compared to pre-crisis
harvests that would be sufﬁcient for seven months.26 Their situation worsened when
abnormally heavy rainfall from July to October 2020, led to the overﬂow of the Nile, Pibor,
Sobat, Lol, and other rivers. The rains caused inland ﬂooding, mainly in the eastern and central
parts of the country. The ﬂooding eventuated in large-scale displacement of people and cattle,
and damaged or destroyed crops and property. An estimated 1,066,000 people were affected by
the ﬂooding in eight of ten states and one administrative area in South Sudan between July 2020
and January 2021. Of the people affected, an estimated 504,000 were displaced. An estimated
1,066,000 people were affected from July 1, 2020 to January 31, 2021. Some 495,000 people were
affected in Jonglei State and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area were the worst areas.27 Most
of them are agro-pastoralists dependent on climate-sensitive activities for their livelihoods,
including agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry resources, the gathering of wild foods, and
ﬁshing.
Agro-pastoralism is the main means of subsistence in South Sudan’s predominantly
rural areas, with agro-pastoral communities being increasingly exposed to adverse
environmental conditions. These changes have forced pastoralist groups to shift migratory
routes for cattle, often leading to local conﬂicts with farmers and other herders over crop
damages and the access to water and grazing resources.28 Not coincidentally, some of the worst
communal conﬂicts have historically occurred in drought-prone regions. Droughts not only
create poverty and destitution among cattle keeping communities (thus providing strong
incentives for livestock raiding as a means for young herders to improve their livelihoods and
be able to provide the bride price, usually paid in cattle, necessary to marry), they also displace
large populations and bring them together under stressful conditions, which facilitate conﬂict
over scarce resources. As previously noted, displacement tends to exacerbate women’s and
girls’ vulnerability to additional risks including intimate partner violence and underage
pregnancy.
Food Insecurity
Severe food insecurity has been one of the major consequences of the combination of conﬂict
and environmental fragility in South Sudan. When millions of people—including farmers,
shopkeepers, and others involved in producing and distributing food—are forced to ﬂee their
homes, it becomes difﬁcult to ensure adequate food supplies. Farmlands and cattle have been
abandoned, and overall agricultural production has declined drastically. These factors have
adversely affected the ability of the South Sudanese population to earn their livelihood and
participate in the economy. In early 2017, a famine was declared in parts of South Sudan—the
ﬁrst such declaration since Somalia’s in 2011—leaving 100,000 people on the verge of
starvation.29 While the famine declaration was lifted in 2018, an estimated 7.2 million people
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remained in need of humanitarian assistance.30 As a result, large-scale humanitarian food
assistance needs persisted throughout the region in 2020, reaching their peak during June
to September. The risk of famine in certain areas of South Sudan has driven people to IDP
settlements in search of assistance.31 Study participants report that the price of sorghum (the
primary of cereal consumed in South Sudan) is currently 200–350 percent above the ﬁve-year
average in the country.32
A UN-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classiﬁcation (IPC) report accurately
projected that during the ﬁrst half of 2021, an estimated 7.24 million people, or 60 percent of the
country’s population, would face either a state of ofﬁcial food crisis, a challenging situation that
has persisted a year later.33 As South Sudan’s National Policy on Gender recognizes, “although
women are the main producers of food, women and children are the most vulnerable to food
insecurity because of traditional gender roles that limit their access to and control of productive
assets.”34
It is also worth noting that South Sudan has very little formal infrastructure—roads,
buses, buildings—which makes it difﬁcult to transport food and supplies. Many towns and
villages become inaccessible during the annual rainy season due to closed airstrips, washed out
roads, or lack of roads altogether, sometimes limiting any delivery of humanitarian aid to the
isolated areas that need it most. Travel to several of my own research sites required a
combination of cargo planes, helicopters—provided by UNHAS, the UN Humanitarian Air
Service—and occasionally canoes. These logistical constraints, combined with the violent
context, make reaching people with the humanitarian support they desperately need incredibly
challenging and risky.
The UN Ofﬁce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 2
million people, including 1.3 million children under the age of 5, and 676,000 pregnant and
lactating women, are expected to be acutely malnourished in 2022.35 Women tend to experience
greater food insecurity owing to socially ascribed roles as caregivers of children and older
persons, which leads to others being prioritized and served food ﬁrst. Additional cultural
barriers include male control over decisions around income generating activities and over
income earned, and perceptions that females without male support (such as widows and
women-headed households) should not engage in certain service sector activities.36 This
practice poses particular challenges for rural women as most female-headed households in
South Sudan are found in rural areas, which have also been the most severely impacted by the
arrival of locust swarms beginning in 2020.
Locust Swarms
A prolonged bout of exceptionally wet weather, including several rare cyclones that struck
eastern Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, caused massive swarms of locusts to begin forming in
2018. The unusually heavy rain that drenched the otherwise arid deserts of Arabia allowed
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locusts to breed unseen in the wet sands. Strong winds in 2019 blew the growing swarms into
Yemen’s inaccessible conﬂict zones, then across the Red Sea into Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya.
These swarms, which can travel up to 150 kilometers (95 miles) in a day, subsequently spread
into Tanzania, Uganda, and South Sudan. By February 2020, an estimated two thousand locusts
had crossed into southern Magwi County, Eastern Equatoria State, on the South Sudanese
border with Uganda.37
Two months later, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations
warned in their Locust Watch report of April 21, 2020, that the situation in the entire East
African region remained extremely alarming. The insects, which eat their own body weight in
food every day, have been breeding so rapidly that numbers could grow 500 times by the
summer. The swarms are a consequence of climate change; unusually wet weather created
perfect conditions for the new swarms to mature and lay eggs. The eggs hatch into hopper
bands during May and form new swarms in late June and July, which coincides with what is
normally the start of the harvest. Illustrating the link between conﬂict and challenging
environmental conditions, the war in Yemen may also have played a role; violence in Yemen
constrained the ability of local authorities to control the ﬁrst swarms before they crossed over
into the Horn of Africa.38 The progression of the locust swarms represents an unprecedented
threat to food security and livelihoods as it coincides with the beginning of the long rains and
the planting season. The invasion is worsening food shortages in a region where up to 25
million people are suffering from three consecutive years of droughts and ﬂoods. FAO reported
that a 1 km2 locust swarm could eat approximately the same amount of food in one day as
35,000 people,39 an alarming fact given the region’s pre-existing food insecurity. Further
destruction of harvests by locusts will likely lead to an even more severe risk of widespread
famine.
East African communities, including those in South Sudan, have not been confronted
with such large invasions for at least a quarter of a century. Governments in the region now ﬁnd
themselves scrambling for pesticides, protective clothing, fumigators, and aircraft to ﬂy above
the locust swarms and spray them dead. Compounding the locust emergency, the coronavirus
pandemic has prompted the grounding of most ﬂights, and cargo supply chains have become
more expensive and less reliable. Beyond the direct impact of reduced food production and
destroyed crops for entire communities in eastern Africa,40 communities were forced to ﬁnd
new lands and sources of income and food elsewhere. These movements of populations in
search of cultivable land and food may reignite tensions and inter-communal clashes among
pastoralist communities, and between pastoralists and farmers, in the affected countries. Due to
compounding shocks, both in areas of displacement and return, populations have been
repeatedly forced to ﬂee their homes and seek safer, more livable circumstances elsewhere.
Conditions of protracted and recurrent displacement continue to impact pre-existing
vulnerabilities and coping capacities of the affected populations, with women and girls being
impacted both differentially and disproportionately.
Massive Displacement
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Complex emergencies resulting from the convergence of climate disasters and mass violence,
like that experienced in South Sudan, can drive displacement in a number of ways. When severe
climate conditions strike regions already experiencing civil unrest, the combined pressures on
the population can both intensify violence and lead to greater displacement. This kind of cycle
between displacement and mass violence can be self-perpetuating. Environmental extremes can
also contribute to, or exacerbate, conﬂict when the resulting water and food insecurity fuels
political instability, leading to outbreaks of violence among local communities. Similarly,
climate change feeds into the environment-conﬂict nexus as a “threat multiplier,” intensifying
competition for already scarce resources, including food, water, energy, and even habitable land.
The many causes of displacement make for complex dynamics that frequently overlap.
This has all been the case in South Sudan where some of the main drivers are the civil war that
began in 2013, inter-communal violence and recurrent natural hazards such as ﬂoods and
drought. Over 1 million South Sudanese refugees have been displaced into neighboring Uganda
in the largest mass exodus on the continent since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the third
largest in the world after Syria and Afghanistan. Close to 2 million civilians are internally
displaced within South Sudan, over 200,000 of whom are currently living on UN bases under
the protection of the peacekeeping mission. The number of South Sudanese refugees currently
stands at over 2.2 million people,41 while an estimated 1.5 million were internally displaced in
2019.42 Almost 259,000 new conﬂict displacements were recorded in 2019. Floods triggered
about 294,000 new displacements that year. In the ﬁrst half of 2020, there were 232,000 new
displacements associated with conﬂict and violence, and 23,000 from climate disasters.43
Additionally, a signiﬁcant but less often discussed source of displacement are cattle raids and
the persistent attacks on civilians by armed cattle keepers. Cattle raids involve not just cattle
theft but also looting and destruction of housing and property, and often involve multiple forms
of violence against civilians, including killing, injury, abduction, and rape.
Figures from the UN Refugee Agency’s Regional Refugee Response Plan (Regional RRP) for
South Sudan, 2020–2021 indicate that, while an estimated 200,000 South Sudanese refugees were
reported to have returned spontaneously since 2017, these returns have not been sustainable
and led to a majority living in IDP-like situations; that is, conditions of internal displacement.
Ongoing protracted displacement of South Sudanese refugees is expected to exert further
pressure on the already limited economic resources of the host countries.44
While records are rarely disaggregated by gender or age, the UN Refugee Agency
estimates that 83 percent of the overall South Sudanese refugee population are comprised of
women and children.45 Often characterized as groups with “special needs,” women and girls
are susceptible to multiple protection risks, including lack of basic services, food insecurity, and
different forms of violence including beatings, rape and gang rape, sexual assault, and forced
labor, as discussed in the previous section. Displacement and the resulting changes in living
circumstances—whether in a refugee settlement, a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs),
a protection of civilians (PoC) site, or a host community within or across national borders—have
forced South Sudanese women and girls to cope with new environments and changing social
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structures. Even when sheltered within structures speciﬁcally established to offer refuge to
displaced populations such as settlements and camps, women’s and girls’ protection concerns
are seldom fully resolved as violence against them, including SGBV, remains a constant threat,
perpetrated by aggressors from within and outside the camp who act in an environment of
impunity. In a country where four in ﬁve people endure extreme poverty, and 70% need
humanitarian assistance, women and girls are shouldering disproportionate responsibility as
caregivers, breadwinners, and protectors for families and communities that have been ravaged
by conﬂict, submerged by ﬂoods, attacked by locusts, weakened by famine, and repeatedly
driven into forced displacement.
Responses to the Crises through a Gender Lens
Against the backdrop of the major environmental and social changes sweeping the country,
there has been notable progress related to South Sudanese women’s participation in public life.
During the previous war, many women took on community responsibilities and leadership
roles traditionally assigned to males. Nominated as community chiefs, some of these women
were in charge of food distribution and provision of services for orphans, widows, and other
potentially vulnerable groups. Women in exile—for example, those living in refugee camps and
settlements—became particularly active and organized themselves across ethnic groups
working towards the return of peace.46 My research among displaced women and girls indicates
that they developed a more ﬂexible outlook on job acceptability than those who stayed behind.
Brewing and selling beer, and occupations that involve interacting with non-kin males—for
example, waitressing in restaurants and bars, considered disreputable by local standards—are
mainly undertaken by displaced women.47
As part of my larger study of the gender-environment-security nexus in South Sudan, I
have also had the opportunity to speak with female South Sudanese survivors of SGBV both in
South Sudan and in several diaspora countries, including Egypt, Uganda, the UK, and the US.
Most recently, in the late summer of 2019, I visited a rehabilitation project in Ganyliel, a town on
the banks of the Nile River in South Sudan’s Unity State. Accessible only by plane or boat, and
sheltered by marshes which form natural defenses in the center of the country, Ganyliel was
spared the worst of the war. The women in this program, known as “Beam of Hope,” are
overcoming the physical and psychological trauma of the SGBV they endured through
counseling, mutual support, and assistance with various livelihood schemes. Although ﬁshing
is traditionally considered a male activity, women in Ganyliel can be seen navigating the town’s
waterways in tree-carved boats and selling their catch in the town’s market. In doing so, they
support themselves and their households, and contribute to the food security of a region that
has often had to rely on food distributions by the UN’s World Food Program.
Women members of civil society have demanded a broadening of the political agenda
to include protection, education, health, and attention to environmental issues, especially as
they impact livelihood provision. Female civil society leaders acted as ofﬁcial observers in the
2018 peace process; women comprised 25 percent of the delegates, while one woman served as
a mediator. Women also constitute the majority of breadwinners in the country, as 58 percent of
South Sudanese households are female-headed. That percentage reaches up to 80 percent
among displaced households.48
In the face of the severity of the violence women engaged in a range of strategies to
prevent mass atrocities and mitigate their escalation. Nyathon Hoth Mai, a researcher and
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lecturer at the University of Juba, describes South Sudanese women’s roles in atrocity
prevention as follows:
Women’s organizations framed the conﬂict as a conﬂict
between men, rather than as an ethnic conﬂict or a conﬂict
between women, in an effort to present women as one tribe.
The Women Monthly Forum invited the Bentiu Women
Network from Nuer, for example, to call for dialogue and the
prevention of atrocities. Women also travelled to the United
States to appeal to Madame Angelina, the wife of [South
Sudanese Vice President and, at the time, Rebel Leader] Reik
Machar, to use her inﬂuence to convince him to end the
conﬂict. On the ground, women’ block organizations
distributed food, water, and clothing to the wounded in
hospitals.49
Legal restrictions, and the threat of harassment by South Sudanese security forces,
placed considerable constraints on civilian women’s and men’s ability respond to acts of mass
violence. In some circumstances, violence persisted despite civilian actions; in others, womenled efforts successfully mitigated risks and discouraged violence. Signiﬁcantly, a women’s
delegation met with UN Security Council members during their October 2019 visit to Juba to
demand the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS). The HCSS is intended
to bring perpetrators to justice and reduce impunity for war crimes, including those committed
against women and girls, as required by the peace agreement (R-ARCSS) signed in 2018.
Chapter ﬁve of the R-ARCSS requires the transitional government to form the Commission for
Truth, Reconciliation and Healing, the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, and a compensation and
reparation authority. In January 2021, South Sudan’s government ﬁnally gave approval to
establish accountability mechanisms to address the country’s conﬂict, including a war crimes
court in partnership with the African Union (AU).50 Provided that concrete action is taken to
operationalize these mechanisms, this could represent an important step to reduce impunity
and bring a measure of justice to victims and survivors.
Also noteworthy is South Sudan National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and
Security, originally launched in 2015. Supported by UN WOMEN, this NAP was developed
through a consultation of various peace and security stakeholders. The process was led by the
Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW), with the United Nations Mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS) as the co-chair. According to PeaceWomen, a New York-based
organization with a particular focus on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, the “National
Steering Committee comprised of government ministries, commissions, United Nations
agencies and civil society organizations, coordinates and monitors the South Sudan National
Action Plan implementation, ... and is intended to ensure that the National Action Plan is
aligned with the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011, the South
Sudan Development Plan, 2011–2013, and all other existing laws and policies.”51
It must however be born in mind that the elimination of gender-based legal
discrimination only constitutes a ﬁrst step. To effect a meaningful impact on women’s lives,
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legal frameworks must be supported by gender-sensitive public institutions and concrete,
effective action on the ground to ensure the sustainability of gender equality policies. Women
and girls face greater burdens from the impacts of climate change, environmental shocks and
stresses, and food insecurity, given the subordinated position they occupy in South Sudanese
society. This profoundly subordinated status and the pervasively patriarchal gender norms that
regulate social life are inconsistent with the progressive stance expressed in South Sudan’s
normative frameworks. The persistently high levels of sexual and gender-based violence
(SGBV) discussed in earlier sections are also a manifestation of patriarchal attitudes.
The current peacebuilding phase in South Sudan nonetheless offers signiﬁcant
opportunities for advancing gender equality, mainstreaming women’s perspectives in
peacebuilding, and fostering their budding efforts in environmental stewardship. In recent
years, South Sudanese women have made signiﬁcant strides in their push for inclusion in
national peace processes. Women negotiators were crucial in shaping the 2018 peace agreement
—“revitalizing” what had been a stalled and contentious process—and in securing a new quota
that requires 35 percent of government representatives to be women, opening the door for a
more expansive role in national affairs.52
Looking Ahead
As climate change intensiﬁes and extreme weather events wreak havoc on communities, human
populations are becoming increasingly mobile. According to some estimates, events linked to
climate change—including extreme drought and desertiﬁcation, wildﬁres, severe ﬂooding, sealevel rise, agricultural losses, food and water insecurity—are expected to forcibly displace
between 50 and 200 million people worldwide by 2050.53 Risk-informed development strategies
and policies have the potential to reduce vulnerability and enhance the ability of individuals
and communities to cope with, respond to, and acquire the necessary skills to deal with shocks
and stressors, including those posed by the combination of climate change and mass violence.
Displaced women and girls require tailored support and protection to ensure their
safety and ability to exercise their rights. The normative framework relevant to their situation is
fairly comprehensive, but implementation lags far behind in many countries. Better data and
analysis can help to improve policies and programs aimed at providing displaced females with
the right resources to meet their speciﬁc needs. Gender-disaggregated data and analysis, and
targeted policies and programs backed by sufﬁcient funds are needed to better address the
impacts of conﬂict, environmental crises and displacement on women’s and girls’ lives.
As the previous discussion has illustrated, South Sudan has been at the epicenter of an
array of destructive dynamics almost since its independence from Sudan in 2011. The country
faces multiple socio-economic, political, and environmental challenges, as it exhibits one of the
highest compound fragility-climate risks globally. Forced displacement has been a common
response to these challenging environmental and security conditions, with women and girls
comprising a large proportion of South Sudan’s refugee population.54 They are often more likely
to ﬂee in the face of conﬂict, violence, disasters, and climate change, and are therefore at greater
risk of displacement. In turn, displacement reinforces pre-existing discrimination and
socioeconomic disadvantages. Women often face greater challenges than men in securing a
decent livelihood in displacement, with repercussions on their ability to ﬁnd shelter and
security, and to access education and healthcare. Undaunted, South Sudanese women have
persisted on making their voices heard, even though traditional gender norms have often
restricted them from doing so. Their determination to participate in decisions on matters that
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affect them must be encouraged. The limited but noteworthy progress they have made against
all odds must not be allowed to be reversed.
By understanding the cascading nature of the impacts of climate change on ethnically
divided, fragile, and conﬂict-prone countries, decision makers will be better able to plan, adapt
and manage risks. Lessons from South Sudan can, by qualiﬁed extension, guide efforts to
advance and sustain peace and security in other contexts and inform responses to the
challenges posed by climate change and deteriorating environmental conditions. South Sudan’s
transformation from conﬂict to recovery is underway, but much needs to be done to secure a
peaceful and prosperous future for all. The overall security, rule of law, and human and
women’s rights situation in South Sudan remains highly volatile and implementation of the RARCSS lags, in particular the foreseen cantonment and disarmament of armed groups. Unless
the country’s political and civil society leaders, including the members of women’s groups,
make a concerted effort to implement the transitional and peace processes, South Sudan will
remain highly fragile and unprepared for future climate shocks. During this critical time when
humanity faces a potentially existential threat in the combined destructive forces of violent
conﬂict and climate change, women and girls in South Sudan and across the globe, must, with
their male counterparts, be at the forefront of a worldwide response that is sensitive to local
contexts.
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Prologue by Way of A Media Scandal
In November 2019, climate activist, Roger Hallam, in the course of an interview with the
prestigious German newspaper, Die Zeit, sparked a public storm with remarks he made on the
Holocaust.1 Hallam, largely unknown on the wider public scene until the previous year, shot
to prominence as co-founder and, to a critical degree, driving force, if not prophetic voice,
behind Extinction Rebellion—XR—the grass-roots, non-violent direct action movement that,
from 2018, has mounted global protests demanding that governments act with urgency and
immediacy to avert the existential threat to humanity and bio-diversity caused by
anthropogenic (human-induced) climate change.2 Hallam’s Holocaust comments, however,
had XR groups in Germany, Britain, and elsewhere, rushing to disavow him. Hallam’s fall
from grace was swift and seemingly irreversible.
Interrogating what it was about what Hallam said to cause such offence is necessarily
relevant to our discussion here. However, more importantly for this piece is the more
searching question as to why Hallam felt it necessary to invoke the Holocaust at all, when
otherwise speaking about climate change. On the first score, by Hallam’s own account, he was
unnecessarily drawn into a discussion by the interviewer about where the Holocaust sits in
terms of genocides in history. His response at this point was spectacularly inept—the use of
an expletive to suggest that the human scale of the Holocaust was comparable with other
incidents of mass murder within the last 500 years being at the nub of the ensuing
controversy.3 Hallam’s strenuous efforts to admit to and apologize for his crass insensitivity,
however, proved insufficient to assuage his detractors. Yet paradoxically, far from seeking to
diminish its significance, Hallam had actually “referenced the Holocaust several times”
during the course of the interview to underscore the much greater scale of, and governmental
complicity in, the “global holocaust... already underway” as a consequence of “lethal levels of
CO2” being pumped into the atmosphere by “the Global North.”4 Nor were these remarks
inconsistent with what Hallam had been arguing in written form. For instance, in Common
Sense for the 21st Century, for which the Die Zeit interview was meant to herald its German
publication, Hallam states:
A moral analysis might go like this: one recent scientiﬁc
opinion stated that at 5C above the pre-industrial mean
temperature, we are looking at an ecological system capable of
sustaining just one billion people. That means 6–7 billion
people will have died within the next generation or two. Even
if this figure is wrong by 90%, that means 600 million people
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face starvation and death in the next 40 years. This is 12 times
worse than the death toll (civilians and soldiers) of World War
Two and many times the death toll of every genocide known to
history. It is 12 times worse than the horror of Nazism and
Fascism in the Twentieth Century.5
To be sure, Hallam, notwithstanding his doctoral research, is not a Holocaust nor a
genocide scholar while some, who are, on the one hand might legitimately take issue with his
assumptions as to the historic scale of genocide fatalities and, on the other, his seeming elision
of specifically Nazi-perpetrated Jewish suffering. Yet what cannot be gainsaid is that Hallam’s
public and written utterances have been both consistent and insistent in drawing an affective
linkage between the failure of the international community to act to stop Hitler committing
mass murder then, and its failure to prevent the perpetration of what he argues will be mass
murder of an entirely greater order of magnitude now, and the immediate victims, to be sure,
primarily peoples of the Global South but ultimately embracing all humanity. In short,
Hallam has taken the Holocaust mantra of “never again” at face value in order to quite
consciously mobilize moral outrage against the indifference, or worse, of criminal
irresponsibility of political leaders who do nothing in the face of climate catastrophe.
This think-piece is not about Roger Hallam as such but rather seeks to explore what
we here refer to as the Holocaust paradigm—more precisely, the way the historic reality of
Nazi-led Jewish destruction has become embedded in late 20th and early 21st century
Western culture—may or may not offer a guide as to how we confront the accelerating and
overwhelming threat of self-destruction as a consequence of anthropogenic climate change.
Our brief answer is paradoxically affirmative. There is a purposefulness in making the
linkage as Hallam has done. To arrive at this conclusion, our aim is to interrogate something
about the nature of the paradigm both of itself and in terms of its applicability to the climate
emergency. Then, we will briefly restate the gravity of the latter in terms of our diminishing
options for collective survival and societal well-being. Finally, we will suggest how elements
of the paradigm might alert us to the potentiality for an exponential wave of crimes against
humanity if national and international society persists in its systemic “business as usual”
refusal to confront our existential crisis.
Objections and Caveats to the Argument
But first, let us start by raising some of the pertinent objections and caveats to this line of
enquiry. “It is easier to feel, conceptualize, and narrate the immediate, spectacular violence of
war or genocide than the glacial, silent, violence wrought by carbon emissions.”6 Though this
statement from an environmentally focused historian is certainly challengeable, it does rather
throw into relief the problem of comparing the ostensibly (if inaccurately) creeping process of
climate breakdown with anything quite as viscerally gut-wrenching as an Auschwitz or
Treblinka.
Actually, Hallam, in his Die Zeit interview, offered an altogether more compelling
historical thread connecting war and climate change by way of late 19th and early 20th
century Belgian colonial mass murder in the Congo. The first cause of what the Congolese
speak of as the Lokeli, “the overwhelming”—with an overall death toll through direct atrocity,
starvation, and disease as high as 10 million people, half the region's population—lies in the
voracious Western demand for natural rubber on the cusp of the age of the combustion
engine.7 Add to this, an almost exact hundred years on, a series of overlapping resource wars
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centered on eastern Congo, not least for control of tantalum, the rare but essential metal we
commonly associate with making capacitors for mobile phones—this time with an estimated
5.4 million death toll, making it the single most devastating conflict since World War II8—and
we might posit that the three-sided relationship between violence, Western rapacity, and the
origins of catastrophic climate change, hardly requires Holocaust signposting. All the basic
building blocks are instead available in an African, colonial and post-colonial, heart of
darkness.
Moreover, if the potential scale of avoidable death in the high age of the
Anthropocene is the primary issue at stake, then there is an even more obvious climate
change parallel. When Daniel Ellsberg, after much effort, laid eyes, in spring 1961, on the topsecret Pentagon document estimating likely fatalities from a nuclear war, the approximate
number stated was 600 million.9 But that was only on the basis of a US first strike on the
Warsaw Pact, not a full-scale superpower nuclear exchange. Two decades later, scientists
proceeded to factor in the effects of a post-exchange “nuclear winter,” turning the prospect of
mega-genocide into omnicide. More recently, the relationship between nuclear Armageddon
and climate catastrophe has been further reinforced by some earth scientists who contend that
the most appropriate stratigraphical marker for the onset of the Anthropocene should be set
at Trinity, the first July 1945 nuclear test, preceding Hiroshima and Nagasaki.10
So, the question might arise, if we have to make climate change comparisons with
other historical events at all, why do we need the Holocaust when there are others with which
the former, in causative terms, is more closely intermeshed? Peter Novick famously argued
some two decades ago that the Holocaust was an entirely unsatisfactory benchmark by which
to “learn lessons” about slavery, prejudice, or, for that matter, other genocides.11 If we want to
explore systemic abnegations of political responsibility, as they cross-relate to biospheric
breakdown, the capitalist-driven, imperial urge to conquer, subjugate and gobble up peoples
and their eco-systems in all hemispheres,12 and then, to envisage, as did post-1945 nuclear
planners, their total extermination, arguably offer far more coruscating insights. And if we
wanted to take this a step further, to highlight how the boomerang effects of systemic
dysfunction has runaway ecological and thus zoonotic consequences too, we need go no
further than cross-reference climatic stress with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic.13 True, it
is more difficult to become outraged against a viral blob of ribonucleic acid than willful
human perpetrators. By contrast, both the peace movement and Black Lives Matter, as heirs of
earlier racial and social justice movements, have been equally empowered by way of a
profound sense of shock and rage at what some human beings are capable of doing to other
human beings. Yet on this score, in the first two decades of the 21st century, neither have had
the same degree of association, or traction in the broader public sphere, as has the Holocaust.
The Holocaust Paradigm in its Various Formulations
It is not our purpose here to reprise how this has happened. It is enough to concur that it is
not only treated in contemporary Western consciousness “as an embodiment of the most
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horrible and radical evil in modern history”14 but “a benchmark against which other events
are judged”15 even to the point “where the destruction of European Jewry gradually has
become the story of the destruction of life in general.”16 This “foundational past”17 that
Western society has fashioned for itself in the last three decades thus holds the Holocaust as
the moral compass for its own political and societal behavior as that too of the wider world. 18
Not surprisingly then, it has also become “an echo chamber of contemporary anxiety, a ready
symbol, often a symbol that circulates out of any planned control or deployment, embedded
in the sites, cycles of events and language of our public discourse.”19 This, in turn, might
explain why those who claim themselves as its gatekeepers have been so ready to cry
anathema against those, including Hallam, charged with offending against its hallowed
status.
However, this further problematizes the very issue of instrumental value that Hallam
seeks to draw from the paradigm. After all, in its most orthodox mainstream rendering, the
Holocaust is deemed incomparable to anything else. It is an event of “unique evil”20 lending
itself to a form of ritualized priestly incantation, even to the point, as Jeffrey Alexander has
suggested, of turning it into a sacralized “trauma drama.”21 Making connections across to
other events in this strictest of commemorative formulae—as arguably best exemplified by
the Yad Vashem memorial museum in Israel—is neither solicited, nor urged as a basis for
solidarity or empathy with today's powerless, let alone as a requirement for “real moral
action.”22 Instead, the insistent requirement on ourselves as commemorants is to remember
what was done to Jews and thus yet might be done—if we are not vigilant against
antisemitism—to Jews alone.
To be sure, there is a more universalizing tendency, more familiarly associated with
the Stockholm Forum initiative. This tendency, which takes Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD)
as its starting point, does seek to promote cosmopolitan values of “diversity and tolerance... a
society free from prejudice and racism and in which all members have a sense of belonging.”23
Even then, what is interesting about this more ostensibly empathetic direction of travel is the
degree to which it is essentially top-down, certainly offering a pointer to what the “benign”
state, founded on notions of “integration, citizenship and community engagement”24 might
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be, but one, nevertheless, for all its nods at supranational ethics, is determined and curated
according to the imperatives of the (powerful) nation-state. This is reflected, for instance, in
the selectivity with which other pre-, or post-Holocaust genocides and instances of mass
murder are, or are not, embraced within the pantheon of HMD celebration each year, as
usually dependent on either ephemeral or ongoing foreign policy considerations. Similarly,
the “rightness” of combatting contemporary wrongdoing may be intoned by way of uplifting
personal stories of Holocaust resistance and rescue. Yet, here too the sublimal message is to
encourage us, as HMD lay congregants, to affirm the moral high ground upon which our own
contemporary society ostensibly stands, thereby deflecting from, or worse, acting as alibi for
its political complicity in actual or structural violence.25
The Holocaust paradigm thus, in its conservative but mainstream persona, offers a
screen through which the public are encouraged to identify with an event of the most acute
and exceptional past suffering and atrocity but minus any real requirement to act on this as if
this were relatable to egregious injustices in the world we actually inhabit. On the contrary,
the very “liturgy” of this priestly voice with its pathos,26 melancholic, “quasi-sublime
catharsis,”27 solemn ceremony, often “sanctimonious” public speeches,28 and, year on year,
increasingly hollow iterations of “never again,” is little short of a recipe for reducing the
public’s role in, or more importantly through it, to that of compliant “bystanders.” To be sure,
as a public relations exercise—by way of seeking us to be “nice” and virtuous to one another
—it may serve to buttress the public persona of the neo-liberal order. But set against the
dysfunctional reality of that order as prime driver of ecological breakdown—and hence mass
omnicidal violence—the paradigm in this form is more than simply inadequate. It could also
be perceived as malignant.
So, is there a voice through which we might envisage the paradigm as neither priestly,
passive nor redundant, but prophetic, active, and purposeful, that is, for an age of biospheric
emergency? Hallam, amongst others, believes so. But that would require drawing on an
alternative current of Holocaust thought, largely marginalized or diluted by the mainstream
orthodoxy. Hannah Arendt wrote towards the end of her life: “the sad truth of the matter is
that most evil is done by people who never made up their minds to be or do either evil or
good.”29 Need we be reminded that it was rarely, if ever, the normative state or its institutions,
whether Axis, subjugated to, or belligerent with Nazi Germany, who actively resisted the
Holocaust? People who did so almost invariably acted out of their own individual or
collective volition, mostly from the grassroots and almost always against their own society’s
hegemonic norms and wisdoms. It is this very reality that makes problematic today’s
mainstream appropriation of such resisters into its celebratory canon. The alternative, active
voice, by contrast, as applied by climate change resisters in the Hallam mode, would enlist
those historic resisters not only as virtuous forbears, but their acts of resistance exemplars for
how to drive a wedge into the inertia, the paralysis of non-doing, or, again, “thinking”
Arendt, the “banality of evil,” which prevents contemporary Western society from
confronting its own self-induced dystopia.30
To be sure, the imminence of this dystopia, albeit on a shrinking timescale, is still at
one small remove from most of us in the West, or, more broadly, Global North (indigenous,
marginalized, and poor people most obviously excepted), the weight of biospheric
25
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breakdown instead falling on peoples of the Global South. This, in itself, might underscore the
lacuna in the orthodox version of the Holocaust paradigm, through its inability,
unwillingness, or both, to draw out the bonds between Jewish (and other) genocides
committed in a 20th century European and near-European arena, and those perpetrated in the
colonial sphere. Granted, the blind spot has never been total. Arendt, for instance, may not
have drawn a causal link but at least she brought European imperialism and antisemitism
into the same orbit.31 Other more contemporary commentators, such as Michael Rothberg,
have explored how liberationist movements in their decolonial struggles, as well as black civil
rights activists closer to home, have not waited for a hegemonic Western cue to link their
experiences with that of the Holocaust.32 Even so, Amos Goldberg has been right to lament
how post-Holocaust and post-colonial discourses have rarely coincided.33 Perhaps this may
go some way to explain the seeming inability of the Holocaust paradigm mainstream to
effectively highlight or censure the abject failure of Western governments to come to the aid of
Jewish refugees as they fled Nazi Germany, and then Nazi Europe; instead, blocking off
escape routes in the face of an emerging “final solution,” when there is such a glaring
contemporary resonance in the failure of the hegemonic Global North—Western liberal states
included—to protect the conditions of life in a Global South from a wholly more gargantuan
refugee fate. Indeed, we might ironically borrow here from mainstream Holocaust discourse
itself to note that intent is not required to charge culpability or complicity in such
contemporary crimes against humanity. Complicity can be structurally as well as functionally
built-in to an elite modus operandi, in this case founded in the way the vulnerable and
exposed in the Global South have been doubly displaced, first by global capitalism, second by
its even more far-reaching climate consequences.
To summarize the argument thus far, the Holocaust paradigm’s active voice is
predicated on a human catastrophe that was preventable before the event but which liberal
elites failed to halt, the historical memory of which offers due warning as to what will happen
on a global scale if nothing tangible is done in the face of today’s clear and present danger.
Certainly, then as now, a complicity of avoidance and inaction can be levelled against society
at large. But if the nub of the failing then lay with a powerful liberal order’s impotence in the
face of Hitler, what is at issue today is that order’s failure to confront the fact that its entire
global system—as founded, above all, on corporate interests’ accelerated emission of
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere—will lead to human catastrophe tout ensemble. There
most certainly is a singular paradox in this latter instance in that the burning of fossil fuels,
not to say intensive, livestock-centered, hence methane-producing agribusiness, are
corporately touted and normatively treated as beneficial to human wellbeing—albeit willfully
ignoring the structural, quotidian violence against the world’s poorest, who are dispossessed,
made ill and hungry, psychically if not actually displaced, and prematurely die as a
consequence.34 Nevertheless, the conjuring trick involved is ultimately at all our expense. As
the leading climate scientist, Michael Mann, puts it:
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The great tragedy of the climate crisis is that seven and a half
billion people must pay the price—in the form of a degraded
planet—so that a couple of dozen polluting interests can
continue to make record proﬁts. It is a great moral failing of our
political system that we have allowed this to happen.35
The active voice thus reaches back to the Holocaust in order to mobilize non-violent
rebellion in the present to ensure that “our political system” is forced to act to prevent our
contemporary moral failing before it is too late. But before we explore Holocaust-climate change
linkages a little further, there is a missing piece in this jigsaw. Rhetorically put, are we really
talking about global mass murder?
The Path to Biospheric Collapse
This essay is not about the science of anthropogenic climate change per se. But just as with
Covid, lay people, myself included, will continue to ask the same, insistent question: how bad
is it? For the more than thirty years now that earth scientists have been intensively plotting its
trajectory and modelling potential outcomes, the fulcrum of the debate has revolved around
how much increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions into the atmosphere above preindustrial levels, CO2 in particular, will push up temperatures beyond what is considered a
“safe” limit and within which “civilization,” as we know it, can continue to “normatively”
function.36 However, we might note that just as with the Holocaust paradigm, climate science
too, on the temperature rise issue, has its own orthodox, mainstream versus radical minority
fault-line.
The more conventional wisdom—as framed through the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—seeks a hold of 1.5-degree temperature
rise above pre-industrial levels or failing that, no higher than 2 degrees. The thinking, as
reflected in ongoing UN-organized fora, most significantly the 2016 Paris International
Agreement on Climate Change, is founded on calculations as to a global carbon budget still
available before that 1.5- or 2-degree limit is irreversibly breached.37 In other words, the
implicit proposition is that a dramatic but nevertheless incremental curtailment in carbon and
other emissions over coming decades to ‘net’ zero by 2050, can yet avert a complete systemic
breakdown.
But putting to one side the highly vexed issue as to whether there is such a
scientifically quantifiable thing as a safe—or alternatively dangerous—climate boundary (not
to say the utter sophistry of ‘net’ zero pronouncements),38 such orthodox prognostications
have been seriously challenged by other cutting-edge researchers such as Kevin Anderson
who have argued that failure to properly factor in the time-lag before pre-existing cumulative
emissions—primarily from the Global North—kick into the atmosphere, will scupper any
notional 2-degree limit even if it were possible to instantly turn off the entire fossil-fuel
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engine.39 Indeed, moving away from a linear approach to one where the amplification effects
from the feedback dynamics of the natural world provide a fuller picture of climate
sensitivity, and the whole idea of being able to technocratically “manage” climate change rise
while at the same time essentially carrying on a somehow near normal fossil fuel economy
entirely, collapses in on itself. The awareness of this yet even bleaker reality has begun to seep
into a more active wing of political thinking. For example, the drafters of the private members
Climate Ecological and Emergency Bill, before the British parliament as of late 2020, assume
that even if all Paris pledges were implemented, a radicalized derangement of biogeochemical
cycles would lead to at least a 3 degrees temperature rise. As the Bill’s executive summary
states:
… current policies will lead to around 3ºC of warming by the
end of the century—but it could easily be 4ºC or more. These
levels of global heating would open us up to unacceptable
risks, including the loss of the Amazon rainforest,
simultaneous failures of staple crops and multi-meter sea level
rise. Many scientists believe 4°C would be incompatible with
any reasonable characterisation of an organised, equitable and
civilised global community.40
Actually, even this sangfroid understatement may be a radical shortfall in what could
be before us. The independent systems analyst, David Wasdell, for instance, who specializes
in combining the various earth sub-system feedback mechanisms amplifying the effects of
anthropogenic disturbances into a macro-picture, has recently revised an earlier, already grim
forecast upwards to a “baked in” temperature something in the region of 10 degrees above the
pre-industrial level.41 Such a shift would be so off the geological scale that a mass extinction
event, as at the end of the Permian period 251 million ago, when 95 per cent of then species
on earth were wiped out, would be a dead certainty.42
But whether it is the cautious, conservative IPCC modelers, or the radical dissenters
whose scenarios ultimately prove more accurate, it should not require proficiency in the
language of CO2 forcing, feedback loops, tipping points, or indeed rocket science, to agree
with Greta Thunberg that “our world is on fire.”43 A more arresting analogy still might be
Shoshana Zuboff’s narrative of when her house was struck by lightning. In what she
describes as a “powerful lesson in the comprehension-defying power of the unprecedented,”
she recalls how she ran upstairs to close doors in order to protect the bedrooms from
encroaching smoke damage only to be yanked out the front door by an arriving fire marshal
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as the house exploded in flames.44 In the last few years we have all seen on our computer or
TV screens the wild mega-fires in Amazonia, Siberia, California, southern Europe, perhaps,
above all, in Australia. The “black summer” of 2019–2020 is estimated there to have
incinerated, mutilated, or displaced some three billion animals in the process.45 The word
holocaust comes to mind. Yet, none of these sequences can any longer be treated as once in a
lifetime blips, any more than can the accelerating range of hurricanes, typhoons, floods, or
other extreme weather events. Nor can even air-conditioned-insulated city dwellers claim
they have not experienced some aspect of climate change, even if it is simply rocketing
summer temperatures. For those alert to the more far-reaching derangement, distant
rumblings from rapidly heating Arctic and sub-Arctic regions in eco-system freefall, may lead
them to voice the same dread as scientists who have been plotting permafrost retreat46 and
with it the potential mass release from below of millions of tons not just of carbon but
altogether more toxic methane hydrates and nitrous oxide, the occasion of which could well
herald a Permian-style mass extinction.
The climate emergency thus, is not simply another addition to a growing list of 21st
century crises. It is the existential crisis of our time, the one that subsumes all others: a species
survival matter, a life on earth matter. And indeed, its truly apocalyptic scale makes
comparison with almost any other historical catastrophe, however overwhelming and
compelling in its own terms, utterly inadequate. Even the Holocaust. Yet what is being argued
here is that there is a paradoxical imperative in pursuing the historical relationship between
the two, over and beyond the Hallamesque cri de coeur enjoining us to resistance. Certainly,
the imperative only serves in terms of intra-human relationships. It has little or nothing to
offer, at least not directly, to addressing, let alone healing the ecocidal relationship between
ourselves and all other living organisms on this precious planet. Some other route, some other
narrative on that score is needed “to change the story.”47 But that does not discount nor
reduce to nothing the historical thread between the human world that made the Holocaust
and a human world in its twilight. Less than a hundred years apart, the system dysfunction is
essentially the same, with the same proclivities to extreme violence built into it. However, the
key to unravelling the probable trajectory of that violence is unlikely to lie in the shift across
the biogeochemical threshold intimated in the previous paragraph. By that point it is case of
game over. What matters is the intermediate phase, the one we currently inhabit, for that is
where the human consequences of biospheric breakdown exponentially magnify, save for the
possibility of the warning from the Hitlerian moment being heeded and acted upon.
Holocaust-Climate Change Interconnectivity
There is insufficient space here to fully develop the contours of this Holocaust-climate change
interconnectivity. However, in this section we attempt to outline some of its most salient
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features even if we begin with its most dramatic disjuncture. Climate change, in the
intermediate term, is likely to have a twofold set of major impacts on entire human
populations. Firstly, sustained intense heat, over and beyond killing people directly, is likely
to lead to a breakdown of the parametric conditions that allow for cereal grasses to grow.
Agriculture, in other words, will not continue to effectively function, at least not in large parts
of the globe, radically destabilizing a relatively stable feature of the Holocene.48 Secondly, as a
consequence of particularly Greenland and Antarctic glacier melt, there is likely to be major
sea level rise. How much will be determined by the rate of global warming. Nevertheless,
recent studies, in line with worse-case IPCC reports, all confirm permanent salination and or
inundation of deltaic and coastal regions, as well as many island archipelagos across the
globe.49
The first impact, magnified by freshwater scarcity, thus augurs mass starvation, the
second, given that most human beings live in coastal regions, mass starvation and
displacement. In a worse case (intermediate phase) scenario, the combined effects of these
impacts could see a significant part of the species homo sapiens, to the tune of hundreds of
millions of people, if not billons, on the move as environmental refugees. In the most
immediate future, however, geography, as for instance presented in Christian Parenti’s Tropic
of Chaos,50 plus the embedded, structurally unequal nature of a received, hegemonic world
system, ensure that the worst effects will fall on the already poorest and most vulnerable,
primarily though not exclusively in the Global South. The current situation thus bears no
direct relationship or cross-over with the essentially First World, European phenomenon
which was the Holocaust. But this would be to elide the historic significance of the event that
mostly keenly illuminates the starkest realities of state-person relations on the one hand, the
collective psychopathology and behavior of modern societal formations in extremis, on the
other.
In a nutshell, we might narrow down the fundamental issue at stake here to what
Giorgio Agamben has described as the distinction between the bios of the good life, a life of
value, and one reduced to mere zo’i, bare life.51 In the contemporary context, starvation and or
displacement through climate change offer variables to state erasure of the person as the way
this might happen. Nevertheless, “the right to have rights,” à la Arendt,52 and the deprivation
thereof, by way of Agamben, return us to the most likely direction of human travel in this
intermediate condition. Put otherwise, not so much a deranged nature, but rather radically
deranged if still national, majoritarian-based polities operating through perpetual emergency
powers; in other words, Schmittian states of exception as the ultimate arbiters of life or death.53
The Nazi rise, accumulation and then instrumentalization of power on the European
stage culminating in the Holocaust, provides our most germane historical touchstone. The
briefest iteration should suffice. Worldwide conditions of acute economic distress, and
downward spiraling life conditions for millions of ordinary people, facilitated the rise to
power of a fringe, far-right, nationalist, overtly authoritarian and racist party in Germany,
which both reflected back and then built upon already embedded popular, grass-roots
anxieties about the nature and causes of the underlying malaise. National integrity and power
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were to be restored through a führer ruling by way of a permanent state of exception, the
guarantee of his legitimacy, wisdom and purpose being that his actions would be on behalf of
all true Germans, bar those excluded on grounds of racial, social, or genetic unworthiness.
Discrimination against Jews, as the particular group charged with malevolent sabotage as
well as racial contamination of the national mission, was by degrees ratcheted up into open,
overt violence aimed at vomiting them out from body-politic and society.
In this pre-war period, a liberal, rules-based, Western-led, international system failed to
respond robustly either to Nazi aggression against other states, or to the speciﬁcity of the
growing Jewish refugee crisis. Nor did a totalitarian Soviet Union. Western state fears hinged on
the relatively small numbers of Jewish refugees from greater Germany turning into a ﬂood from
neighboring east European states. This collective failure to agree on a rescue plan reached its
nadir at the Evian conference, in summer 1938. As the Zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann, acidly
summarized, the world had become divided “into two camps, one of countries expelling Jews,
and the other of countries which did not admit them.”54 The accuracy of this statement was put
to the test soon afterwards when Poland passed a law effectively denationalizing Germanresident Jews with Polish passports, to which the Nazis retaliated by deporting thousands of
them to the Polish border. The subsequent no-mans-land at Zbąszyń, where the majority were
dumped, became indicative of the reduction to nothingness that denial of citizenship entailed.
International abandonment also paved the way for the Nazis—under the cover of ensuing war,
and more precisely a no holds barred war of colonial expansion in the east—to “solve” Jewish,
Roma, and other alleged population “problems” in the subjugated territories by unilateral and
lethal method. Planned mass starvation of Slavic Untermenschen (sic.) and the evolving
formulation of a continent-wide Jewish “ﬁnal solution” by shooting, starvation, slave labor, and
mass industrial-scale gassing, in turn engendered other Nazi aligned polities to organize and
initiate their own removal-cum-extermination programs, not only against Jews but other
unwanted “minority” peoples.55
If this shorthand summary confirms that Hitlerism was at the extreme end of a
spectrum of political violence and atrocity, looked at through a 21st century climate change
prism, what is however significant is that it was not alone in devising policies to keep
unwanted people out of states, vomit out those already in them, or failing either,
disappearing them into the furthest reaches of nowhere. Synchronically, the Soviet system
was genocidally deporting all manner of peoples into its Central Asian and Siberian
“wastelands.”56 On paper, if not in practice, the US too was researching grand projects of
problematic population “resettlement”—European Jews again at the top of the list—in
remote, far-flung places.57 Nor, at the very time that it and its Western allies were sowing the
embryonic seeds of the United Nations’ declaration on human rights, was it averse to
agreeing to the wholesale eructation of millions of Germans and other peoples from central
and eastern Europe. The notion that this could be done by some sort of intelligent and
humane design, as urged by Winston Churchill to the British parliament in 1944, is belied by
what actually took place in practice,58 the fallacy being even more monumental and
catastrophic when an imperial Britain, in retreat from the Indian subcontinent, hastily devised
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boundary lines to divide a newly minted India from a newly minted Pakistan. Hundreds of
thousands, if not millions paid the ultimate price for being on the “wrong” side of the lines,
while even more millions fled or were ethnically cleansed.59
These aspects of what one might describe as a Holocaust hinterland do not sit
comfortably within a Holocaust paradigm, at least not in its mainstream formulation. Yet,
what they should forcefully remind us of is that the destruction of Nazism in 1945 did not
remove the embedded dysfunctional underpinnings of a global system that enabled its most
horrendous outcome in the first place. The normative basis for human existence and
wellbeing, then, as now, continues to be grounded in the notion of rights bestowed through
citizenship within a universally-accepted system of nation-states, each of whose sovereign
writ and hence discharge of responsibilities to its citizens—its universe of obligation60—is
founded on an absolute territorial control and cohesion. The nation-state is equally
understood as such by way of clearly defined, internationally recognized borders. Putting
aside the small matter of whether a state fulfils its obligations equally across its citizen
population, and the entirely greater sophistry of sovereignty within an international political
economy where real power, then as now, is disposed of by a small handful of hegemonic
players, any process or event that breaches the territorial boundaries of any given state is
likely to render its citizens exposed and vulnerable. In worse-case scenarios, denial or loss of
citizenship in the modern world renders the person, as Arendt clearly understood, and as
Agamben pursued, rightless, nothingless, a subject for erasure.
Thus, with or without the actuality of Nazism, latent conditions for a reassertion of
some variant of the same exist in the collision between the assumed monopoly of violence of
the universalized nation-state to guarantee its integrity and borders on behalf of its “national”
citizen cohort (as determined by itself), and the time-honored urge of people, as of other
species, to move to some other safer place as worsening conditions, such as complete
inundation, or an existential threat to life demand. We might wish to remind ourselves that in
contemporary international law, a polity must have a defined territory to exist as a state and
so enter into relations with other states.61 To restate the dialectic otherwise: there is a UN
refugee convention but the condition of refugee in today’s world is entirely anomalous.
The Plight of Refugees
The last statement is not expressed as an abstraction. Whereas in 2010 the number of
displaced people globally was estimated by UNHCR at 41 million, it has surged to today’s
figure of close to 80 million; or, put another way, one per cent of the world's population. Of
these, 4.2 million are classed as “stateless.” Perhaps even more significantly, though UNHCR
does not refer to environmental or climate refugees as such, it does acknowledge that “the
interplay between climate, conflict, hunger, poverty and persecution”62 is responsible in 80
per cent of cases, nearly all in the Global South. Indeed, studies on internal displacement or
refugeedom from war zones increasingly confirm a climate signature.63 As the wheels come
off the planetary train, we can expect exponentially escalating numbers of such displaced
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humanity—again disproportionately from the Global South—to become the most emphatic
feature of the climate emergency. What this in turn infers is the creation of the most gigantic
and extraordinary stress test for how human interactions, as normatively founded on the idea
of immutable “national” space, can cope with not just people from other “national” spaces
abandoning theirs to move to, across or within yours, but even as this same space
environmentally degrades, desiccates, or is water-inundated.
Harbingers of how this dystopian near future may develop have been already
signaled in the rise of contemporary nativism. Brexit Britain, Trump’s America, Bolsonaro’s
Brazil, Modi’s India, plus a slew of increasingly strident, populist administrations, or wouldbe-ones, in Europe and elsewhere, have all found degrees of majoritarian support either in
their hardly concealed xenophobia and desire to deny or disbar refugees and asylum seekers,
again primarily from the Global South, or alternatively, through legislation and state
enactment, implicitly or explicitly designed to enfeeble indigenous or other ethnic groups
who do not fit their conception of the “authentic” ethno-national type.64 A renewed
acceptability of racist chauvinism, combined with what has been described as a hierarchic
individualism,65 usually expressed by those most aggrieved by a real or perceived loss of
traditional socio-economic status in the face of globalization, provide a ready seedbed for
others who claim to speak for a sacro egoismo. In a world of climate uncertainty and food
shortages, one can envisage how these resentments might easily translate into a popular
clamor to keep the “barbarians at the gate” through ever more draconian border controls, or
by vomiting out excess “alien” mouths to feed.
In fact, though not widely reported in the world’s media, climate events are fueling
these sorts of tendencies right now. In the wake of super-hurricane Dorian, for instance, which
devastated the Bahamas in September 2019, an unelected but vocal “patriotic” group calling
itself Operation Sovereign Bahamas, acted as goad to the Bahamian authorities to clear out
Haitian shanty towns, especially from the most wrecked island of Great Abaco, and “repatriate”
their inhabitants back to Haiti. Resonances from the 1930s, and its Zbąszyń-like destinations, are
all too apparent. Like Jews then, Haitians today, though critical to the Bahamian economy, are
anathematized as the lowest of the low: criminals, drug dealers, child trafﬁckers, and, of course,
clandestins. Usually lacking either passports or papers to “prove” their residence, and with no
protection either for their Bahamian-born children, they have no “right to rights.” Nor is
anybody elsewhere willing to either provide them with sanctuary or offer succor.66 Back in 2007,
in a report co-published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, former CIA chief,
R. James Woolsey, warned that on a much warmer planet “altruism and generosity would likely
be blunted.”67 Presumably he part had in mind the way, two years previously, the primarily
white, comfortable suburbanites of New Orleans abandoned their mostly black, impoverished
co-residents, as Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed the city’s levees.68
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What is even more alarming, however, is the way climate change is now creating
opportunities to socially engineer whole groups of historically marginalized people out of the
frame. As a further example, while Haitian “evacuees” (sic.) can be potentially numbered in
their tens of thousands, the so-called Chars of Indian Assam are under the cosh in their
potential millions. The Bengali speaking and mostly Muslim Chars take their name from the
riverine islands of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries, where they attempt to eke out a transient
existence as subsistence farmers. Migrants into the region from British imperial times, their
ecological niche has always been a fragile one, the Chars regularly washed away by seasonal
ﬂoods, though much worsened in recent decades by the entirely throttling effect of more
“efﬁcient” dams, embankments and canals developed by their wealthier Assamese neighbors.
Climate change’s “threat multiplier” effect comes through altogether more cataclysmic ﬂoods,
not least as a consequence of Himalayan glacial melt. But the potential coup de grace for the
Chars emanates not from this source, but through the federal government’s decisions, on the
one hand, in 2019, to pass a Citizenship Amendment Bill, on the other, to create a National
Register of Citizens. Both are seen as stratagems to delegitimize Muslims. But in the case of the
latter, the onus on alleged “illegal immigrants” to present documents proving long-term
residence represents a political tool to strip an estimated two million Chars of citizenship.
Consequently, it has been seized upon by Assamese nationalists knowing that most do not have
the documents or indeed have lost them in the ﬂoods.69 The Chars thus face a not dissimilar
prospect to the better-known case of the Rohingyas but with the Char trajectory largely
dependent on the degree to which encroaching climate disaster offers politicians the excuse for
mandating a state of siege by way of a supposed “general will.”70
Societal fears about a vastly uncertain future might thus explain in part the popular
basis for the “strong leader” taking effective action against terrifying hordes of dangerous
outsiders, or, alternatively, supposedly parasitic insiders soiling the carpet of one’s beloved
home. Trump’s wall may be the current apotheosis of this sort of mentalité, but as with the rise
of Hitler, national intolerance is hardly the monopoly of the crowd. On the contrary, what
Holocaust analysis reinforces is its structural embeddedness. Daniele Conversi asserts,
“wherever nation-states have become hegemonic institutions, nationalism pervades
governmental public policies.”71 To be sure, elites in their more unconsidered utterances can
be entirely capable of inhabiting the wilder shores of lunacy. In January 2008, for instance, five
of the most senior, retired NATO strategists and chiefs of staff issued a manifesto urging the
Alliance to maintain its ongoing commitment to a nuclear first strike option, citing amongst
other things the critical threat from “potential ‘environmental’ migration on a mass scale.”72
Yet a few months later, a distinguished group of military, state, and corporate policy makers
representing leading industrialized countries, in a US think-tank, devised and filmed “war
game” that envisaged a future climate-related mass environmental exodus from poor
countries, and only the matter of immediate mass obliteration proved less remorseless. Their
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preferred solution: refugee repatriation by “non-coercive means,” even while failing to
elucidate how this might be applied to islanders whose islands were already inundated.73
Remarkably, the outcome of the 2008 Centre for a New American Security (CNAS)
“game” is entirely consistent with the sort of strategic forward planning among the security
apparatuses of every advanced country, certainly in the Western world.74 Such planning goes
back to at least the Pentagon report on climate change of 2004.75 It is also confirmed in the
billions of dollars that have been pumped into US and other advanced government research
and development high-tech perimeter control system programs geared towards the
“immobilization” of waves of border trespassers, long before Trump’s wall become iconic.76
Further Dystopias
However, if the increasing lift, sophistication, and national (or intra-national as in the European
Union) spend on surveillance, fences, mineﬁelds, and patrolling of the seas, offers some
measure of the heightened anxiety and hence lengths to which the richest, most powerful, most
fossil-fuel addicted polities in the 21st century world system will go to defend their sovereign
“home” space entitlement against homeless, starving, and immiserated climate refugees, there
is a further dark shadow from the Nazi past to be noted. Namely, blocking in unwanted people
on the inside. This may take various forms. It may mean literal ghettoization with intercourse
between different controlled zones heavily regulated by security forces plus social and
economic access to the hegemonic space equally restricted or denied: Israeli-occupied Palestine
an obvious exemplar.77 It may mean turning the entire restricted space into a biopolitical
experiment with the aim of genocidally reducing the population therein; for which Beijing’s
campaign against Uighurs and other peoples in Xinjiang both hark back to the Nazi camps and
equally represents a truly Orwellian foretaste of things to come.78 And it may also infer keeping
the reservoir of human cheap labor, that is, poor, marginalized, shanty-town, or more accurately
mega-city slum inhabitants, isolated from their nationally bona-ﬁde (sic.) mainstream
neighbors, with the option, where the former might collectively dispute the received terms and
conditions, that the state responds with the full force of its “counter-terrorist” arsenal.
According to researchers in this ﬁeld, the city is assumed, by US and other Western military
think-tanks, to be the major terrain of future warfare, “urbicide” included.79
If all this is dystopian enough, there is a further dimension still. On a planet in which,
according to a late 2007 UN Environment Program, reports water, land, air, plants, animals,
and fish stocks are all in “inexorable decline,”80 it should be self-evident that not only will this
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fall most calamitously on subsistence societies, but with the double whammy that powerful
states will grab from these societies what remains of these precious items for themselves. In a
remarkable leap towards linking the Holocaust to precisely these aspects of the world of
climate change, Timothy Snyder’s 2015 tome, Black Earth, argued that the driving force behind
Hitler’s Lebensraum agenda and subsequent onslaught on Poland and Russia was a
fundamental anxiety about food scarcity leading to starvation. These same fears, proposed
Snyder, could equally drive ecologically panicked states to make their own latter-day,
colonial-style land grabs. Snyder went on to offer a small list of actual or likely contenders,
China, Russia, Islamicist-inclined Middle Eastern regimes, corrupt African ones, included.81
China, correctly, is already far down this route, for example in Sudan—a country one might
consider challenged to amply feed itself—leased to the tune of millions of acres, to provide
Chinese—not Sudanese—food requirements. But then a great many other countries, some of
which Snyder mentions, such as South Korea and United Arab Emirates, are also involved in
this latter-day “scramble,” or more precisely rape of an already environmentally devastated,
genocidally scarred Sudan, others of which, including Turkey and Jordan, he does not.82
South Korea’s voracity elsewhere one might add, offers its own dark Nazi resonances. The
thankfully Malagasy people-defeated efforts of the corporate giant Daewoo Logistics, in 2008,
to buy up 1.3 million hectares of a vastly ecologically fragile Madagascar to feed people back
home,83 hardly more than the flip side of late 1930s and early 1940s German, Romanian, and
Polish efforts to expel their excess Jewish “mouths” there.84
What Snyder omits from his litany, however, is that some of the largest present and
future envisaged land grabs at the expense of indigenous and peasant communities come
from European Union and other Western polities working in collusion with weak, and/or
corrupt governments in the Global South. And they do so fully legitimized under the terms of
two decades or more of international climate change agreements that mandate the
monocultural production and harvesting of plantation-style flex crops for biofuels as
alternatives to fossil fuels.85 Putting aside the entirely dubious value of this sort of activity as
a mitigant to climate change, the vast encroachments that this entails on what are the planet’s
last residual commons, often involving massive deforestation, especially in sub-Saharan
Africa, south-east Asia and central and south America, are nothing more than a case of taking
the food out of the mouths of billions of poor peasants and pastoralists and forest and fisher
communities who depend absolutely on these commons for their sheer existence, in order to
enable rich people in the Global North to continue their unsustainable lifestyles and
grotesquely excessive carbon footprints.86 And the situation can only get worse as corporate
transnationals make their last great bid for more bioenergy—now for supposed carbon capture
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(BECCS)—in order to ensure their pole position in the hegemons’ drive towards the chimera
of carbon ‘net’ zero.87
We have almost come full circle from our starting point. Snyder argues that
“understanding the Holocaust is our chance, perhaps our last one, to preserve humanity.”88
Putting aside the extravagance of the claim, his reading of the climate crisis and its cure
through a Holocaust prism is to say the least problematic. The “totalitarian utopias” of the
20th century, and their colonial drive for land and resource, no more offer a grounding as to
why we are here and now facing near-end game, any more than his proposition that the sort
of science that gave us the “green revolution” (sic.) and an end to the prospect of hunger—
certainly not for subsistence communities in the Global South—can offer us redemption from
planetary catastrophe.89
Indeed, the critical blind spot within Snyder’s approach is the same one that is at the
heart of the orthodox version of the Holocaust paradigm. The “us,” a Western “us,” may
freely gaze at either catastrophe but always with the assumption that the “evil” is nothing to
do with ourselves, or “our” history but something at distance; something that consequently
can only retrospectively or contemporaneously be put to rights within the essentially
humanitarian framework of our decent, rational, liberal order. Proposing instead that that
order is anything but rational, that it is driven by predatory and entirely suicidal drives for
growth, out of synch with the carrying capacity of the planet, not to say a disaster for intrahuman relations and all life forms, is, to be sure, a rather difficult pill to swallow. Yet there is a
connecting thread linking European past to climate-change present. It is to be found in the
processes by which a small group of particularly aggressive “national” Western polities
conquered, colonized, encompassed, and commodified the rest of the planet, set up a model
for development founded on the idea of the nation-state on the one hand, hegemonic resource
control, imperial or otherwise, on the other, and proceeded to strip the commons of
everything, dispossessing, and dissolving the global ethnographic mosaic of subsistence
societies who had been dependent on them.90 And now we are reaching the culmination of
that process: not a drawing back, nor rational retreat, but precisely more resource nationalism
and carbon colonialism in order to ensure the Global North has control of what remains of the
Global South, until such time, that is, that total collapse intervenes, yet in that interregnum
with ever more weaponized and insurmountable barriers to keep the peoples of the Global
South firmly outside the North’s metropolitan boundaries. Caught in this preordained vice,
great swathes of Global South peoples will find themselves, like Jewish refugees on the cusp
of the “final solution,” with nowhere to rest or go, no safe haven, nor sanctuary. A world-wide
Zbąszyń. One does not have to call it genocide. But it is a recipe for mass murder all the same.
The warning from history should be self-evident. Three years on from Zbąszyń, after
Hungarians and Romanians had dumped thousands of their unwanted, “stateless” (sic.) Jews
across borders into a Nazi-occupied Ukrainian war zone, the SS responded by murdering
them en masse. The Kamenets-Podolsk massacre in late August 1941 was the first five-figure
slaughter of Jews in the course of Operation Barbarossa, and the first premeditated one
involving men, women, and children.91 The rest is history as one might say. And certainly, by
that point there was no stopping the killing.
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Today, there is no precise equivalent of Hitler or the Nazis. Indeed, in some sense the
criminality of our current carbon-emitting trajectory towards global mass murder—over and
above the specific, ongoing, murderous but indirectly climate-related range of conflicts,
nearly all in the Global South—is diffuse. It would seem counter-intuitive, thus, to hold the
urbane executives of the major fossil fuel transnationals criminally accountable for destroying
the planet when all of us in the Global North are to greater or lesser extents complicit. And
yet, it is above all the leaderships of these companies who have knowingly taken us on this
path to hell. Knowingly, because they were from as early as 1959, among the very first to be
aware of the death sentence extracting ever more fossil fuels would spell for ourselves and
the planet.92 Knowingly, because they have poured millions of dollars annually into public
relations campaigns denying and covering up that truth, and equally so in order “to delay,
block, or control policies to tackle climate change”93—the parallel here with Holocaust denial
surely not requiring further elaboration. Knowingly, because in spite of all the scientific
warnings that further exploitation of fossil fuel reserves must cease forthwith, they have
continued “through an intricate plan of deception, of deceit, of manipulation”94—not least by
making spurious claims to billions of consumers that they are cleaning up their act—to
getting yet more oil, gas, even coal out of the ground with full knowledge “that their use as
intended will worsen the climate crisis,”95 even as we pass all thresholds en route to runaway
climate chaos. And knowingly too, in the way that “they systematically uphold violence,
exploitation and impunity against black, brown, indigenous peoples and frontline
communities” in order to achieve these goals.96
Let there be no mistake or obfuscation on the political and societal consequences of
this corporate-led trajectory. It must necessarily take human “civilization” as we know it—
again, primarily meaning that as created and determined by the hegemonic Global North—
into a final, twilight era of totalitarianism, whether fascistic, eco-fascistic, or otherwise. It will
necessarily be so because, as ecological breakdown accelerates, the national body-politic will
seek to protect its “own” as best it can, with its inevitable corollary, a majoritarian clamor for
the state to “save our souls.” A state of exception thereby legitimized by popular acclaim,
making of coronavirus clampdowns, on the one hand, vaccine nationalism on the other, the
most feeble and ephemeral precedents, powerful states, doubtless led by the USA, will
accelerate their efforts to hold climate breakdown at bay with gargantuan but ultimately
pyrrhic geo-engineering projects. Meanwhile, with the drawbridge now firmly and
irrevocably shut tight, the billions of poor and racially unwanted on the far side will have to
sink or swim as best they can, but “never again” at the Global North’s expense. Geopolitically, this will inevitably lead to a breakdown of the international system, as weak states
collapse in on themselves and the surviving still unsubmerged ones, more territorially
defensive and belligerent than ever, turn—where they have them—to their nuclear arsenals as
weapons of last resort.
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Conclusion
And so, ﬁnally, we have arrived at our paradoxical imperative for the century of anthropogenic
omnicide. Snyder in this respect offers valuable insight. What Hitler loathed above all else about
the Jews was not their supposed racial worthlessness, it was what they represented in terms of
worldview. In complete antithesis to his own, as founded on a perpetually violent, zero-sum,
social Darwinian struggle for existence, Jewish universalism, or as Saul Friedlander might put
it, “the Jewish spirit” involved a moral appreciation of all human worth.97 Humans beings thus
are not simply created in the same image, but to destroy a human life is to desecrate God’s
holiness in the world.98 Thus, the Judaic injunction of piku’ah nefesh, to save life at all costs, is
necessarily an active one. So too are notions of empathy, compassion, loving-kindness, all of
which feed into social justice. It is no accident that love for the stranger is mentioned thirty-six
times in the Old Testament.99 To work for social justice with the poor, the vulnerable, the
marginalized, the asylum seeker and refugee, in this sense is integral to how we heal a broken
world and restore it to its harmony.100 But to do so in the Jewish tradition requires one other
critical, active, insistently prophetic ingredient: to speak truth to power.
Hitler sought to erase the Jews not only because they were Jews but because
communally, they were bearers of the Judaic message. The value of the Holocaust paradigm in
the here and now must have as its starting point the remembrance of what can happen to whole
peoples when “radical evil” arises. But its value is specious if it simply ends up as a rhetorical
device to bolster what in reality is an abnegation of responsibility by those who could have
done something about it. That is what happened when the supposedly great and good met at
Evian in 1938 to resolve the Jewish refugee crisis and then did precisely nothing. The failing
would prove all the more egregious and calamitous at the Bermuda conference in 1943. Faced
today with an exponentially far greater threat “and after years of orchestrated neglect verging
on censorship”101 the obligation on international leaders to act on climate change is beyond
urgent. True, many are now lining up to make all the right noises. But as in 1938, as in 1943, the
gap between rhetoric and genuine concerted action amounts to a gaping chasm. Truth to power
demands that governments must recognize their own complicity in this signal failing of
globally calamitous proportions. Truth to power demands not ﬁne words but systemic change—
and with it a rapid foreclosure on the fossil fuel industries, beginning with the hundreds of
billions of dollars gifted to them annually in government subsidies, which are at the heart of
today’s biosphere-destroying radical evil.102 Truth to power speaking through the people, and
for the people, demands “never again” will we allow ourselves to be bystanders as the hubris of
the economically and politically powerful take us hurtling towards planetary nemesis.103 To
break with the path of this inevitable trajectory demands the Holocaust paradigm in active,
purposeful mode. It is effectively the same thing as the Judaic prophetic voice. In 2018, when
Extinction Rebellion was co-founded by Roger Hallam to call out government inaction on
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climate change and to demand, through nonviolent direct action, that they change course, its
ﬁrst guiding principle was “to tell the truth and to act as if the truth is real.”104
Coda
This piece was written in the months leading up to COP 26, the international summit on
Climate Change held in Glasgow in November 2021. Its result conﬁrms that the international
community is as systemically incapable and unwilling to act to halt catastrophic climate change
as it was equally incapable and unwilling, in the lead up to Jewish catastrophe, to act to halt
Hitler's drive to mass murder.
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Introduction
In February 2020, the Brooklyn Museum1 in New York City opened Climate in Crisis:
Environmental Change in the Indigenous Americas, which I curated with assistance from Joseph
Shaikewitz and Shea Spiller, former Curatorial Assistants in the Arts of the Americas and
Europe Division.2 The exhibition presents the collections of Indigenous art from North,
Central, and South America through the lens of climate change and its impact on the survival
of Indigenous people.

Image 1. Installation view, Climate in Crisis: Environmental Change in the Indigenous Americas, Brooklyn
Museum, February 14, 2020 through July 2023. (Photo: Jonathan Dorado, Brooklyn Museum)

The show was developed in response to the relentless news in 2019 about the raging,
deliberately set forest fires in Brazil, the impact of global warming on Arctic sea ice, and the
Trump administration’s assault on Native American sovereignty and ancestral homelands.

1

The Brooklyn Museum acknowledges that it stands on land that is part of the unceded, ancestral homeland of the
Lenape (Delaware) People. As a sign of respect, we recognize and honor the Lenape (Delaware) Nations, their
elders past and present, and future generations. We are committed to addressing exclusions and erasures of
Indigenous peoples and confronting the ongoing legacies of settler colonialism in the Museum’s work.

2

The exhibition has been extended until July 2023.

Nancy B. Rosoff. “Climate in Crisis: Art and Activism at the Brooklyn Museum.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 16, no.
1, 101–119. https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.16.1.1867.
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There is a growing awareness in the museum ﬁeld that cultural institutions can no longer be
neutral, and that they should use their public and educational platform to address inequalities,
injustice, and environmental issues in society. This relatively new, activist trend in museum
practice is examined by Robert Janes and Richard Sandell in their edited volume Museum
Activism, in which they argue that “museums not only have the potential to shape a more
sustainable, equitable and fair world, but also have an obligation to do so.”3 The Brooklyn
Museum has adopted this activist position, which it expresses in the vision statement posted on
the website: “Where great art and courageous conversations are catalysts for a more connected,
civic, and empathetic world.”4 The exhibition Climate in Crisis was possible because of this
institutional philosophy that sees the role of the museum as an agent for positive change.
As mentioned earlier, the environmental crises in 2019 provided the impetus for
developing the exhibition, which was rapidly organized in ﬁve months with a modest budget.
Existing display cases were used, and the majority of the works were already on view in a
preceding exhibition of the Arts of the Americas collection. The curatorial approach reframed
the presentation of the collection from the point of view of the impact of climate change and
environmental destruction on the Indigenous peoples (or their ancestors) who produced the
featured works. In addition, the regional organization, which will be described later, enabled us
to focus on a speciﬁc environmental problem that is currently affecting that region and its
Indigenous communities. This is not a unique approach to curating exhibitions in a climatechanged world. Jennifer Newell, Libby Robin, and Kirsten Wehner write in their introduction to
Curating the Future: Museums, Communities and Climate Change that “collections are valuable in
many ways, as constructions of knowledge and experience, repositories of cultural memory,
agents for cultural creativity, resources for scientiﬁc inquiry and records of ecologies.”5 As a
result, collections create unique forms of material storytelling for perceiving and understanding
the world.6 Climate in Crisis used the Arts of the Americas collection as an entryway for
understanding Indigenous knowledge systems and their centrality in the creation of
environmental justice.
One of the disadvantages of the collapsed timeframe and small budget is that
appropriate Native consultations were not possible during the planning and implementation
process. We compensated by including published statements by Indigenous community
activists at the top of every section panel. The author also interviewed the living artists featured
in the exhibition to get their perspectives on the climate crisis for inclusion in object labels.
Another disadvantage of the collapsed timeframe is that we were not able to establish true
partnerships with community organizations invested in environmental justice projects and
Indigenous rights work. When such partnerships are established early in the development of an
exhibition, community input provides critical dialogue across diverse perspectives, promotes
more inclusive interpretive strategies, enables audiences to engage with target issues, and
provides economic opportunities for local community participation in public programs.
The Exhibition
The main thesis of the exhibition is that the current climate emergency is part of a longer history
of environmental colonialism that began five hundred years ago.7 For millennia, Indigenous
communities throughout the Americas have maintained profound and expansive relationships
with the natural world. However, beginning in the 1500s, Europe’s conquest and colonization of

3

Robert R. Janes and Richard Sandell, eds., Museum Activism (London: Routledge, 2019), xxvii.

4

See “About,” Brooklyn Museum (website, n.d.), accessed April 20, 2022, https://www.brooklynmuseum.org/about.

5

Jennifer Newell et al., “Introduction: Curating Connections in a Climate-Changed World,” in Curating the Future:
Museums, Communities and Climate Change, ed. Jennifer Newell et al. (London: Routledge, 2017), 5.

6

Ibid.

7

Mary Lyn Stoll, “Environmental Colonialism,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society (SAGE
Publications Inc., 2018), 731–732, accessed November 1, 2019, https://sk.sagepub.com/reference/sageencyclopedia-of-business-ethics-and-society-2e/i15679.xml.
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the Americas forced ways of using natural resources that clashed with traditional Indigenous
modes of relating to the world. This fundamental difference in worldview—between one that sees
human beings, animals, plants, and the land as interrelated and co-equal, and another that
privileges human needs above everything else—has resulted in ever-escalating threats to
Indigenous homelands, ways of life, and survival, as well as the unprecedented level of climate
change affecting the planet today.8
The works on view connect to the environment in one of two ways: many reveal
Indigenous understandings of the world as they relate to natural resources, cultural practices, and
spiritual beliefs, while others more directly address the threat of climate change to Indigenous
livelihoods. The central concept of environmental colonialism refers to the cumulative impact of
land seizures, forced relocations, government, and corporate development projects, and accelerated
natural-resource extraction on Indigenous peoples. This history is manifested today not only in
environmental problems such as wildfires, droughts, floods, glacial melt, and resource scarcity,
but also in societal problems such as starvation, public health emergencies, military conﬂicts,
refugee crises, and violence waged against Indigenous communities and activists.9
The exhibition is divided into seven regional groupings and countries spanning
North, Central and South America, an organizational framework that is complicated because it
disregards the spread of myriad cultures across the continents before nation states with political
borders existed. However, by grouping the works by country, the exhibition underscores the
geopolitical nature of any attempt to combat the climate crisis today. Each regional section
provides a history of Indigenous occupation and
spotlights a current environmental problem, and
how Indigenous activists are resisting and
counteracting this problem. Statements made
by Indigenous environmental activists that are
quoted on each section panel have been
included throughout this article to further
humanize the impact of the global climate crisis
on Native people.
A didactic map, included to help visitors
locate the regions, ancient cultures, and presentday communities, and to visually gesture to the
complications of organizing the exhibition by
nation, is juxtaposed with an ancient Maya
tetrapod vessel (see image 2), which conveys a
very different form of mapping: one that uniﬁes
the natural, spiritual, and ancestral realms.
The vessel illustrates the three levels of
the Maya universe: the celestial overworld of
ancestors and supernatural beings, the earthly
middleworld of human and animal life, and the Image 2. Maya Tetrapod Bowl with Lid, 350-450.
Possibly from Petén, Guatemala. Ceramic, pigment,
watery underworld of the dead. These realms 13 × 11 ¼ × 11 ¼ in. (33 × 28.6 × 28.6 cm).
are indicated by way of a bird that has the Brooklyn Museum, Ella C. Woodward Memorial
ability to float on the earth’s waters and fly in Fund, 64.217a-b

8

On an Indigenous perspective on the “pre-colonial mind,” see Vanessa Watts, “Indigenous Place-Thought and Agency
Amongst Human and Non-Humans (First Woman and Sky Woman Go on a European World Tour!),”
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 2, no. 1 (2013), 20–34, accessed November 2019, https://
jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/des/article/view/19145; David Rich Lewis for a survey of environmental issues
facing Native Americans in the twentieth century in “Native Americans and the Environment: A Survey of
Twentieth-Century Issues,” American Indian Quarterly 19, no. 3 (Summer 1995), 423–450, accessed November 6,
2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1185599.

9

Steve Lyons and Kai Bosworth, “Museums in the Climate Emergency,” in Museum Activism, ed. Robert R. Janes and
Richard Sandell (London: Routledge, 2019), 174.
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the sky, while the quatrefoil design incised on its beak represents a portal to the
underworld. The modeled legs representing peccaries are associated with the pillars
supporting the four directions of the cosmos.
The exhibition opens with introductory objects that spotlight two devastating
environmental issues and illustrate the exhibition’s format. A beaded model tipi by Kiowa artist
Teri Greeves is displayed in conversation with a photograph of the 2016 protests against the
Dakota Access Pipeline (or DAPL) in North Dakota. The pipeline, which crosses under Lake
Oahe, just upstream of the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation, started operation in 2017 and was
originally slated to cross the Missouri River near Bismarck, but was moved out of fear that an
oil spill would contaminate the state capital’s drinking water. Despite numerous lawsuits and
protests, many of which culminated in
violence toward protesters, the pipeline
was completed after President Trump
issued an executive order in January
2017. The pipeline, which handles
570,000 barrels a day, is a direct threat to
the tribe’s drinking water and
sovereignty. A recent court order was
unsuccessful in halting operations and
the pipeline continues to carry crude oil
while litigation continues.10
The model tipi with beaded images of
contemporary Kiowa life (see image 3)
reafﬁrms the sacredness of the land for
Native people. Greeves references the
tipis erected at the Oceti Sakowin protest
camp in the following statement:

Image 3. Teri Greeves (Kiowa, born 1970). 21st Century
Traditional: Beaded Tipi, 2010. Santa Fe, New Mexico. Brain
tanned deer hide, charlotte cut glass beads, seed beads,
bugle beads, glass beads, sterling silver beads, pearls,
shell, raw diamonds, hand stamped sterling silver, hand
stamped copper, cotton cloth, nylon “sinew” rope, pine,
poplar, bubinga, 46 × 29 × 32 ½ in. (116.8 × 73.7 × 82.6
cm). Brooklyn Museum, Florence B. and Carl L. Selden
Fund, 2008.28 © Teri Greeves

My tipi is about a Kiowa way of
life, passed down through the
generations. The tipi as idea
represents the home and the
heart of family, community, and
tribal nation. In staking down a
tipi, a way of life is staked down
and thus sacred space is created
and held. This is what those
Water Protectors were doing,
they were creating and holding
sacred space with their tipis,
and in a place that is once again
under threat from the United
States.11

10

The author consulted numerous articles on the Dakota Access Pipeline including Rebecca Hersher, “Key Moments In
The Dakota Access Pipeline Fight,” National Public Radio, February 22, 2017, accessed November 2019, https://
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/514988040/key-moments-in-the-dakota-access-pipeline-ﬁght;
Mike Faith, “Our Fight Against the Dakota Access Pipeline is Far from Over,” Guardian, November 15, 2019,
accessed November 19, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/15/dakota-accesspipeline-standing-rock; and Phil McKenna, “Standing Rock Asks Court to Shut Down Dakota Access Pipeline as
Company Plans to Double Capacity,” Inside Climate News, August 20, 2019, accessed November 12, 2019, https://
insideclimatenews.org/news/20082019/standing-rock-dakota-access-pipeline-impact-assessment-court-doublecapacity/.

11

Teri Greeves, email to author, December 6, 2019.
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Image 4. Tembé Girl’s Initiation Headdress,
mid-20th century. Pará, Brazil. Feathers, cotton,
bird skins, 21 × 8 × 9 in. (53.3 × 20.3 × 22.9 cm).
Brooklyn Museum, Gift of Ingeborg de Beausacq,
64.248.25
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The second introductory object is a Tembé
girl’s initiation feathered headdress (see image
4) that is shown adjacent to photographs from
2019 of the Amazon forests burning and of a
Tembé community meeting in the Alto Rio
Guamá Indigenous Reserve in the state of Pará,
in northeastern Brazil. The Reserve of 1,080
square miles is supposed to be protected from
outside exploitation but has been overrun by
illegal loggers who are cutting down trees and
setting fires to clear land for commercial
farming, livestock grazing, and mining. Tembé
community members have been forced to
patrol their territory with bows, arrows, and
video cameras to document the destruction. As
Sergio Muxi Tembé, Chief of Tekohaw Village
states: “Every day that passes, the invasion
comes closer to our village. We don’t want to
be killed by bullets. We want the federal
government to assume its responsibility and
guarantee the right that we have to live in our
lands, to live in peace.”12
In the main exhibition gallery, groups of
objects spanning approximately 2,500 years,
reveal Indigenous understandings of the world
as it relates to local natural resources, cultural
practices, and spiritual beliefs. The three
contemporary works either address the threat
of climate change directly, or represent new
forms of artistic traditions that are tied to the
land or Native identity.

Canadian and U.S. Arctic
Indigenous peoples have lived throughout the North American Arctic region for approximately
twelve thousand years, populating an area that spans from Russia to Scandinavia. About forty
Indigenous groups live in the Arctic today, each with unique histories, languages, and
traditions. Inuit and Alaskan Native soap stone carvings, an engraved whale tooth and walrus
tusk, and works on paper reﬂect the continued importance of hunting in the Arctic region and
the inter-relationship between animal and spirit worlds. For example, soapstone sculptures of a
walrus and hunters in a model kayak are naturalistic, while the sculpture of a shaman
transforming into a seal is enigmatic, and likely depicts a creation story. Prints by Inuit artists
such as Pitaloosie Saila and Kenojuak Ashevak likewise depict iconic images of Arctic wildlife
or mysterious mythical creatures.
In the 1700s, the introduction of commercial whaling by Dutch, Scottish, French, and
U.S. crews severely impacted the Arctic ecosystem, followed just decades later by unsustainable
hunting of caribou, musk ox, walrus, and other animals. Today, Arctic temperatures are rising
twice as fast as the global average, and in the past three decades alone, multiyear ice has
declined by 95 percent, shifting animals’ migration patterns, devastating the region’s
biodiversity, and creating dangerous conditions that threaten the very existence of the ice and

12

Luis Andres Henao, “Amazon Tribe in Brazil Patrols Territory, Braces for Fight,” Amazon Watch, September 17, 2019,
accessed November 2019, https://amazonwatch.org/news/2019/0917-amazon-tribe-in-brazil-patrols-territorybraces-for-ﬁght.
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those who live on it.13 As Sheila Watt-Cloutier, an Inuit environmental and human-rights
activist, writer, and Nobel Peace Prize nominee, states:
For the Inuit, ice is much more than frozen water; it is our
highways, our training ground and our life-force. It’s
something we thought to be as permanent as mountains and
rivers in the south. But, in my generation, the Arctic Sea ice and
snow, upon which we Inuit have depended for millennia, are
now diminishing.14
This section also features a contemporary, 16mm ﬁlm basket by Onondaga-Micmac
artist Gail Tremblay (see image 5), which was acquired for the exhibition. The work references
the effects of global warming on Arctic sea ice and demonstrates how art can be an act of
environmental stewardship and healing in our highly
polarized society.15 Entitled When Ice Stretched on for
M i l e s , t h e w o r k re s e m b l e s a Vi c t o r i a n - e r a
Haudenosaunee fancy basket, but Tremblay has
substituted the traditional materials of black ash and
sweetgrass with strips of white ﬁlm leader and
exposed 16mm ﬁlm from the 1967 documentary At the
Winter Sea Ice Camp. This ﬁlm features a Netsilik Inuit
family who reenacted scenes to accommodate the
director’s ethnographic vision of earlier Inuit life,
including traveling by dog sled, hunting, and
building igloos. Tremblay’s basket points out the
paradox of the documentary ﬁlm, in which an
anthropologist—hailing from a culture that is in the
business of modernizing the Arctic region and
exploiting its oil and gas reserves—nevertheless
idealizes traditional Inuit ways of life. Tremblay’s
artistic practice often interrogates issues of
appropriation and misrepresentation. The artist’s
repurposing of the ﬁlm enables her to gain control of a
medium that has been historically used to perpetuate
stereotypes about Native people, but it also enables
Image 5. Gail E. Tremblay (Onondagaher to make something beautiful out of painful
Micmac, born 1945). When Ice Stretched on
history. Tremblay’s exquisitely woven basket, which is for Miles, 2017. Olympia, Washington.
based upon centuries of Indigenous knowledge, 16mm ﬁlm, white leader, gold and silver
draws viewers in, but also challenges us to confront braid, 16 × 9 × 9 in. (40.6 × 22.9 × 22.9 cm).
the misrepresentation and destruction of Indigenous Brooklyn Museum, H. Randolph Lever
Fund, 2019.41a-b. © Gail Tremblay
cultures and homelands. She states:

13

Meteor Blades, “2019’s Grim Arctic News Ought to Spur Aggressive Climate Change Activism,” Red, Green and Blue,
October 15, 2019, accessed October 18, 2019, http://redgreenandblue.org/2019/10/15/2019s-grim-arctic-newsspur-aggressive-climate-change-activism/; Henry Fountain, “The Arctic is Changing in Ways ‘Scarcely Imaginable
Even a Generation Ago,’” New York Times, December 9, 2020.

14

Sheila Watt-Cloutier, “If We Protect the Arctic, We Save the Planet,” Globe and Mail, October 2, 2019, accessed
November 2019, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-if-we-protect-the-arctic-we-save-theplanet/.

15

Nicholas Leonard, “The Arts and New Materialism: A Call to Stewardship through Mercy, Grace, and Hope,”
Humanities 9, no. 3 (2020), 2, accessed February 23, 2022, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
343696095_The_Arts_and_New_Materialism_A_Call_to_Stewardship_through_Mercy_Grace_and_Hope.
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Throughout the Americas, Native people are ﬁghting to save
the forests, plants, animals, and ﬁsh runs because they can’t
forget the way of seeing the world that our ancestors passed
down to us. With the threat of global warming, I want people
to think about the importance of the Arctic, how it supports
life, and how the Native people who live there keep that life
going. The exploitation of oil and fossil fuels is causing people
to destroy the Earth, and the lack of balance is endangering life
on the planet.16
Canadian and U.S. Northwest Coast
Indigenous people of numerous tribal afﬁliations and nations have lived in the Northwest Coast
region of North America, bordering the Paciﬁc Ocean, since time immemorial, with ancestral
homelands encompassing present-day British Columbia in Canada and Alaska, Washington,
Oregon, and Northern California in the United States. Though diverse in their cultural and
political identities, the tribes of the region share a reverence for the natural world, and family
clans and belief systems are rooted in the environment and its life-giving resources.
Nineteenth century cedar wood carvings of elaborate dance masks and house posts from
the Kwakwaka’wakw and Heiltsuk Nations of British Columbia reference animal ancestors and
the clan system, which is based upon the special relationship between animals and humans since
time immemorial. A monumental baleen whale mask was likely worn by a Kwakwaka’wakw
chief during winter potlatch ceremonies to demonstrate his prestige and celebrate the bounty of
the sea, while a Thunderbird transformation mask depicts a supernatural Kwakwaka’wakw
ancestor with the power to produce thunder and
lightning, and to transform into a human being. A
carved house post, which is one of four in the
collection, depicts the creation story of the Heiltsuk
eagle clan and its ancestral homeland of Yálátli or
Goose Island. Chief Harvey Humchitt of the
Heiltsuk Nation relayed the story included in the
exhibition. A contemporary glass sculpture by
Tlingit artist Preston Singletary depicts a killer
whale, which is the hereditary crest figure of his
clan (see image 6). Singletary writes:

Image 6. Preston Singletary (Tlingit, born 1963).
Guardian of the Sea, 2004. Seattle, Washington.
Glass, 18 × 6 × 18 in. (45.7 × 15.2 × 45.7 cm).
Brooklyn Museum, Gift of Fairﬁeld-Maxwell,
Ltd., by exchange, 2004.2. © Preston Singletary
(Photo by Russell Johnson, courtesy of Preston
Singletary Inc.)

16

Gail Tremblay, interview with author, November 17, 2019.

17

Preston Singletary, email to author, November 18, 2019.
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Corporations and even our current
government are rolling back
environmental regulations,
d e f u n d i n g scientific research,
building oil pipelines which
endanger our clean water, and a
whole host of other issues that
endanger our health as a nation. In
my opinion, this is due to the lack
of a true spiritual connection in
relation to nature … It is driven by a
blind and misguided capitalist
perspective that is not balanced by a
respect for our environment.17
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The Northwest Coast region has been over-exploited by non-Native people for ﬁshing,
logging, mining, and agriculture since the early-nineteenth century. Today, rapid environmental
degradation continues because of population growth, pollution, adverse land-management
policies, industrial-scale logging, and climate change, irreversibly impacting the natural
resources of the region. Salmon, a cornerstone of many tribes’ cultural and economic
sustainability, has experienced a signiﬁcant decline, which threatens treaty rights, tribal life, and
the integrity of the ecosystem. As the late Nisqually environmental leader and treaty rights
activist Billy Frank Jr. said, “As the salmon disappear, so do our cultures and treaty rights. We
are at a crossroads and we are running out of time.”18
U.S. Southwest
The Hopi and Zuni are descended from the Ancestral Pueblo peoples, who lived for thousands
of years in the region today divided among Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and Utah. The
Hopi refer to these ancestral lands as Hopituskwa (“Hopi land”), and the Zuni refer to them as
Ulohnanne (“world” or “universe”), which encompasses land, water, subsurface, and sky. Both
cultures rely on traditional knowledge and ecological rhythms to sustain farming techniques
that are central to Native customs, rituals, and life. A supernatural being that represents a lifeforce or embodies a natural phenomenon such as
the sun, the moon, a plant, or an animal, is called
koko by the Zuni and katsina (commonly anglicized
as “kachina”) by the Hopi. Such beings have the
power to control rainfall, crop growth, and
fertility; to cure and protect; and to act as
messengers between the gods and human beings.
Carved kachina ﬁgures, called tihu in Hopi, such
as the ﬁerce ogre Tsaveyo (see image 7), are
representations of these spirits and can have a
sacred or an educational purpose.
During some ceremonies, the carvings are
given to female community members to award
virtuous behavior, recognize a recent marriage, or
teach girls about the religion. In the 1800s, a lively
market for the carvings developed among nonNative collectors and tourists, giving rise to the
elaborate art form that ﬂourishes today.
The Hopi and Zuni are among several
Native American tribes who identify the Bears
Ears region in Utah as an integral part of their
Image 7. Hopi Kachina Doll (Tsaveyo), late 19th ancestral homelands. These lands are sacred, as
century. First Mesa, Arizona. Wood, pigment fur,
Zuni tribal member Jim Enote points out: “The
cotton, horsehair, feather, shell, horn, stone, 13 ×
7 ½ × 6 ½ in. (33 × 19.1 × 16.5 cm). Brooklyn Zuni people go to the Bears Ears area to pay
Museum, Museum Expedition 1905, Museum respect to our ancestors in a way that is not very
Collection Fund, 05.588.7193
different from people going to a cemetery and
paying respect to their family members.”19 The
Bears Ears National Monument was established by President Barack Obama in 2016. However,
the Trump administration reduced its size by 85 percent in order to permit uranium mining and
gas and oil drilling. After winning the 2020 presidential election, President Joseph Biden

18

Lorraine Loomis, “Being Frank: Tribes Release Habitat Recovery Strategy,” Qyuuqs News, December 10, 2018, 18,
accessed November 2019, https://issuu.com/swinomish/docs/20181207_qyuuqs_dec_vol52no10_onlin.

19

Jim Enote, “What the Bears Ears Monument Means to a Native American,” interview by Hannah Nordhaus, National
Geographic, October 18, 2018, accessed November 8, 2019, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/
article/bears-ears-monument-native-americans-photography.
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appointed Deb Haaland Secretary of the Interior, the ﬁrst Native American cabinet secretary in
U.S. history. He then signed an executive order restoring Bears Ears National Monument to its
original boundaries. This is great news for the region’s Native people, but it also shows how
fragile environmental protections can be.
U.S. Mississippi River Valley
While scientists agree that climate change is occurring today at an unprecedented rate, they also
acknowledge its longer history across the planet. An engraved conch-shell cup (see image 8)
depicting a falcon warrior is displayed as an example of pre-Contact climate change, when a
Little Ice Age brought cooler temperatures and extreme weather to the Mississippi River valley.
The Spiro Mounds archaeological site in presentday eastern Oklahoma was the western outpost of a series
of prosperous cultures, referred to as Mississippian, that
developed in the riverine regions of the Midwest and
Southeast between 900 and 1650. In one of Spiro’s
mounds, a hollow chamber was found containing
thousands of ceremonial objects, including this cup,
which had been brought there from all over the
Mississippian world. The ritual chamber and most of the
offerings date to about 1400, when the Little Ice Age was
causing disturbing environmental changes, and suggests
that the ceremonial chamber was an attempt to summon a
new age of stability and abundance.20
More recently in 2016, the Isle de Jean Charles
Band of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw Tribe along the
Mississippi delta became the first Native community to
receive federal funding to support its resettlement as a
result of climate change.21 A combination of rising sea
levels, land subsidence, and oil and gas development
has forced the community from its homeland and
required that its members adapt their ways of life to a
Image 8. Mississippian Engraved Conch new region. Chantel Comardelle, Tribal Executive
Shell, 1200–1500. Spiro Mound, Le Flore
Secretary of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw Tribe, has
County, Oklahoma. Conch shell, pigment,
10 7⁄16 × 7 ½ × 5 ½ in. (26.5 × 19.1 × 14 cm). been very involved in the resettlement efforts, as well as
in the preservation of the tribe’s ancestral homeland and
Brooklyn Museum, By exchange, 60.53.1
cultural traditions.22
This section also features a multi-media work by Chitimacha-Choctaw artist Sarah
Sense who references her family’s history in Louisiana, Oklahoma, Germany, and Ireland.
Entitled Remember 5, Sense literally weaves together her Chitimacha, Choctaw, and German
heritage, as well as her personal connection to Ireland through her marriage and the birth of her
ﬁrst child there. The photographs of the German city of Krefeld in the 1920s, and waterfalls in
Germany’s Black Forest and Connemara, Ireland are cut into strips like the river cane use to
weave Chitimacha baskets in Louisiana, and are woven together in traditional basket patterns.

20

Dorian J. Burnette et al., “Climate Change, Ritual Practice, and Weather Deities at Spiro,” in Recovering Ancient Spiro:
Native American Art, Ritual, and Cosmic Renewal, ed. Eric D. Singleton and F. Kent Reilly (Oklahoma City: National
Cowboy & Western Heritage Museum, 2020), 77–89.

21

Oliver Milman, “‘We’re Moving to Higher Ground:’ America’s Era of Climate Mass Migration is Here,” Guardian,
September 24, 2018, accessed November 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/24/
americas-era-of-climate-mass-migration-is-here.

22

Doug Herman, “Prospects Are Looking Up for This Gulf Coast Tribe Relocating to Higher Ground,” Smithsonian
Magazine, August 9, 2018, accessed November 2019, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/
prospects-are-looking-gulf-coast-tribe-relocating-higher-ground-180969932/.
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Sense’s work refers to the complexity of Native American identity today and its connection to
place both physical and spiritual. In her artist statement she writes:
Drawing inspiration from archival and photographic research,
these photo-weavings explore the vast colonial history in
Native North America, the English colonizing Ireland, and
family histories of immigration. Research into stories of
contact, exploration, war, and their effects on contemporary
Native life and the environment, bring into question
colonization’s role in climate change. Physically combining
images by weaving ancestral basket patterns into archival
documents and photographs reclaims space and Native
perspectives, telling visual stories of Indigenous peoples, while
staying grounded in Chitimacha and Choctaw basket- weaving
techniques. The German archives combined with my landscape
photography, brings relevance to past-present narratives,
conceptually closing a gap between historical and
contemporary time. This unique rhythm spins an historical
web, entangling realities of war and genocide while honoring
ancestral basket weaving.23
Mexico and Guatemala
Between about 1200 B.C.E. and the Spanish conquest in 1521 C.E., cultures such as the
Olmec, Maya, and Aztec established sophisticated civilizations with monumental art and
architecture, large-scale farming, and complex calendars and writing systems. For three
millennia, these Indigenous cultures
residing primarily in present-day Mexico
and Guatemala created a vast array of
aesthetic, functional, and sacred objects.
These works testify to the diversity of
artistic expression in the region and
demonstrate a close interplay between the
spiritual and natural worlds. The
Museum’s iconic Huastec Life-Death
sculpture of a male figure carrying a
human skeleton on his back epitomizes this
interplay. The primary figure is the Aztec
wind god Ehecatl-Quetzalcoatl, who
created humankind and is identified by his
J-shaped ear pendants. The skeletal figure
with a protruding heart represents death
and wears a collar and a skirt decorated
w i t h s e m i c i rc u l a r m o t i f s t h a t w e re
associated with the sun and the planet
Venus. Venus, the morning star, was
another important god, thought to pull the
sun across the sky and down into the
Image 9. Maya Cylindrical Vessel, circa 550-950. underworld. Densely patterned designs on
Mexico or Guatemala. Ceramic, pigment, 6 ¼ × 5 ⅜ ×
the primary figure’s arms and legs include
5 ⅜ in. (15.9 × 13.7 × 13.7 cm). Brooklyn Museum,
ears of corn, which are symbolically related
Gift in memory of Frederic Zeller, 1998.176.2
to agriculture, fertility, life, and death.

23

Sarah Sense, email to author, April 12, 2021.
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The use of animal imagery to support divine rule and convey military strength was
common among the ancient Maya and Aztecs (see image 9). For example, a procession of
warriors wearing animal headdresses on a Maya polychrome vessel likely represents a
warrior society, and an Aztec sculpture of a reclining jaguar is associated with power and
physical strength. Among the Aztecs, the highest-ranking warriors were called jaguar
warriors.
In the five hundred years since Spain’s deadly conquest and occupation of Indigenous
lands, the region’s climate and ecosystems have experienced significant changes that have
destabilized and displaced Native populations. During the 1500s and 1600s, increased
fluctuations in temperature and rainfall disrupted agricultural traditions and indigenous
biodiversity, the effects of which continue to shape the natural environments of Mexico and
Guatemala. Today, Indigenous activists are advocating for environmental reform and
Indigenous land rights in an attempt to overcome the violent actions against people and the
environment perpetrated by logging and mining profiteers. Xiye Bastida, an Otomi-Toltec
climate justice activist, is among the strongest and most effective voices in the youth climate
movement. Born in Mexico, she relocated to New York City with her family in 2015 after
extreme flooding hit their hometown of San Pedro Tultepec in central Mexico, following three
years of drought.24 Her personal experience with how climate change is causing extreme
weather and human displacement has been a catalyst for her vocal activism in the Indigenous
environmental justice movement:
People say the climate movement started decades ago, but I see it
as indigenous people protecting Earth thousands of years ago. We
need to bring [this philosophy] back and weave it into today’s
society. People are here not to take over life, but to take care of it. It
shouldn’t be “we the people.” It should be “we the planet.”25
Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia
In this section, ancient objects from present-day Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia represent
different cultures, but they all share a common belief in the connection between the natural and
spiritual worlds. Representations of rulers, warriors, shamans, and supernatural beings incorporate
attributes of animals that were revered for their strength and other natural abilities. A carved stone
warrior figure from Costa Rica wears a fearsome
crocodile mask, which an actual warrior may have
done in the hope of ascribing the animal’s power onto
himself. An elaborately painted effigy vessel, also from
Costa Rica, depicts the jaguar as a fearsome and
powerful predator with blood-stained jaws,
pronounced incisors, and a crouching stance. Its
anthropomorphic pose with hands on knees is
common in depictions of shamans, who have the
power to transform themselves into animals in order to
move between the natural and supernatural realms.
Certain qualities of the materials also reinforce
this connection to the natural world, whether it is the
hardness of volcanic stone or the lustrous appearance Image 10. Coclé Plaque with Crocodile Deity,
circa 700-900. Sitio Conte, Coclé Province,
of gold, which is associated with the sun and Native Panama. Gold, 8 ½ × 9 in. (21.6 × 22.9 cm).
cosmologies. A circular gold plaque from Sitio Conte, Brooklyn Museum, Museum Expedition
Panama (see image 10), depicts the crocodile god, who 1931, Museum Collection Fund, 33.448.12

24

Marlene Cimens, “Meet Kick-Ass Teen Climate Activist Xiye Bastida,” New Mexico In Depth, September 20, 2019,
accessed November 2019, https://nmindepth.com/2019/09/20/meet-kick-ass-teen-climate-activist-xiye-bastida/.
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Quoted in ibid.
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was likely associated with strength, the sun, water, and fertility. The ruling elite probably wore
prestige ornaments such as this to appropriate the power of crocodiles, ﬁerce predators
connected to the underworld for their ability to ﬂoat on water and drown their prey.
While the thrust of urban development in Costa Rica, relative to other Central American
countries, has been balanced by a concern for conservation and environmental sustainability,
Indigenous people in Panama and Colombia have had to combat the spread of logging and
other causes of deforestation, which are displacing communities from their ancestral
homelands. In addition, the increasing frequency of hurricanes and other extreme-weather
events threatens the well-being of Indigenous communities. Environmental activists from these
regions—though dealing with different national and political circumstances—are speaking out,
such as Angelica Ortiz, a Wayúu human rights activist and General Secretary of the Fuerza de
Mujeres Wayúu in Colombia who is leading protests against an open-pit coal mine. Ortiz writes,
“For us, territory is everything. It is life, water and food. It is where we pass on our culture and
knowledge. It is where we practice our spirituality.”26
Climate Change and Immigration
Central America is one the most vulnerable regions to climate change, particularly the region
referred to as the “Northern Triangle,” encompassing Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador;27 so, a didactic panel on climate caused immigration is included adjacent to this
section. Although discussions of immigration usually focus on its economic and political
dimensions, the climate crisis is increasingly recognized as a significant factor in human
displacement. As the climate change intensifies, migration is escalating across the globe, and
it is estimated that by the year 2050, two hundred million climate refugees will have left their
homelands in search of new places to live.28 In recent years, in the Northern Triangle region,
floods along the coastlines and droughts in the highlands have multiplied, affecting rural
communities and their economies and forcing millions of people to immigrate. The recent
flood of Honduran refugees at the U.S border is the result of two hurricanes in 2020 that
buried their communities, homes, and farmlands in mud.29
Furthermore, the migratory response to climate change in Central America is
transforming an ancient relationship between people and the land. The difﬁculty of growing
corn today, for example—a crop that has been cultivated in the region for millennia—has
signiﬁcant repercussions that are not only economic but also religious and cultural.
Peru
Climate change is also affecting agriculture in Peru, a country that has been home to
Indigenous peoples for millennia. Approximately two thousand Indigenous cultures
flourished along the Andes Mountains and the nearby coasts prior to European colonization.
The works in this section, dating from 500 B.C.E. to 1000 C.E., were made by artists from
several different cultures that inhabited the area known today as Peru and demonstrate some
26

Angelica Ortiz, “Indigenous Resistance: My Fight For Land and Life in Colombia,” Ecologist, October 12, 2017,
accessed November 2019, https://theecologist.org/2017/oct/12/indigenous-resistance-my-ﬁght-land-and-lifecolombia.

27

Lauren Markham, “How Climate Change is Pushing Central American Migrants to the US,” Guardian, April 6, 2019,
accessed November 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/06/us-mexico-immigrationclimate-change-migration.

28

Oli Brown, “Migration and Climate Change,” IOM Migration Research Series, no. 31 (Geneva: International
Organization for Migration, 2008), 11. This report also discusses the debated terms “climate refugees” and “climate
migrants” to identify people displaced by climate change. The author proposes “forced climate migrant” instead
because “it conveys a reasonably accurate impression of the increasing phenomenon of non-voluntary population
displacement likely as the impacts of climate change grow and accumulate.” See Brown, Migration and Climate
Change, 13–15.

29

John Burnett, “Why People Are Fleeing Honduras For The U.S.: ‘All That’s Left Here Is Misery,’” National Public Radio,
May 10, 2021, accessed May 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/05/10/994065661/why-people-are-ﬂeeinghonduras-for-the-u-s-all-thats-left-here-is-misery.
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of the ways those cultures reflected on and communicated with the natural and supernatural
worlds. A Chavin ceramic figurine of a priest holding a branch of San Pedro cactus references
the use of the hallucinogenic plant to achieve
ecstatic states and communicate with the spirit
world. A Paracas funerary mask and Nasca
polychrome vessel illustrate the importance of
agriculture in one of the driest regions of the
world with depictions of supernatural fertility
beings decorated with undulating snakes (a water
symbol) and agricultural plants (see image 11).
In the ecologically diverse country of Peru,
which includes mountainous highlands, an arid
coastline, and vast tropical areas of the Amazon
rain forest, the effects of climate change manifest
themselves in myriad interconnected ways. For
example, melting glaciers in the high Andes not
only affect rainfall but also lead to an increase in
floods and landslides toward the coast. This
complex situation is exacerbated by companies’
attempts to seize land from farmers and herders
for the purposes of oil and gas extraction, illegal
Image 11. Nasca Double-Spout Vessel, logging, and gold mining. However, in the face of
325-440. South Coast, Peru. Ceramic,
t h e s e t h re a t s , a s w e l l a s p ro p o s e d l a n d
pigments, 6 × 7 × 7 in. (15.2 × 17.8 × 17.8 cm).
Brooklyn Museum, Gift of the Ernest Erickson d e v e l o p m e n t s , I n d i g e n o u s r e s i s t a n c e i s
managing to stall such projects and bring
Foundation, Inc., 86.224.15
attention to their effects on Native people such
as the David vs. Goliath case of Máxima Acuña, a subsistence farmer in the northern
Peruvian highlands of Cajamarca who battled the gold mining company Newmont for
three years and won.30
In the Quechua language, the word Pacha or Earth encompasses space, place, time,
and the universe, a worldview of interrelationships among human beings and material and
spiritual worlds that continues to inform much Indigenous activism and advocacy for
environmental stewardship.31 According to Gladis Vila Pihue, a Quechua environmental
and human rights activist who is a Women and Youth Program Coordinator at the
Asociación de Productos Ecológicos:
Many communities already feel the effects [of climate
change]—glaciers are reducing, in the Andes water is less
accessible and we have to walk further to get it … We used
to plant chakra next to the river, now we cannot. Our food
security has already been impacted.
For centuries our
people have relied on mother nature to dictate when to plant
and when to harvest, and now there is no regularity for us to
rely on.32

30

See Máxima Acuña, “2016 Goldman Environmental Prize Recipient South and Central America,” 2016, accessed
November 13, 2019, https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/maxima-acuna/.

31

Catherine J. Allen describes Pacha (Earth) as a generalized entity who is everywhere, and is personiﬁed as female,
which is why Quechua and Aymara people address her as Pacha Mama or Mother Earth. See Catherine J. Allen, The
Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean Community, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1988), 44–45.
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Sophie Yeo and Gitika Bhardwaj, “Climate Change is Killing Our Mother Earth,” Cultural Survival, July 31, 2014,
accessed November 13, 2019, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/climate-change-killing-our-mother-earth.
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Brazil, Colombia, and Peru
The last thematic section focuses on the Amazonian region of South America. Prior to European
colonization in the 1500s, several million Indigenous people inhabited the Amazon rain forest,
which spreads across a sizable area of South America, including parts of present-day Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. About two thousand different tribes once inhabited the
ecologically diverse region within the current borders of Brazil alone, and more than three
hundred survive today.33 However, since the 1500s, European-introduced diseases have
decimated the Indigenous population, and many tribes have been displaced from their ancestral
homelands and relocated to reserves. These reserves are crucial to the survival of Indigenous
people. It is where they plant crops, including manioc, açaí palm, pumpkins, and beans. The
forests provide fruits, animals, building materials, medicinal plants, pigments for body paints,
and materials for the musical instruments used in rituals. The rivers provide life-sustaining
water, ﬁsh, and transportation. For Indigenous people, the land is who they are, and their songs,
dances and ceremonies are an expression of gratitude that reinforces this interdependent
relationship.34
Works illustrate how Indigenous people utilized tropical forest resources to produce
exquisite ornaments. The Ka’apor of Brazil are known for their spectacular featherwork, which
they call putir (literally, “ﬂowers”), such as a man’s visor and bird-bone ﬂute necklace worn
during naming ceremonies for children. The tradition of wearing feathered ornaments relates
directly to the legendary exploits of the Ka’apor cultural hero Maíra, who created the world and
all its peoples and wears the same regalia. Through stories about Maíra, children learn the
symbolism of the ornaments. Blue feathers, for example, evoke the sky and the supernatural
beings who live there.35 A dazzling Shuar or Achuar toucan-feather headband from
southeastern Ecuador or northern Peru, exempliﬁes the headdresses still worn by male political
leaders as symbols of their authority, and the iridescent green, beetle-wing cover earrings made
by the neighboring Aguaruna people in Peru would have shimmered in the sunlight when
worn for special occasions.
Indigenous reserves are supposed to be protected areas according to Brazil’s
Constitution, which prohibits non-Indigenous people from carrying out logging or any other
economic activity inside them.36 However, these territories are being invaded by illegal loggers,
miners, cattle ranchers and commercial farmers, who wish to extract whatever they can from
the environment. The river ecosystems are also under threat by dams, deforestation,
overﬁshing, and pollution caused by mining and commercial agriculture. The damage that
extractive industries are having on the environment are adversely affecting Indigenous
communities. As Sônia Guajajara, a Guajajara environmental and Indigenous-rights activist
says:
When you destroy nature and foreclose the indigenous
peoples’ way of life, preventing them from exercising their
culture, you are killing them. If we do not follow our culture,
our tradition, we are no longer people.37

33

“The Brazilian Indians,” Survival International (webpage), last updated March 5, 2019, accessed November 10, 2019,
https://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/brazilian.
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César Muñoz Acebes, “Rainforest Maﬁas: How Violence and Impunity Fuel Deforestation in Brazil’s Amazon,”
(Human Rights Watch, September 17, 2019), accessed October 28, 2019, 47, https://www.hrw.org/report/
2019/09/17/rainforest-maﬁas/how-violence-and-impunity-fuel-deforestation-brazils-amazon#6288.
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Tom Hill and Richard W. Hill Sr., eds., Creation’s Journey: Native American Identity and Belief (Washington: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1994), 60.
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The Constitution also speciﬁes that Indigenous people in the reserve should use resources only in a sustainable way.
See Acebes, Rainforest Maﬁas, 26–27.
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Alan Azeved, “Sonia Guajajara: Reconnecting People with the Planet,” Believe Earth, n.d., accessed November 2019,
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Take Action Panel
The exhibition ends with a Take Action panel that provides visitors with a variety of
suggestions as to how they can make a difference, from recycling at home to supporting
environmental organizations and Indigenous communities. These suggestions were compiled
by Brooklyn Museum staff with contributions from local environmental and community-based
organizations such as GrowNYC.org, which promotes food access and agriculture,
conservation, green space, and education programs; the Indigenous Environmental Network,
an environmental and economic justice organization; and the American Indian Community
House, which serves the needs of Native people living in New York City. Visitors are prompted
to take a photo of the suggestion that inspires them, act on it, and share their experience on
social media with the hashtag BKMArtsoftheAmericas.
Responses to the Exhibition
The Museum closed shortly after the exhibition opened due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the
exhibition still received attention in several publications due to the topic.38 The exhibition also
attracted attention from two international environmental organizations. The National Resource
Defense Council (NRDC) highlighted the show in its newsletter,39 and Extinction Rebellion
reached out to the author asking if the Brooklyn Museum would host a screening of the 2020
documentary Necessity: Oil, Water, and Climate Resistance. Screened in front of the Museum on a
cold night in March 2021, the ﬁlm documents the critical role of Anishinaabe women in the
Indigenous-led struggle to protect ancestral homelands in Minnesota from the construction of a
one-thousand-mile pipeline.
Constructed by the Canadian oil company Enbridge, the Line 3 pipeline began
operation on October 1, 2021, and carries 760,000 barrels of tar sands oil a day from Edmonton,
Alberta, to Superior, Wisconsin. The pipeline replaces the original Line 3, which was built in the
1960s and was so badly corroded and cracked that the line’s carrying capacity had been cut in
half. The new pipeline does not follow the same route, but runs through untouched lands,
waters, and wetlands of wild rice that is a traditional food of the Anishinaabe people. Crossing
under 200 bodies of water, the pipeline violates Indigenous sovereignty and treaty rights, and
poses an existential threat to the survival of Anishinaabe communities who depend upon the
rivers and lakes for clean drinking water.40 Lawsuits to stop its operation continue, and
Indigenous water protectors still occupy protest camps in order to monitor pipeline leaks with
drones and thermal imaging equipment that can also capture images of drilling-ﬂuid spills and
other groundwater contamination that occurred during the pipeline’s construction.41 One of the

38

James D. Balestrieri, “Climate In Crisis: Environmental Change In The Indigenous Americas,” Antiques and The Arts
Weekly, November 10, 2020, accessed February 23, 2022, https://www.antiquesandthearts.com/climate-in-crisisenvironmental-change-in-the-indigenous-americas/; Akiva Blander, “Brooklyn Museum Presents a ‘Hemispheric’
Survey of Indigenous Responses to Climate Change,” Metropolis Magazine, March 20, 2020, accessed February 23,
2022, https://metropolismag.com/viewpoints/brooklyn-museum-climate-in-crisis/; William S. Smith, “Climate
Change Has Already Transformed Everything About Contemporary Art,” Art in America, May 4, 2020, accessed
February 23, 2020, https://www.artnews.com/art-in-america/features/climate-change-contemporaryart-1202685626/; “Brooklyn Museum, Climate in Crisis: Environmental Change in the Indigenous Americas,”
Artforum International Magazine, artguide, accessed February 23, 2022, https://www.artforum.com/artguide/
brooklyn-museum-698/climate-in-crisis-environmental-change-in-the-indigenous-americas-182043.
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Line 3 protest leaders, Taysha Martineau is also co-founder of two organizations dedicated to
locating missing and murdered Indigenous women, who are particularly vulnerable when
extractive industry projects such as the Enbridge Line 3 pipeline establish camps of transient
male workers near Indigenous communities.42
Another public program in November 2021 involved the participation of about a dozen
students from the City University of New York Language Immersion Program at
Queensborough Community College, who gave pop-up talks in the Climate in Crisis exhibition.
Entitled “Earth Love: Climate Change, Literacy, and the Immigrant Experience,” the program
was the culminating event of a six-week English-language class in which college-bound
immigrant students discussed works of art related to climate change, inspired by the exhibition,
and then produced altered books—recycled books that incorporate the participants’ texts,
photographs, paintings, and more—while further developing their English skills. Over one
hundred museum visitors attended the program and listened to the students share their books
and their stories.43
Conclusion
The late museologist Stephen Weil asks, “If our museums are not being operated with the
ultimate goal of improving the quality of people’s lives, on what [other] basis might we possibly
ask for public support?”44 This question is at the heart of the Brooklyn Museum’s mission: “To
create inspiring encounters with art that expand the ways we see ourselves, the world and its
possibilities.”45 By using the power and beauty of objects to connect with visitors, while
conveying an important message, Climate and Crisis is hopefully encouraging courageous
conversations and actions to combat climate change and make the world a better and a safer
place for everyone.
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Introduction
All human beings experience an intrinsic need to feed ourselves and our families, and this
need preoccupies vast amounts of psychological and physical energy. The anxiety of this need
not being met, either for ourselves or for our loved ones, leaves us open to fear and
manipulation.1 Bad actors can use the resource scarcity—or even the threat of resource
scarcity—as a propaganda tool for identity-based scapegoating and violence. The genocidal
process hinges on the consistent, persuasive “othering” of an identity group.2 This process
can be linked to a population’s access to, or control over, their food, water, and energy
resources.
This manufacturing of “otherness” can spiral into genocidal violence, pressing on
pressure points between neighbors in an entangled system. As Raphaël Lemkin wrote, “like
all social phenomena, [genocide] represents a complex synthesis of a diversity of factors.”3
The gray areas presented by these entangled systems refutes the linear narrative of what
“causes” genocide, and turns attention to the structural conditions that allow a genocide to
take place. The effects of climate change are putting pressures on groups in different ways
than ever before, including the known stress of resource scarcity. As individual and collective
identities shift to adapt in these complex systems, new stressors may emerge.
While there is a rich literature on the relationship between conflict and the effects of
climate change, there is notably less research focused on the specific threat of mass atrocities.
This is due in part to the aforementioned non-linear relationship between the effects of
climate change and the perpetration of mass murder. But, it is also due in part to the
persistent concept of the Holocaust as a paradigm that scholars use to understand what
factors contribute to the structural conditions that bring about genocide. This paper argues
that natural resource scarcity—not just the quest for abundance—was a factor in Nazi
decision making and influenced specific propaganda against the Jews. This argument lays the
groundwork for food, water, and energy scarcity to be included in the narrative of the
Holocaust and integrated into the genocide studies and prevention discourse. If we accept
that natural resource scarcity has a place in the genocide prevention conversation, we must
then acknowledge that climate change does as well, inasmuch as the changing climate will
cause new and less predictable strains on food, water, and energy resources on both micro
and macro levels worldwide.
This paper analyzes the Holocaust trajectory through the lens of food, water, and
energy resource scarcity, or the threat thereof. To that end, this paper is divided into four
sections which will highlight the complex relationship between natural resource scarcity and
identity-based violence. The first section will examine the Hunger Plan and Hitler’s concept
of Lebensraum. This is followed by an outline of the ways in which the Nazi party discussed and
understood food, food security, and the memory of World War I, as well as how that rhetoric
influenced their policies and propaganda. These narratives built the framework of targeted
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antisemitic propaganda that hyperbolized tropes of Jewish parasitism.4 Finally, a discussion of
how these policies and centralization of resources culminated in the “Holocaust by Bullets” in
Eastern Europe and the eventual industrialized massacres in gas chambers. This paper will
conclude with a discussion on the connection between genocide and resource scarcity, and its
relevance to genocide prevention in the future.
“The Solution Lay, in Hitler’s Mind, in the Conquest of Lebensraum.”5
One of the fundamental struggles Hitler focused on was control over people and over nature.
He wrote: “Nature knows no political boundaries. She places life forms on this globe and then
sets them free in a play for power.”6 In his mind, and in the priorities set forth by the Nazi party,
the power he speaks of here includes control over the food, water, and energy resources
necessary to not just survive, but to live in plenty.
Two things were necessary for Germany to obtain the Nazis’ idealized Lebensraum:
colonies to supplement the home farmlands, and fewer “unworthy” mouths to feed. Herbert
Backe, under the direction of Hermann Göring, crafted The Hunger Plan as a solution to these
twin goals. The Hunger Plan outlined a progressive attack on Soviet-held land, followed by the
total export of food and other natural resources from those territories back to central Germany.
In implementing the Hunger Plan, Lizzie Collingham argues, “[s]ecuring the nation’s food
supply was a primary war aim in Hitler’s mind and the central importance of food was clear to
the men charged with planned and executing [Operation] Barbarossa.”7 The plan intended for
the total starvation of the native population of the occupied territories, including the expulsion
of Jews and other “useless eaters” to Siberia, where they could work in forced labor camps until
they starved or were killed.
The Nazis were able to build a narrative of the necessity of resource security through
their use of propaganda against the Jews, as well as a heightened internal and external focus on
food security. Resource scarcity in Nazi Germany, both real and threatened, contributed to the
choices and timelines of mass murder. The Final Solution was an answer to not only the Nazi’s
Jewish problem, but a solution to their food security issues as well.
The Nazis used many different kinds of rhetoric and propaganda to build the narrative
of the necessity of resource security for the future of the German people. They built a sense of
community based on racial purity, with clear legal and structural guidelines as to who is and
who is not one of the Volk. They utilized and hyperbolized well-known prejudices against
Jewish people, and entrenched narratives of Jewish parasitism as a threat to current and future
German lives. At all levels of leadership up to and including Hitler himself, the Nazis centered
their own anxieties around resource scarcity. In embracing this as a framework for their
propaganda, the Nazi leadership sought to exploit the biological fear of starvation and
scapegoat the Jewish population and other “useless eaters” for taking more than their fair share.
This rhetoric led to its intentional conclusion: “It had always been the intention of Hitler
and a section of the National Socialist leadership to eradicate the Jews from Europe. The food
crisis of 1941–1942 provided an ostensibly rational reason as to why the crime of murder should
be committed. The Jews could not be allowed to continue eating the precious food which the
German workers deserved: they must die on order to free up desperately needed food
supplies.”8
Hitler’s position is made clear in a speech given on May 30, 1942 to a group of junior
military ofﬁcers. The speech was not public, but it was transcribed by one of his secretaries,
Henry Picker. The speech itself was focused on why Germany had needed to go back to war.
The speech, translated in part, reads:
4
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But there is another problem that determines our ﬁght. Every
people comes to this earth with a mandate to multiply, and every
nation ﬁnds a limit in the restraint of the Lebensraum. Here the
eternal conﬂict arises, if one wants to let a people grow, as is
given by nature and intended by providence, then also with
this people the Lebensraum must increase. If one does not want
to expand the Lebensraum, then one day a disproportion must
arise between the number of people that is constantly growing
and the Lebensraum that remains the same. That is the purpose
of nature: it compels man to ﬁght, just like every other being in
the world. It is a battle for food, a battle for the basis for life, for
the raw materials the earth offers, the natural resources that lie
under the soil and the fruits that it offers to the one who
cultivates it [emphasis original].9
In the pursuit of the “circular idea” of Lebensraum, Hitler and the Nazis waged a war
focused on both access to natural resources and the growth of the racially pure people to
populate and colonize that territory.
“Arbeit, Freiheit, und Brot! Vote National-Socialism!”10
After surviving the starving years of World War I and then the economically depressed Weimar
Republic, Hitler envisioned and campaigned on a well-fed Germany. But Hitler did not just
view survival as scraping together the means of life. With enough territory, Germany could
maintain their level of industry and still have enough food for Germans to thrive. With
sufﬁcient farmland and labor, the Nazis believed Germany could become a self-sufﬁcient
autarkic economy.11
The years of starvation in a blockaded Germany during World War I was fresh in the
minds of the German public, a trauma precisely deployed in the 1920s and 1930s election
propaganda by the National Socialist German Workers’ Party. During the Allied blockade of
Germany, the German Board of Public Health claimed that up to 763,000 German civilians had
died from either starvation or disease caused by the blockade, from its beginning in 1914
through the end of December 1918.12 While many scholars consider this number high, the
constructed truth that hundreds of thousands of Germans had perished from starvation became
part of the collective German-chosen trauma after World War I. Collingham dubs this the
“spectre” that loomed over Nazi decision making processes and rhetoric. She writes, “[i]n 1936
food shortages and rising food prices combined with fears of inﬂation and a rise in
unemployment to revive the spectre of November 1918. Hitler demanded that a brake should be
put on food prices. Two years later he warned that unless sufﬁcient foreign exchange was made
available to overcome food shortages the regime would face a crisis.”13
Food was forefront in the minds of the Nazi leadership, and several plans were
established in an effort to make sure that Germany never starved again. One of the main
slogans for early Nazi elections was for the triumvirate of needs that the Nazis would provide:
“Work, Freedom, Bread.”14 The Nazi party was concerned about food not only for their long-
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term goals of a thriving, racial pure Volk, but more immediately for the war morale of their
soldiers and those on the home front throughout the war. There was mercurial support for
another all-encompassing war in Europe, and food security was of pivotal importance. At a
meeting of troop commanders in February 1939—a full seven months before German invaded
Poland—Hitler declared the “food question” the most urgent problem facing Germany.15 As
early as 1941, the intelligence agency Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS found that food was
omnipresent on the minds of Germans at home. Collingham points out, “The Sicherheitsdienst
claimed that across the whole of Germany a psychosis of anxiety had developed over food…As
[workers] stood queue for food outside the shops they had been heard to declare that ‘the
alleged victories in the East were less important that the necessity of getting enough to eat.’”16
The Nazi leadership was highly tuned into this worry, with Göring reiterating to a meeting of
Nazi leaders, including Hitler, “at military headquarters on 16 July 1941, ‘we must ﬁrst of all
think about the securing of our sustenance, everything else can be dealt with only much
later.’”17
This focus on food and resource scarcity seeped into the public narrative through
propaganda. As part of the Nazi energy conservation campaign, a 1940 poster features a rotund,
mustachioed ﬁgure in black; the “coal thief,” was the symbol of wasted energy resources. The
text on the poster reads: “There he is again! He’s always hungry, his sack is always empty.
Greedily he skulks around the oven, the stove or the dripping faucet. He sneaks around the
window, the door or the light switch, stealing what he can. He steals from armaments
production, which needs every little bit he steals from city and countryside. Catch him! Read
more about it in the newspapers.”18
In a similar vein, a poster advertising for the 1934/1935 Winter Aid Program
(Winterhilfswerk des Deutschen Volkes) solicits donations for members of the Volk in need. The
poster shows an older woman and young child, presumably a grandmother and grandchild,
dressed in dark, potentially mourning attire. They stand looking toward the open arms of a
male ﬁgure just out of sight. The text translates as: “No one shall go hungry! No one shall be
cold!”19 The subtext of this poster, beyond the charitable spirit of the Nazi party, is that those
who are unable to keep themselves in food or fuel are the minority. Additionally, being part of
the Volksgemeinschaft means looking after others when they are in need, with the unstated
assumption that should you need aid, your community will be there for you as well.
Nazi propagandists had to walk a ﬁne line between admitting that resources were
scarce in the Third Reich and inducing panic and hoarding. Active starvation was not the only
fear. It is worth acknowledging that resource scarcity is inherently gendered, as women are
socialized in almost all societies to be responsible for food, water, and energy resources, and
Nazi propaganda reﬂects that reality. Collingham notes:
It is not necessary to be actually starving in order for food
deprivation to cause psychological and physical distress.
Women used up a great deal of mental and physical energy
thinking up different ways of preparing the same foods and
producing something edible out of a few potatoes and lentils,
with barely any fat or green vegetables. Long and tiring food
queues, anxiety about where the next meal would come from,
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interspersed with periods of real deprivation, all combined to
cause great stress.20
Another poster addresses just the kind of panic-induced hoarding the Nazis sought to
avoid, euphemistically called “hamstering.” One such poster features an anthropomorphized
hamster dressed as a frowning housewife clutching two baskets of wine, food, yarn, oil, and a
box of new gloves tucked under her arm; the text on the poster reads, “Hamster—Shame on
you!” Narratives of scarce resources, especially in the urban setting, required a response from
the Nazi government. An excerpt from Deutsches Ärzteblatt, a leading medical journal in
Germany at the time, exempliﬁed the Nazi ideology on food: “The person who, in his greed for
food, eats—or rather gobbles—more meat and fats than he needs for the maintenance of his
health and working capacity, robs other racial comrades of these foods; he is a debauchee and a
traitor to his land and his country.”21 The population needed to be constantly reassured that
their experiences during World War I would not be repeated, and that the current war and its
seemingly bottomless need for resources was worth the investment. As an answer to that
question, the Nazi Party Central Propaganda Directorate published this “Slogan of the Week”
on March 11, 1940: “Why we ﬁght—for our children’s bread!!” This propaganda frames the war
not as a drain on the nation’s resources, but rather as a necessary ﬁght for the bread to feed
current and future generations of Germans.
“He did not have to Earn his Bread by the Sweat of his Brow.”22
The Nazis preyed on people’s worst fears about not being able to feed their families—a tangible
fear in living memory—and intertwined these promises of stability with hateful ideology. It is
within the context of this struggle for food and resource security that antisemitic rhetoric grew
and adapted. One of the oldest antisemitic tropes is that Jews cannot and will not work the land,
but rather only work in business, trade, and ﬁnance. Even during the lean times of the Weimar
Republic, depression in the 1930s, and wartime rationing in Germany, Jews are consistently
discussed and portrayed visually as fat and well-dressed, in direct contradiction to the
everyday German experiencing food and clothing restrictions. In a 1935 brochure titled “Advice
for Nazi Speakers on Anti-Semitic Propaganda,” this same narrative is repeated:
Although the Jew was not inclined toward agricultural labor,
he was at the forefront of commerce in agricultural products.
The exchanges for grain, ﬂour, fat, and eggs, to name only a
few, were his ﬁeld of endeavor. He sat in the breadbasket of the
German people, and could set the prices higher or lower,
depending on what pleased him. In the fall when the farmer
was forced to sell his harvest to get the money he needed,
prices had to be low. But when over the course of winter and
spring these important products were needed by the public,
prices had to rise. The difference between the buying and
selling prices was the “proﬁt” of the Jewish grain trader, or
whatever he was called.23
In this propaganda piece, the Jew is not just useless in feeding the country, he is
speciﬁcally proﬁting off of others’ labor and restricting the market by inﬂating prices. In a
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country that is hyper-focused on resources, centering narratives of farmers and peasants, and
looking to reduce the population of “useless eaters,” this trope is more than dangerous, it is
deadly.
This rhetoric is presented in educational forums as well. In a lecture entitled “Jewry, Its
Blood-based Essence in Past and Future” presented by the Leader of the SS in the Chief of the
Race and Settlement Main Ofﬁce, a surviving slide shows a stereotypical caricature of a Jewish
man with a full beard, payot, and a large, hooked nose, wearing a dark robe and kippah. He is
alone on a road scowling at a ﬁeld of tall corn, while an inset photograph shows a clamoring
crowd, presumably a stock exchange. The text on the image reads: “The Rabbi: ‘Your ears [of
corn] sway back and forth, but business is preferable to you!’”24 While this propaganda is not
subtle in its messaging, there is a subtext; not only do Jews not contribute to feeding their
community and they would rather manipulate the ﬁnancial system than get their hands dirty.
This narrative is further bolstered by dehumanizing images depicting Jews as myriad of
different animals feeding off the Germans or the German economy. The ideological narrative is
clear; we must go on the offensive against this group before they starve us and our families and
destroy our way of life. To this end, “useless” eaters of all kinds had to be removed from both
the gene pool and the food chain. While the term “useless eater” applied to people of mental
and physical disabilities, as well as Slavs and Jews, the key deﬁning factor was that they were
people who did not conform to the Nazi’s pseudo-scientiﬁc ideal of purity. Jews were chief
among the “useless eaters,” often labeled as greedy and depicted as parasites or vermin. In one
Nazi handbook published under the title, “Anti-Semitic Instruction for Girls,” this narrative is
explained:
The word parasite comes from the Greek and in German is
translated as “fellow eater” or parasite (Schmarotzer). In nature,
nearly all plants get the nourishment they need from the soil.
However, there are plants that suck what they need from other
plants. That slows the growth of their hosts and may even kill
them… Plants and animals defend themselves with all their
resources against these foreign bodies. A person, too, has an
instinctive aversion to all types of parasites. The body
constantly makes defensive substances. That was known for a
long time, yet people did not believe the Führer’s warnings.
They found it uncomfortable to hear the Führer say: “If a
person believes he can get along with a parasite, it is like a tree
attempting to form a beneﬁcial alliance with mistletoe.” The
Jew works to inﬁltrate the peoples and hollow them out. He
ﬁghts with his weapons, with lies and slander, poison and
discord. He intensiﬁes the battle until the bloody extermination
of his hated foes. We say today, and forever more: The Jew is
the parasite among the peoples! He can as a parasite attack
individuals, whole people, indeed, all of humanity. Examples
from nature teach us, however, that we have no other choice
than to combat him with all our strength and ﬁnally to destroy
him.25
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This handbook utilizes both science and pseudo-science in order to build a case for this
interpretation of Jewish people. The handbook directly incites violence against the Jewish
parasites not because they are evil per say, but as a reasonable defense of innocent lives. This
rhetoric was used proliﬁcally in both public and private speeches, lectures, and articles, as well
as in propaganda posters.
“…as long as no German Collapses from Hunger.’”26
While the potential for food scarcity was far from the only reason to perpetrate the mass murder
of European Jewry, there is evidence that the Holocaust was part of the larger overall plan for
German Lebensraum. Food rationing in Germany was announced on August 28, 1939, just four
days prior to the invasion of Poland.27 While the variety and amount of foods were reduced for
all Germans, Jews were allowed only a fraction of the food. As early as 1940, Herbert Backe
expressed anxiety to the Nazi leadership that they would need to increase the speed of
territorial occupation or there would be food shortages in central Germany. While Backe’s
Hunger Plan was ultimately sparsely and inconsistently implemented in the Nazi occupied
territories, the thought processes, fears, and rhetoric that led to the Hunger Plan still inﬂuenced
Nazi policy. Through the lean winter of 1941–1942 and the following spring, food security
became a pressing issue for morale of both German soldiers and Germans on the home front,
especially in urban areas. The announcement of yet another ration cut on the home front in
March 1942 resulted in the lowest public opinion survey since the beginning of the war.28
Collingham points out, “[i]t was in the spring of 1942 that Hitler pronounced that other peoples
should starve before the Germans. The response within his administration was to begin a
campaign to exterminate ‘useless eaters,’ primarily the Polish Jews…The food problem
provided his administration with a rationale for beginning a process of systematic
extermination.”29
The Nazi administration believed that eliminating the Jews, especially from the Soviet
territories, would help their cause in several ways. Foremost, it would remove millions of
mouths from the food chain and free up those meals, which they expected to be transported
back to Germany. Secondly, they believed that the Jews were controlling the black market for
food and supplies, and their removal would cause the black market to crumble and dissipate.
Thirdly, as a result of the previous two actions, the local populations in these areas would feel
more charitably towards their German occupiers, and their relationship would improve.30 The
antisemitic assumption that Jews “controlled the market” would come back to plague the Nazis
when the black market for food and resources decidedly did not fall apart after the removal of
the Jews.
Many of the decisions to murder the Jews in certain areas were made locally in order to
solve a regional resource scarcity problem. Local decisions to solve local supply “problems” by
mass murder could appear rational, albeit deeply inhuman.31 That there was a real supply
problem—or at least a perceived supply problem—played a role in justifying which Jews from
where would die, and when. The nexus of ideational and material factors made the decision to
engage in mass murder a matter of local politics within the larger system of antisemitic dogma.
Approximately 800,000 Jews were shot and killed in localized massacres in Eastern Europe
starting in August 1941, due at least in part by the need to free up resources for soldiers on the
ground in occupied Soviet territory. Collingham writes:
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The department of the quartermaster, food ofﬁcers and the
military commanders and commandants on the ground
responded to the problem of the disappointing food deliveries
by calling for the removal of Jewish mouths from the Soviet
food chain…The quartermaster-general reported that he
expected the annihilation of the Jews in central Lithuania,
which began in August [1941], to signiﬁcantly alleviate the
food supply problems for Army Group North. In August,
15,000 Jews were shot in Polesje (Prijetsümpfe). Task forces
moved through northern Ukraine massacring the inhabitants of
village after village. Particular targets were Jews in urban areas
where the civilian population was starving, especially in the
towns were food and shelter were a problem for troops moving
up to the front. In Kharkov 15,000 Jews were murdered that
winter, supposedly in order to alleviate the food situation. In
Kiev the German authorities claimed that a systemic massacre
of Jews on 29 and 30 September had alleviated the food and
housing conditions for the rest of the civilian population. By
the end of 1941 there were virtually no Jews left in eastern
Belorussia, northern and eastern Ukraine or other parts of the
occupied Soviet Union.32
As progress slowed on the Eastern front and supply lines became less robust and less
reliable, there were only two paths forward: everyone eats less, or fewer people eat. After over a
decade of antisemitic propaganda, scapegoating, and rhetoric of parasitism on their resources,
the Jews were an easy population to target for elimination. Even prior to the industrialization of
the murder of the European Jews, their status as “useless eaters” made them the ﬁrst target for
the mobile killing squads.
By the summer of 1942, food had become central to the decision-making process for the
Nazi regime: “The ‘critical food situation and its dismal future prospects’ was constantly used
as a justiﬁcation for the course the war followed. While Nazi ideology provided the ‘valuerational’ reason for murder, the food situation in Germany and the occupied Soviet Union
provided the economic rationale.”33 That summer, the Nazi leadership in occupied territories
further restricted the rations that local populations could keep of their harvest in order send
more to German troops and the German home front. When confronted by local leaders that
their own people would not have enough food if they continued to extract resources at this rate,
“Göring declared: ‘it makes no difference to me in this connection if you say that your people
will starve. Let them do so, as long as no German collapses from hunger.’”34
By 1943, the large gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau became operational, allowing
industrialization of the killing process and massive liquidation of smaller camps and ghettos.35
Even more food could hypothetically be extracted from the occupied territories, on both the
Eastern and Western fronts, now that the Jews were being removed en masse. Even so, the
Nazis continued to enforce strict rationing and conﬁscation of all harvests in occupied Europe in
order to feed the people and soldiers of Germany. Only after the Nazis’ disastrous defeat at
Stalingrad in early 1943, and the German militarily move from the offensive to the defensive,
that the Hunger Plan and the ideal of Lebensraum took a secondary position to the twin goals of
eliminating the Jews and winning the war.
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Natural Resource Scarcity and the Genocidal Continuum
As evidenced by this analysis of Nazi rhetoric and decision-making, the realty or threat of food,
water, and energy scarcity can be manipulated to scapegoat and target a speciﬁc identity-group.
Though the debate about the existence of climate change and humankind’s participation in it
are outside the scope of this article, the scholarship is clear about the future of our climate. The
effects of climate change will, and already have, created new and signiﬁcant resource scarcity.
The cascading effects of climate change, in addition to its overall unpredictability, make the
threat of resource scarcity feel as tangible a danger. Climate change does not linearly cause
genocide; but, “it will certainly create conditions and mind-sets conducive to the development
of intergroup hostility, tension, and violent conﬂict.”36 In addition to other potential triggers for
mass atrocities, the effects of climate change are putting new or different strains on networks of
societal pressure points.
As the climate changes, populations’ ability to anticipate food and water availability,
including agricultural growth cycles, may be heavily impacted. Droughts, poor rainy seasons,
and inconsistent water access contribute to issues of economic instability that compound
feelings of unpredictability and insecurity.37 The powerful combination of ideology and tangible
resource supply issues opens the door for bad actors to prey on religious, ethnic, and racial
biases and fears. Localized massacres, like those seen across Eastern Europe in 1941, could be
just the beginning as resources are strained in one town or region, and then another. Growing
violent extremism, as seen now across the Sahel, provides both ample cover and concrete threat
for these actors to appeal for offensive rather than defensive tactics. In this way, groups that had
previously lived harmoniously with their neighbors may ﬁnd themselves suddenly in
competition for formerly abundant resources.
Resource scarcity is not the only problem raised by climate change. When disastrous
weather events increase in intensity and frequency, so do refugee ﬂows and the potential for
conﬂict over basic needs, which in turn have the potential to destabilize neighboring states and
regions. The presence of refugees and internally displaced persons, especially those displaced to
areas of differing ethnic or religious identities, are a well-known conﬂict indicator.38
Conditions in urban areas, though more resilient to the daily ﬂuctuations of climate
change, are forecasted to deteriorate quickly in the face of natural disasters or extreme food and
water shortages due to the fragility of water and energy grids. But even barring catastrophic
weather events, urban structures and the needs of an urban population are vastly different from
the needs of people living in rural settings. Sites of informal housing, or slums, are increasing as
more people leave the countryside seeking opportunity or relief. This growing population often
does not have access to water, food, or energy resources in their immediate area. Sewage and
rainwater runoff do not have a local treatment plant, nor a way for the ﬂuid to travel there, and
garbage is often burned because there is no formal waste removal service. This informal
housing means many youth lack an address to use for public schooling, compounding a host of
known mass atrocity triggers. In addition to making public services like police and ﬁre
protection harder to access, urban sprawl breaks down traditional community and kinship
ties.39
The Holocaust looms large in the established norms of what is and is not a factor in the
potential for genocide. This article points to the ways in which food, water, and energy
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resources were an inﬂuential part of the Holocaust narrative and propaganda. Antisemitic
ideology, in combination with the collective memory of resource scarcity, and the very real
threat of future scarcity, all combined to facilitate the Nazi perpetration of mass atrocity. By
integrating this resource lens into analysis of the Holocaust, we can broaden the discourse
around genocide prevention in the face of the growing potential for real and threatened
resource scarcity due to climate change. Genocide prevention scholars and policymakers must
acknowledge the compounding effects of climate change and their role in the potential for
genocide, or risk missing the triggers for future mass atrocities.
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The volume Postgenocide: Interdisciplinary Reﬂections on the Effects of Genocide, edited by
Klejda Mulaj, presents a new and compelling analytical framework for theorizing genocide and
its aftermath across twelve chapters and three interconnected and interdisciplinary themes.
These include the law and responsibility for genocide; genocide denial and remembrance; and
postgenocide identities, memory, and IR/reconciliation. This framework offers a path-breaking
lens through which to critically rethink the study of genocide and address a number of
overarching questions, including: how the law contributes to advancing genocide knowledge;
how victim groups transition to a postgenocide society; what are the uses of genocide in a
postgenocide setting; and how are genocide narratives constructed and contested in
postgenocide settings.
Particularly since the 1990s, there has been a steady stream of literature seeking to
understand and analyse genocide. Nevertheless, genocide has remained an event that “is
difﬁcult to understand, analyse, or write about.”1 A signiﬁcant portion of disciplinary studies on
genocide engage only in limited ways with genocide studies in other disciplines. Moreover, in
the available literature, the study of genocide is frequently undertaken in instrumental, strategic
terms, often overlooking the capacity of genocidal violence for being a generative force, a
mechanism for change.2
This volume makes an important contribution to knowledge of genocide scholarship by
offering an approach for studying genocide and mass violence more broadly by expanding and
complementing some of the existing approaches in terms of “processes, actors, identities, and
narratives involved.”3 The chapters in this volume employ a variety of methodologies from law,
politics, history, and social sciences.
So what is “postgenocide”? The volume opens with a very thorough introduction that
unpacks the key themes of postgenocide, which is then further ﬂeshed out in the contributing
chapters. The postgenocide framework focuses on the transitional character of the events and
processes in the aftermath of genocide. It implies a preoccupation with the transitional and
pervasive impact of genocide on society. In line with an interconnected understanding of past
and future, the “post” in postgenocide thus signiﬁes not only the era “after” genocide came to
an end, but the entire period following the inception of genocide. In that sense, Mulaj notes that
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postgenocide shares a certain afﬁnity with “postcolonial.”4 Both frameworks are concerned with
the continued effects of these phenomena in shaping realities of the affected societies.
While the postgenocide framework is primarily concerned with genocide—as the
“crime of crimes”5—it also lends itself to studying mass violence more broadly. Mulaj
acknowledges the controversies in international case law around establishing “hierarchies of
crimes” with genocide at the apex.6 She notes that these controversies remain “active spaces”
where the effects of genocide are felt in the postgenocide era.7 These controversies also show
that there cannot always be a sharp divide between interpretations of genocide and crimes
against humanity,8 particularly in face of contemporary challenges.
In this review, I only have the space to focus on some of the issues arising from the
stimulating chapters of this volume. In light of my background as an international lawyer, my
attention was particularly drawn to the theme of how the law contributes to advancing
genocide knowledge.
The four chapters in Part 1 deal, inter alia, with the role of law in genocide. In his
chapter, Kevin Aquilina explores the challenges of criminalizing State responsibility for
genocide.9 The author develops a cogent argument for State criminal responsibility for
genocide.10 He argues that the perpetration of genocide is often a crime of State, necessitating
State support. As such, it “should not sufﬁce to punish only a handful of responsible leaders
and state ofﬁcials.”11 As the author also notes, however, the idea of State criminal responsibility
was rejected by the International Law Commission in the drafting of the Articles on State
Responsibility, and later by other international courts.12 Nevertheless, the author provides
compelling reasons for why this debate should be pursued and for holding “genocidal states
liable not only for a civil wrongful act of genocide but, more importantly, for state criminal
responsibility for genocide.”13
Several other chapters in this part shine a light on the strengths and deﬁciencies of law
as an instrument in the toolkit of postgenocide responses. Christopher Soler’s chapter, for
instance, focuses on justice for genocide by international(-ized) courts and tribunals. The author
argues that international(-ized) prosecutions in response to genocide are “indispensable as a
means to achieving (criminal) justice.”14 This thought-provoking chapter also raises several key
questions related to the appropriate legal avenues for dealing with genocide and its aftermath.
For instance, although with the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals, international criminal
law was driven by the ideal of international(-ized) justice, in contemporary practice, many
limitations and critiques of this model have become apparent.15 In some cases, moreover, the
focus of energy and resources on international(-ized) justice has undermined the pursuit of
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more localized forms of justice favoured by victim-survivors.16 Soler recognises the move away
from such international(-ized) justice, in recent practice, to alternative models of justice, such as
“quasi-prosecutorial” models.17 A contemporary challenge of this broader justice architecture
will be developing a system that draws on the individual strengths of these diverse fora and
allows greater dialogue between their constituencies.
The three chapters in Part 2 focus on the theme of denial and remembrance. In her
chapter, Tatevik Mnatsakanyan uses the Armenian genocide as a case study for exploring what
genocide and genocide denial may reveal about “sovereignty,” “subjectivity,” and “violence.”18
The author argues that denials were not only integral to, but generative of, the Armenian
genocide and this insight has implications for understanding postgenocide denials, and for
beginning to imagine alternatives to current politics. Mnatsakanyan’s chapter offers a
compelling example of how the postgenocide framework may be used to understand the
continuing effects of genocide in postgenocide settings.
Similarly, in her chapter on (mis-)constructions of genocide in Bosnia, Mulaj argues that
Bosnia's political community is fractured both from without, due to the denial of genocide by
the Serbs, and from within, due to failures to fully recognize and address the needs of women
and men violated in the course of genocide and war, and children born of rape.19 The
contestation of genocide narratives has implications for the cohesion of the postgenocide
community in Bosnia. Both Mnatsakanyan’s and Mulaj’s chapters raise important questions
about how victim groups transition to a postgenocide society and the role (or absence) of courts
in shrinking “the space for denial” of genocide.20
Finally, the four chapters in Part 3 contribute to discourses of postgenocide identities,
memories, and (ir-)reconciliation. In her chapter on personal objects from genocide in galleries,
museums, and archives (GAMs), Martine Louise Hawkes demonstrates how the multiple
purposes that the one same object will serve in its relationship to genocide are highly dependent
on the narrative that a GAM wishes to transmit.21 The author distinguishes between affective
objects or stolen/disconnected objects, and argues that in these objects we ﬁnd an unbroken
connection that has the potential to shift how we can share stories that help us understand the
past.22
In her chapter on rhetorical versus substantive reconciliation in the context of the
cultural genocide in Canada, Maureen S. Hiebert posits that while reconciliation in Canada is
under way, it has mainly focused on rhetorical/ideational issues while largely leaving aside or
taking only very preliminary steps to address substantive/material policies that would produce
a more thorough-going form of reconciliation.23 In her incisive analysis, the author argues that
the Canadian government and many non-indigenous Canadians have elected to pursue the
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rhetorical aspects of postgenocide reconciliation because they are largely win-win.24 Both
Hawkes’ and Hiebert’s chapters employ the postgenocide frame to emphasize how, inter alia,
genocide narratives are constructed and contested in postgenocide settings.
In the concluding chapter, Christopher P. Davey explores agendas for further
postgenocide research, examining how contemporary challenges, at the intersection of the
geopolitical order, warlordism, climate change and resource exploitation, might be framed
through the lens of postgenocide.25 His is not an attempt to broadly redeﬁne genocide, but to
emphasize an approach to studying the above challenges using a framework that takes
seriously cross-cutting views on genocide. In so doing, however, Davey also brings to the fore
the challenges of trying to ground contemporary challenges, such as climate violence, into legal
deﬁnitions of genocide and conventional understandings of agency and intent. The author
posits that “[a] crucial point has now also been reached where analysis need not be limited to
the legalistic identiﬁcation of intent at the expense of robust analysis of genocidal processes and
their ensuing legal and other effects.”26 This assessment would indicate that, particularly in face
of contemporary challenges, there cannot always be a sharp divide between interpretations of
genocide and of mass violence more broadly.
In summary, this is an excellent volume that makes an innovative and valuable
contribution to the available literature on genocide studies. In view of its interdisciplinary
nature, it is well-suited for upper-undergraduate and graduate students in law, history,
transitional justice and social sciences, as well as for policy-makers and others wishing to gain
deeper knowledge about the nature and effects of genocidal violence. The postgenocide
framework offers an interdisciplinary lens through which to frame violent processes, which can
help leverage a qualitative and reﬂective approach to the problems of assessing such violence in
the contemporary age.27 One of the standout strengths of this framework is that it encourages
sustained dialogue between restrictive legal understandings of genocide, and broader
conceptualisations of the concept. As the drivers of postgenocide violence become more global
and diffuse in nature, the importance of such sustained dialogue between concerned scholars
and policymakers should not be underestimated.
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It is a truth universally acknowledged that the Holocaust is the quintessential template
against which every episode of mass violence or atrocity is relativised. Anyaduba’s The
Postcolonial African Genocide Novel begins with this premise, unravelling accounts in novels of
genocide in postcolonial Africa that reproduce motifs from the Holocaust.1 It is noteworthy that
attempts are now being made to reorient the norm-alising gaze beyond its ambit.2
For what it’s worth, the narrative of genocide in Nigeria contains an allusion that just as
Israel was a geographical solution to the Holocaust, so was the emergence of Biafra for the
targeted Igbo.3 Moreover, the ﬁrst published novel on the genocide in Nigeria contains a
character (Lord Haw Haw, a civilian administrator for the enemy faction) closely resembling the
World War II propagandist, William Joyce.4 But tropes and symbols pegged to the Holocaust
extend beyond scholarly work to instances of memorialisation: The Genocide Museum of
Phnom Penh, once known as Tuol Sleng or S-21, was initially structured and organised by Mai
Lam who based his aesthetic choices on Nazi concentration camps.5 Anyaduba claims that
representational practices drawn from the Holocaust make it seem like “a kind of Lacanian
Master-Signiﬁer” and this imposition is violent and irrational, borrowing the words of Slavoj
Zizek.6 The overall effect of this domination, or “asymmetrical encounter,” is that it manipulates
representations of African genocides so that essence and complexity are renegotiated and
eventually distorted.
Anyaduba views Holocaust prototyping as having merits and faults. The Holocaust
“provides those working with and on African genocides with a ready-made descriptive
toolbox,” making “African genocides visible globally” while it “has also in various ways
overdetermined the explanatory and moral-evaluative frames through with African genocides
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See Alexander Laban Hinton, It Can Happen Here: White Power and the Rising Threat of Genocide in the US (New York:
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have been conceived of and responded to in art as well as in the ‘real’ world.”7 Moreover,
aligning the narrative of genocides in Africa to the Holocaust suggests a reductive exercise,
whereby a complex history pre and post war is set aside for a “story of evil that is removed
from the larger ﬂow of history.”8
Anyaduba’s focus, promising an evaluation of African genocide literature, bears
primarily on mass killings of the Igbo in in Nigeria (1966–1970) and the Tutsi in Rwanda (1990–
1994). Anyaduba justiﬁes it. He refers to the wealth of literary work concerning atrocity events
in these two countries and where “the word ‘genocide’ was mobilised for a range of political,
socio-cultural, and legal purposes,”9 having for a long while been blurred out in the catch-all
phrase “civil war.”10 Additionally, the Rwandan experience of genocide now provides a
blueprint within the African context for subsequent representations of mass violence and
atrocity.11 The main texts of Anyaduba’s focus are Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Half of a Yellow
Sun12 and Wole Soyinka’s Season of Anomy13 in the context of Nigeria, and Boubacar Boris Diop’s
Murambi, the Book of Bones,14 as well as Gil Courtemanche’s A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali15 for
Rwanda. These choices, he says, were based on the abundance of critical attention they received
and the quality of their representation of genocide.16
In Chapter 1, Anyaduba lays the groundwork to evaluate the connections (or the lack
thereof) of postcolonial genocides in Africa and colonial rule, as many scholars such as
Mahmood Mamdani have concluded that atrocities originate from the “politicisation of the
social identities of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa in Rwanda during the colonial times.”17 Anyaduba
veers towards the opinion that genocide took place long before the arrival of the colonials so
that identifying its origins in racism or colonial politics would be objectionable. Genocide in
Africa is not a modern phenomenon. Anyaduba draws on a study of Raphael Lemkin’s early
ideas on labelling an episode of mass violence as genocide, distinguishing between
killing targeted individuals, and them as a group.18 A distinction between structural and
intentional genocide is also underscored, with Anyaduba pointing out the difﬁculty in
associating the latter to the African context.19 The former, with its take on the effects of social
organisations and ideologies, seems a better ﬁt. Structuralists’ admittance of intended as well as
unintended causes validates the experience of genocide in Africa.20
In Chapter 2, Anyaduba deepens the schism between colonial violence and genocide,
claiming that the former invigorated the African aspiration for independence, nationalism, and
the nation-state; the latter drew people away.21 More crucially, this chapter lays out the idea of
entanglement where Anyaduba speaks of the Holocaust blueprint as having been moulded by
more than the Holocaust experience itself. Drawing on Michael Rothberg’s Multidirectional
Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization that challenges the “linear
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trajectory of memorialisation,”22 Anyaduba says that memories of the Holocaust were entangled
with other atrocities, such as the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) against colonial
France. By this, in line with the overarching idea of the book, it is suggested that the narrative of
the Nigerian genocide possesses characteristics over and above the entangled template of the
Holocaust. Moreover, it is highlighted that the Holocaust permeates the narrative of other
genocides in both, direct and indirect, intended and unintended ways. Citing Rwandese Gilbert
Gatore’s Le Passé devant Soi,23 Anyaduba points out that the author confessed documenting his
experience of the civil war after reading The Diary of Anne Frank,24 handed to him by his father
on the eve of the war.25
Chapters 3 and 4 explore the tropes that Anyaduba singles out as pervasive in
postcolonial genocide African literature; these being “a descent into hell, the portrayal of
victims as objects of ritual sacriﬁce, and writing about genocide as duty to a moral
imperative.”26 Chapter 5 lays out the fallacy in the gendered genocide novel of authors such as
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (Half of a Yellow Sun)27 and Buchi Emecheta (Destination Biafra)28
where the focus of genocide, its instigators and victims, is subsumed by the feminist project.
Anyaduba goes on to show how such novels “racialise masculinity,”29 laying the blame of
genocide on the hubristic masculinity of Igbo men, deﬂecting attention from the real culprits,
the Nigerian military government,30 a feat by all means ironical since the genocide in Nigeria
was ethnically driven, and not based on class nor gender. From a scholarly perspective, as
opposed to a creative and reader-driven one, the choice of centering the storyline along a
romantic account also dilutes the signiﬁcance of bringing the Nigerian genocide to the fore.
In Chapter 6, the charge of deﬂecting attention from genocide is also applied to
Courtemanche’s A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali, where this time violence is sexualised.31 Issues of
positionality arise as Anyaduba analyses whether a white man ought to write about the sexual
life of a black woman. The chapter discusses the meaning of “pornography” in terms of the
double-victimisation of genocide victims and survivors, since their pain and suffering are
turned into commodities.32 A close reading of Courtemanche’s novel reveals the multifarious
ways in which death, sex, pleasure, and violence are juxtaposed into what is best described as
pornographic representations of genocide.
This study, ﬁercely loyal to the boundaries it initially marks out, also deserves to be
commended for its references across a wealth of sources and disciplines beyond the subject of
genocide studies.
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Jody M. Prescott joins a burgeoning body of literature seeking to analyze how military
organizations operationalize a Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, and how climate
change impacts both military missions and the lives of civilians living in conﬂict zones. In
Armed Conﬂict, Women and Climate Change, Prescott investigates concepts of sex and gender in
armed conﬂict, the link between climate change and armed conﬂict, and argues that military
organizations should use the lenses of both overlapping issues when planning their missions,
particularly when considering civilian harm and protection.
The book’s intended audience includes those studying and researching international
relations, development and security, sustainability issues, gender studies, and international law.
I also recommend that students and scholars of military doctrine, and, in particular, The United
States Army Training and Doctrine Command and others responsible for writing doctrine, as
well as scholars of international humanitarian law and war studies, consider the concepts and
issues Prescott discusses. Prescott, a lecturer teaching environmental law at the University of
Vermont, recognizes the relationship between realistic, relevant training and doctrine, and has
seen the need for it ﬁrst-hand through his experience as a military attorney in the U.S. Army for
twenty-ﬁve years. Working internationally in operational, training, and educational settings in
the military, Prescott had the opportunity to see how necessary recognizing the links between
armed conﬂict, the experiences of women and girls, and climate change is to mission success,
and how those links can be operationally signiﬁcant.
The main goal of the book is to argue for military doctrine that incorporates a gender
perspective, with a focus on the lives of women and girl civilians, while also taking into
consideration the impact of climate change in conﬂict situations. Prescott argues that when
gender analyses are conducted properly by military organizations, they should look at how host
nations distribute power between women and men, how different genders contribute to
operational security, and how a gender mix can be used to engage with actors on the ground.
He also recognizes that unless these analyses consider the relationship between women and
climate change, they will miss critical information that provides a clearer picture of the
operational environment. Consequently, if these analyses are conducted and incorporated, he
contends that they will lead to more effective missions and ostensibly peace and stability in the
region.
It has been more than two decades since the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1325, which afﬁrms the role of women in violence prevention and in building peace
and calls on parties to conﬂict to take special measures in preventing gender-based violence
during conﬂict. With UNSCR 1325 in mind, the book’s nine chapters are divided into three
sections with the first three chapters in section one discussing the intersection of armed
conﬂict, women, and climate change. Chapter 1 focuses on armed conﬂict and gender through
the lens of UNSCR 1325. Using short case studies as examples, this chapter calls for a gendered
Shelly Clay-Robison. “Book Review: Armed Conflict, Women and Climate Change.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 16,
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analysis in conﬂict situations if the goals are peace and human security. Chapter 2 moves to
address gender and climate change and how they impact military operations, while
emphasizing that unless these issues are considered and discussed speciﬁcally in doctrine and
strategy, important resources may be allocated elsewhere. Chapter 3 examines the relationship
between climate change and armed conﬂict and makes a case for why military organizations
should consider their own impact on environmental degradation, and how climate change adds
complexity to conﬂict situations, which is particularly hard on women and girls.
Prescott recognizes that doctrine inﬂuences norms within the military, thus the second
set of chapters centers around a comparative analysis of documents, training, and strategies
used by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Kingdom (U.K.), the United
States (U.S.), and Australia, and their relationships to a gender perspective and climate change.
While Prescott recognizes that NATO’s strategic-level documents have progressed over time
with regards to gender and recognition of climate change and will likely inﬂuence member
states and their norms, there is still uneven progress. When it comes to doctrine and non-kinetic
operations, or those that do not require security, and also in kinetic doctrine, there is little
consideration of gender. Australia, however, is praised as embracing the goals of UNSCR 1325
and embedding gender considerations into review criteria of new doctrine. The chapters
focused on the U.K. and the U.S. note that while some gender considerations have been made in
civilian protection operations, hierarchically across the structures there is much need for shifting
norms related to gender and to considering how gender is relevant to a mission. The size and
complexity of these organizations should be taken into consideration, and Prescott points to
where doctrine and strategy can continue to improve in this area.
The ﬁnal chapters consider gender and international humanitarian law (IHL) and the
ways that IHL reinforces traditional ideas of gender. These ideas are based in “male-normative”
concepts that inherently see women and girls as victims, and while IHL provides protection to
women, these patriarchal notions are steeped in inequality. Prescott ends by outlining pragmatic
ways military organizations can incorporate gender considerations and the effects of climate
change into doctrine and strategy. He warns that not doing so risks not only the mission, but
also their political leaders and civil societies.
The book’s cover image is a striking stock photo taken in rural India and depicts three
women in bright pink and red clothing with four girl children at their feet. The women stand at
what is presumably a well, set in a stark and sandy landscape and they look to be drawing
water up in metal cisterns by hand. Due to its nature as a stock photograph, it is unclear
whether the women gave consent for their image to be used as representative of the effects of
climate change and armed conﬂict. For those readers who use this book in a classroom setting,
the cover image provides an excellent topic for group discussions on these issues. When using
stock photographs of people in violent conﬂict situations, particularly those in the Global South,
it creates a visualization for the reader of who the victims of conﬂict and climate change are and
what they look like. This can reinforce a problematic Global North worldview, which does not
always include local perspectives and considerations of the conﬂict situation. While it was likely
not the intention of the author or photographer, an image like this can also reinforce colonial
stereotypes of people in the Global South, imagining them as constant victims in need to saving.
This type of thought exercise would also beneﬁt military personnel and students of war. How
do we visualize and conceive of civilians in conﬂict areas, and how might those conceptions
perpetuate violence?
While Prescott warns against drawing hasty conclusions regarding how military
organizations approach an issue based on its doctrine alone, he uses case studies illustrating
where doctrine and strategy have effectively used gender considerations and also where they
need to be better incorporated. He is also critical of military institutions themselves when it
comes to normative approaches to gender and to the low percentages of women on active duty.
While this book digs down into why militaries do not consistently use gender and climate
change as lenses when writing doctrine and developing strategy, he uses the case studies to
show how norms and values can change. While it is not within the book’s objectives, a critical
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feminist analysis of strategy and doctrine is the next step needed to enhance the literature base
and inﬂuence doctrine and operations. Readers would also beneﬁt from a discussion on the
intersection of the three complex, but very intertwined main themes that can go beyond
“mission success.”
At the risk of being cynical, it is a tall order to hope that militaries will effectively write
and incorporate gender-mainstreaming into their doctrines and procedures. Their roots lie in
hierarchical, patriarchal paradigms that are still present in organizational norms and values and
these will be difﬁcult to dismantle and reimagine. However, if Prescott’s work is any indication
of shifting worldviews and different conceptions of operational success, there is much to hope
and work for. Recognizing the increased harm women and girls face during armed conﬂict and
under the stresses from climate change, connecting high level doctrine with lower-level
operations and actions on the ground, and promoting the goals of UNSCR 1325, are critical and
necessary steps in writing better and more holistic military doctrine and strategy.
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